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Аннотация  
Данная магистерская диссертация была написана в рамках общих положений 
основной программы Школы Международных Отношений СПбГУ в исследовании 
международных отношений. Объектом нашего исследования является сам текущий 
конфликт в нагорном Карабахе, и предметом данного исследования будут 
сосуществующие факторы гибридной войны в продолжающемся конфликте. К 
сожалению, конфликт за нагорный Карабах между Арменией и Азербайджаном все еще 
находится в политическом, дипломатическом, академическом и военном безысходных 
положениях.  
Больше 20 лет уже были сделаны различные попытки и проведены много научных 
исследований по поддержанию мира в данном конфликте, но тем не менее, каких-либо 
реальных признаков развития не было достигнуто. Основная цель нашего исследования 
состоит в том, чтобы показать необходимость и уязвимость этого региона для 
международных отношений и расскрыть старые и новые факторы “Гибридной Войны”, 
которые, в концепционных рамках современных международных отношений, понимаются 
и проводятся в довольно дифференцированных интерпретациях. 
Ключевые слова: Гибридная война, война биспилотниками, Армянский терроризм, 
поддельные новости, цифровая пропаганда, Нагорно-Карабахский конфликт; 
 
Abstract 
Description of the goal This Master thesis has been written within the general 
provisions of the SPbU School of International Relations’ 
main master program in International Relations Study. An 
object of our research is the current conflict in Nagorno-
Karabakh, and the coexisting factors of hybrid warfare in this 
conflict will be a subject of the current research.  
Unfortunately, the conflict for Nagorno-Karabakh 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan still is in political, 
diplomatic, academic and military stalemates. More than 20 
years various attempts have been already made and carried 
out a lot of scientific research on peacekeeping in this 
conflict, but nevertheless, has not been reached any real signs 
of development. The basic goal of our research is to reveal the 
necessity and vulnerability of this region for international 
relations and to unveil old and fresh factors of “Hybrid 
Warfare”, which, in a conceptual framework of the modern 
international relations, are understood and conducted in quite 
differentiated interpretations. 
Keywords Hybrid warfare, drone war, Armenian terrorism, fake news, 
digital propaganda, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict; 
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Introduction 
 
Today, it is a pretty implausible desire to find an authentic, internationally proven, 
unanimously adopted, and academically systemized definition of "war". Most of all 
contemporary studies on international conflicts are accompanied by the assiduous discourse of 
social world. As a result, we are inevitably being involved even in the social construction and 
perceptional interpretations of "war". In that way, my thesis will be binding with academic 
clarification on one of these constructions and interpretations of war that will be based on newly-
interpreted and very quickly-scattered "Hybrid Warfare" concept of XXIth century and its hidden 
role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Azerbaijan as a main 
economic power and the biggest country in South Caucasus has been almost more than 25 years 
existing under conflict with Armenia over its Nagorno-Karabakh region. Armenia as a land-
locked, economically and territorially smallest country of South Caucasus has been attesting to 
the drastic degradation for more than two decades. Unsurprisingly, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
and unremitting internal struggles for power and ruling of foreign policy tossed up this country 
closer to the verge of extinction. Unfortunately, the academic research on this conflict is still 
based on conservative assumptions of "war" and "conflictology" and there is an obvious 
scarcity of novel, theoretical and academically-refreshed studies. Nevertheless, if we are going to 
distinguishably look through contemporary facets and perceptions of "hybrid warfare", we will 
realize its old and new factors in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. This region is situated in the south-
west of the modern Republic of Azerbaijan and was partially occupied by illegal separatist 
regime directly/indirectly supported by the Republic of Armenia. My task is to make more fresh, 
independent and objective research over the nature of this conflict and to reveal unstudied 
categories of hybrid warfare’s factors in it.  
Respectively, each country has its own "National Security Doctrine" which are 
available even on the Internet and not surprise undergone permanent alterations up to these days. 
One of them, Azerbaijan has a centuries-long history of statehood and established the first-ever 
democratic Republic in the East in 1918. Azerbaijan has lost its state independence in 1920, and 
only after disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, could restore it.1 The official position of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh region and its future basically remained 
constant, it is still considered to be an illegal occupation and breaching of its state sovereignty 
                                                          
1 The title of the primary source - NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT OF THE REPUBLIC OF 
AZERBAIJAN // Approved by Instruction No. 2198 of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan on 23 May 
2007 // p.3 // URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/154917/Azerbaijan2007.pdf // Retrieved at 28.10.2017 
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and territorial integrity. But, sometimes, during peace-process negotiations organized by Minsk 
Group of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE MG), 
Azerbaijan has accepted the option of giving autonomy to Nagorno-Karabakh, similar to 
Nakhchivan's autonomy, just within its internationally recognized borders. For instance, on 22 
June 2011, the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan Ilham Aliyev by giving an interview to 
"Euronews" TV Channel in Brussels again made clear-cut the official position of one's 
government.2 He has underscored that first step en route peace and stability lay on the 
implementation of four resolutions (8223, 8534, 8745, 8846) of the UN Security Council adopted 
for immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied Nagorno-
Karabakh region and from seven surrounding districts. That is where in return, Azerbaijan has 
promised wide autonomy to people who are living and who were living, then internally displaced 
from Nagorno-Karabakh. It has been permanently stated that prosperity and future economic, 
cultural and demographical development of Nagorno-Karabakh might be constructed by 
aforementioned efforts and imperatives.7  Ultimately, Republic of Armenia neighboring with 
Azerbaijan has made similar attempts to be independent even in the beginning of XXIth century, 
but each countries' fate was probably diverting into the regaining of their independence within 
the collapse of Soviet Union. If we look up their historical and cultural background under the 
Soviet regime, we will stumble with permanent impediments that sometimes led to mass 
casualties. According to the "National Security Strategy" of Armenia, Azerbaijan is a basic 
source of threat to its National Security, territorial integrity and state sovereignty.8 Nowadays, 
Armenian foreign policy over Nagorno-Karabakh region is getting to be more complicated and at 
                                                          
2 Ilham Aliyev's interview to "Euronews" TV Channel in Brussels, 22 June 2011, 13:00 // URL: 
https://en.president.az/articles/2500 // Retrieved at 29.10.2017 
3 UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions // Resolution 822 adopted by the 
Security Council at its 3205th meeting, on 30 April 1993 // URL: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/822 // 
Retrieved at 29.10.2017 
4 UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions // Resolution 853 adopted by the 
Security Council at its 3259th meeting, on 29 July 1993 // URL: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/853 // Retrieved 
at 29.10.2017 
5 UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions // Resolution 874 adopted by the 
Security Council at its 3292nd meeting, on 14 October 1993 // URL: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/874 // 
Retrieved at 29.10.2017 
6 UNSCR Search engine for the United Nations Security Council Resolutions // Resolution 884 adopted by the 
Security Council at its 3313th meeting, on 12 November 1993 // URL: http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/doc/884 // 
Retrieved at 29.10.2017 
7 Baku is ready to grant Nagorno-Karabakh the widest autonomy possible within Azerbaijan borders. This is our 
final decision," Ziyafet Askerov was quoted as saying by the Azeri news agency APA. // URL: 
https://sputniknews.com/world/201607221043467831-nagorno-karabakh-azerbaijan-autonomy/ // Retrieved at 
29.10.2017 
8 The title of the primary source - REPUBLIC OF ARMENIA NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY // 
Approved at the session of National Security Council at the RA President office on January 26, 2007 // pp.3-4 // 
URL: http://www.mfa.am/u_files/file/doctrine/Doctrineeng.pdf  // Retrieved at 29.10.2017 
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some points too contradictory. For instance, an official position outlined by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia is quite apparent that Armenia accepts peace and 
consolidation only by participation of self-declared "Nagorno-Karabakh or the Artsakh 
Republic" in the post-war negotiations as well. It has been clearly documented that "Armenia 
believes that the improvement of the peace process efficiency is impossible without the full 
participation of the conflict party Nagorno-Karabakh in the negotiations." Armenia believes that 
the conflict settlement should be based on the following principles: 
a) Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement must be based on recognition of the Nagorno-
Karabakh people's right to self-determination; 
b) Nagorno-Karabakh should have uninterrupted land communication with Armenia, 
under the jurisdiction of the Armenian side; 
c) the security of Nagorno-Karabakh should be internationally guaranteed.9 
The latest contradictory is dealing with shadow-policy of Armenian National Committee 
of America within local political frictions. As an example, we can scrutinize the starting sentence 
of so-called Artsakh's history with abovementioned official statements. If hidden sponsors of 
Armenian diaspora who basically chooses its leaders and mostly directs one's country's future 
economic, political and social policies argue that "The Republic of Nagorno Karabakh (Artsakh) 
is an integral part of Armenia",10 how will we be able to make a definition of self-determination 
and participation in negotiations as a third independent part, even without referendum of consent 
of currently living and internally displaced population of Nagorno-Karabakh?! 
Generally speaking, in comparison with current Armenian leadership which is more 
intertwined with ambiguous participation in transition of political regime in so-called “Artsakh 
Republic” from parliamentary to the full presidential regime and its own opposite transition from 
presidential one to the parliamentary state, Azerbaijan is more opinionated and encouraged by 
one's military, economic and cultural power. And as a final point of brief comparative analysis, 
we can mention the blitzkrieg-war in April 2016 which was lasting four days and considered as 
the most prevailing violation of the armistice since 1994 that led to the confirmation of 
uselessness of ceasefire agreements with no date of expiration. Repercussions of these events in 
Armenia were the election of Karen Karapetyan as the prime minister of Armenia, Vigen 
Sarkisian as the Secretary of Defense on August 2016, both from the Nagorno-Karabakh region 
                                                          
9 The title of the source – “Nagorno-Karabakh issue: Position of Armenia on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” // 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Armenia // URL: http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh-issue/#a5 // 
Retrieved at 22.01.2018 
10 The title of the source – “The history of Artsakh” edited by Armenian National Committee of America // URL: 
https://anca.org/nagorno-karabakh-overview-2/ // Retrieved at 23.11.2017 
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and the Karabakh political spectrum and the plan for recognizing the independence of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region by the Armenian government in the National Assembly of Armenia 
without a final approval and without completely being ruled out of the agenda.11 For me, this is 
quite idiosyncratic how each country has become eligible to successfully use modern, mixed and 
non-linear methods of war, not only in real life but also within political, economic and cultural 
aspects. Though this fact is not a novelty, there were being emerged and updated quite new 
strategies, tactics and systematic changes that redirect and led the understanding of simple war in 
Nagorno-Karabakh to the more fresh and vitalized factors of Hybrid warfare. From the other 
standpoint, it requires very well-organized study over these factors and academic clarification 
upon the concept itself which might be surely associated with the current situation in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh. Reasonably speaking, we would split apart these factors into two categories: 
a) Old factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Talking more 
about strategical part of conflict, we must argue that the existence of permanent 
struggles using quite non-linear methods, between Azerbaijani and Armenian political 
elites, for getting endogenous and exogenous majority of power was a time-worn 
factor of hybrid warfare, even in the close period of Soviet collapse. This irregular 
strategy was backed by external supports and found its perspectives in such official 
documents as Section 907 of the United States Freedom Support Act. Another 
inactive factor must be associated with terrorism. Prior to full-scale war operations, 
complexed with using different irregular methods such as “patriotic volunteers and 
other paramilitary groups” without military insignia, in the tactical-operational level 
of war which became another auxiliary factor of hybrid warfare, there were atrocious 
terroristic attacks on civilians. Aftermath, it became a detonator of massive crimes 
and national hatreds between Armenians and Azerbaijanis; 
b) New factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: Nowadays, old 
struggles for power excellency has been converted into image-making game in the 
international diplomatic arena, saturated by repetitive and dormant meetings, 
negotiations, temporal agreements escorted by such external actors as OSCE MG and 
other international organizations, which are differing with one’s so-called “innovative 
principles” for alleged peaceful resolution of conflict. Indeed, current Azeri and 
Armenian power-based stamina is being consumed by those external actors in their 
                                                          
11 The title of the article – “Referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh Region 2.0” edited by IRAS – The Institute for Iran-
Eurasia Studies //  URL: http://www.iras.ir/en/iraneurasia.iren/doc/note/3076/referendum-in-nagorno-karabakh-
region-2-0 // Retrieved at 23.11.2017 
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own geopolitical games as well, and it entails the demolition of democratization and 
more secure governments in Azerbaijan and Armenia. This factor is still being 
consolidated by such legally invalid, internationally mistrusted, thematically distorted 
armistice as Bishkek Protocol signed on May 5, 1994, in Bishkek, the capital of 
Kyrgyzstan. It does conduce each leadership to use Nagorno-Karabakh conflict itself 
as a trigger of emergent mobilization and an alternative escape from domestic 
uprisings based on internal economic and social disorders. Therefore, it became quite 
a fresh factor of hybrid warfare where the conflict’s strategical part turned into the 
more complexed diplomatic fight in order to get the vast majority of international 
support. The lack of internationally guaranteed “peace treaty” that must be based on 
mutual interests and basic principles of international law is another new factor which 
paves a chiseled way to the most complexed hybrid war in the South-Caucasus 
region. Today, there is also another convert from old hybrid methods in the tactical-
operational level of conflict, whereas terrorism and unnamed paramilitary fighters 
were replaced with active digital state propagandas developing and differing by fake 
news, incessant arms race for deterrence, and innovative military technologies 
inculcating with various irregular methods, that have taken place in the last April 
2016 skirmish and denoted even a new battlespace of “drone wars”; 
To this end, it is obvious that deadlock here might be overcome by pure understanding of 
relationship between regime types and conflicts which are a lot more complex than is often 
argued in the literature, and that the Karabakh peace process has been undermined by the worst 
of two worlds: intense elite competition, but without the restraint and widened participation that 
democratisation could assure.12  
 
 
What is a "Hybrid Warfare"? Different interpretations of existing data 
 
It is quite conspicuous that modern discussions upon local military policies and their 
intrusion into the body of international relations are getting rapidly enhanced. For the first blush, 
there is an inevitable issue on the road of our research upon enshrouded linkage between "Hybrid 
                                                          
12 The title of the article – “Regimes and peace processes: Democratic (non)development in Armenia and Azerbaijan 
and its impact on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict” edited by Nina Caspersen // Department of Politics, Philosophy 
and Religion, Lancaster University, United Kingdom // URL: 
https://is.muni.cz/el/1423/podzim2013/MVZ208/um/43679843/Caspersen.pdf  // Retrieved at 24.11.2017 
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Warfare" concept and its ever-upgrading components in an unstable Nagorno-Karabakh region 
of the Azerbaijan Republic which has been attesting to many distinguished historical events for 
more than 20 years. Undoubtedly, this research will contribute to the academic disclosure on 
how the concept of hybrid warfare is often too narrowly concentrated on a conflict's "kinetic" 
facets and had not been paid its tribute on such new and ambiguous aspects as a digital struggle 
for primacy in the minds of population, self-interpretation of strategic arms race on different 
battlespaces and superiority of national brinkmanship. In practice, hybrid warfare is being 
commenced by establishing strategic objectives and employing means that breach another state's 
sovereignty during not only a wartime but also within peace negotiations. Findings further point 
to prosperous results when coercive infringement is accorded to minimize the chances of 
international military and juridical responses.  
Today, there are, approximately, more than 250 articles, 50 books and other sources that 
indicate and define different interpretations of hybrid warfare concept, but, in general, three of 
them are most valuable definitions of theoretical and practical assignments of hybrid warfare. 
First one chiefly relates to Frank G. Hoffman who is a father-founder of this concept and his 
disciples. Dr. Hoffman is serving at the National Defense University (hereinafter, NDU) as a 
Distinguished Research Fellow with the Institute for National Strategic Studies. He formerly 
directed the NDU Press operations which include the journals Joint Force Quarterly. From 
August 2009 to June 2011, he has served as a senior executive and as the Senior Director, Naval 
Capabilities, and Readiness in the U.S. Department of the Navy. He started at the NDU in 2011 
and became a Distinguished Research Fellow in December 2016. Mr. Hoffman holds a Ph.D. in 
War Studies from King's College London.13 By giving one's theoretically endorsed 
interpretation, Mr. Hoffman does not forget to make a comparative analysis of alternative 
concept – "compound war". In his seminal article "Hybrid vs. compound war", written for 
Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, Global Defense Strategy in October 2009, Dr. 
Hoffman underscored that contemporary researchers rely on the new adjectives and prefer to 
retain oversimplified depictions of warfare in two distinct bins: conventional and irregular. He 
quoted: “I do not share their concerns about new adjectives if they help us think about, debate 
and prepare for the future. I have a more huge concern about preparation for the future, just 
looking backward. I am afraid that we will face more complicated phase in the constantly 
changing character of the modern conflict, and it would allow us to understand better the modern 
                                                          
13 Frank G. Hoffman - Member - FPRI Board of Advisors // URL: https://www.fpri.org/contributor/frank-hoffman/ 
// Retrieved at 24.11.2017  
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conflict and it is better to prepare our operational forces for success. We need a sound 
appreciation of history, and we need to understand the ever-evolving character of the emerging 
future all at the same time. In short, as warfare evolves, which Clausewitz reminds us it will do 
in every age, our professional lexicon should evolve, too.”14 Alongside with one's interpretation, 
he has also mentioned the ideas of his colleagues. He stated that there are a number of hybrid 
definitions. For instance, Marine Lt. Col. Bill Nemeth's graduate work on Chechnya and hybrid 
warfare was path-breaking research. He defined hybrid warfare as "the contemporary form of 
guerrilla warfare" that "employs both modern technology and modern mobilization methods."15 
Likewise, Nathan Freier of the Center for Strategic and International Studies was one of the 
originators of the hybrid warfare construct when he worked in the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense on the national defense strategy. "This strategy has stated in the one's well-known "quad 
chart" of four threats - traditional, irregular, catastrophic terrorism and disruptive". This strategy 
noted that in the future, the most complex threats would be combinations of these four. Freier's 
version defines a hybrid threat as an actor who uses two of the four modes of conflict. 
Meanwhile, retired Army Col. Jack McCuen paid its tribute mostly on the loci of the asymmetric 
battle, fought on three decisive battlegrounds "within the conflict zone population, the home 
front population, and the international community."16 This definition emphasizes the battle of the 
narratives and reinforces Nemeth's emphasis on modern information tools and mass 
mobilization. Dave Kilcullen who is another advocate of this new concept, in one's prolific book 
"The Accidental Guerrilla," supported hybrid warfare as the best description for today's modern 
conflicts. Nevertheless he emphasizes a combination of the irregular modes of the conflict, 
including civil wars, an insurgency, and terrorism. Other contributors to hybrid wars find more 
utility in conceptualizing the hybrid threat in terms of how the adversary is organized or his legal 
status (states and nonstate actors as proxies).17 Talking more about Mr. Hoffman's inferential 
logic over this sort of interpretations, we must underline his main separations within hybrid 
warfare's strategic and operational levels. In another outspoken article "Hybrid Warfare and 
                                                          
14 The title of the article – “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, 
Global Defense Strategy // p.1 // URL: http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf  // Retrieved at 
24.11.2017 
15 The title of the article – “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, 
Global Defense Strategy // p.1 // URL: http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf  // Retrieved at 
24.11.2017 
16 The title of the article – “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, 
Global Defense Strategy // p.1 // URL: http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf  // Retrieved at 
24.11.2017 
17 The title of the article – “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, 
Global Defense Strategy // p.2 // URL: http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf // Retrieved at 
24.11.2017 
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Challenges", he has stated that “as difficult as compound wars have been, the operational fusion 
of conventional and irregular capabilities in hybrid conflicts may be even more complicated. 
However, compound wars proposed synergy and combinations at the strategic level, but not the 
complexity, fusion, and simultaneity which we expect at the operational and even tactical levels 
in wars where one or both parties mix and merge all range of methods and modes of the conflict 
into the battlespace. Irregular forces in cases of compound wars worked generally as derivation 
or economy of force in separate theater or in the next operational zone, including a non-
combatant echelon”.18 Thereafter, we can surely assert that his definition of "hybrid warfare" 
focused on the adversary's modes of conflict. He obviously eliminates "destructive technology" 
and includes "destructive social behavior" or crime as the fourth modality. To many military 
theorists, it is inconvenient with this element and they do not want to deal with something that 
our culture sharply rejects as a business of law enforcement agencies. But the interrelation 
between the criminal and terrorist organizations is conventional, and the emergence of the 
narcoterrorist and odious transnational organizations which use smuggling, drugs, human 
trafficking, extortion, etc., undermines the legitimacy of the local or national government, rather 
obviously. 
Dr. Hoffman has also underlined that he defines hybrid threat as any opponent who 
simultaneously and adaptively uses the alloyed combination of conventional weapons, irregular 
tactics, terrorism and criminal behavior in the battlespace for the achievement of the one's 
political goals. There is a number of questions, lifted by definition of Mr. Hoffman. Five various 
elements of definition concern them: 
a) A modality against structure: Whether our definition has to focus on modes of the 
fighting of the opponent or on its structure (a combination of the states, non-state actors, foreign 
fighters)? 
b) Simultaneity: Whether force has to use at the same time four various modes of the 
conflict or show an opportunity to use all four during the campaign? 
c) Fusion: Whether force has to combine various forces, regular and irregular, to the 
battleground or it has to mix various modes of the conflict? How much does coordination qualify 
and in what level of war? 
d) Multimodality: Whether the actor has to mix all four ways or three of four enough to 
make the conflict hybrid? 
                                                          
18 The title of the article - “Hybrid warfare and challenges” edited by Frank G. Hoffman // URL: 
http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/jfqhoffman.pdf // pp.36-37 // Retrieved at 25.11.2017 
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e) Criminality: Is criminality a deliberate mode of conflict, or simply a source of income 
or support for gangs and terrorists?19 
 
Complexed definition of “Hybrid Warfare” for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
 
Despite genuine interpretation of “Hybrid warfare”, there are other two definitions given 
by NATO-financed researchers from its Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, RAND 
Corporation etc., and Orthodox school, mostly represented by Russian scientists in international 
relations who held the earliest ideas upon “new warfare types”. One of them was Russian 
military strategist (Георгий Самойлович Иссерсон / "Новые формы борьбы" / “New forms of 
struggle”), who was one of the father-founders of “Deep Operation Theory”20 in Soviet Armed 
Forces and Evgeny Messner who also was well-known military scientist and anti-communist 
activist fighting for “White movement” within Russian Civil War (1917-1922). Being an 
assertive anti-communist and military theoretician of the Russian diaspora Prof. Messner has 
served as General Staff colonel of the Russian Imperial Army, during the civil war fought on the 
White side, mainly in the headquarters of the units. He was the last chief of staff of the Kornilov 
Division in the Russian Army. He was unique theorist with his “psychological warfare”, which is 
one of the main components of the current concept of “hybrid warfare”, within the context of 
one’s very prolific book “Myatej Voyna”.21 The main idea was dealt with the brainwashing of 
plain folk within appropriate countries and the pivotal role of insurgencies in non-linear 
warfares, where the best explanation of this concept could be defined through author’s 
innovative quotation: “If you want a peace, defeat the “Myatej Voyna”.” The third one is 
considered to be Igor Nikolaevich Panarin who is a graduate of the Higher School of the KGB. 
He worked at the Soviet Embassy in London. Several years ago, Panarin was invited to work in a 
closed state structure, and for some time he disappeared from the information field. He was 
famous with a mixture of “informational warfare” in one’s seminal article “Gladiators of the 
                                                          
19 The title of the article - “Hybrid vs. compound war” - October 2009 - Armed Forces Journal - Military Strategy, 
Global Defense Strategy // p.3 // URL: http://indianstrategicknowledgeonline.com/web/4198658.pdf // Retrieved at 
25.11.2017 
20 The title of the source – “New forms of struggle”, Moscow: Voengiz, 1940., G.S. Isserson // URL: 
http://militera.lib.ru/science/isserson/index.html  // Retrieved at 26.11.2017 
21 The title of the book – “Myatej Voyna” written by Evgeny Messner // URL: 
http://militera.lib.ru/science/0/pdf/messner_ea01.pdf // Retrieved at 29.11.2017 
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hybrid war”.22 According to his ideas, “hybrid warfare” is not anything new, but rather deep-
historical experience used predominantly by British Empire in order to reinclude the USA into 
one’s leadership and to fight against world communism. For him, hybrid war is a combination of 
military-political, political-diplomatic, financial-economic, information-psychological and 
information-technical methods, as well as technologies for color revolutions, terrorism and 
extremism, special services, special forces, special operations and public structures diplomacy, 
carried out under a single plan by state authorities, military-political blocs or Transnational 
Corporations (hereinafter TNC). The last one is the outstanding “eurasianist” Aleksandr 
Gelyevich Dugin who is still popular with one’s “Network-centric warfare (hereinafter NCW)”23 
theory which converts information supremacy within “hybrid warfare” into fighting sword by 
efficiently tying well-informed military organisms in the battlespace.  For him, in the 
postmodern geopolitics in order to attain its full capacity, NCW has to be profoundly crusted in 
operational workmanship. Notwithstanding, we are still not able merely to relate these fresh 
ideas and new technologies to the modern platforms, organizations, and warfare doctrines. 
In comparison with western interpretations of “hybrid warfare”, Russian concept should 
be called as “Gibridnaya Voyna” in order to differentiate and make a comparison between two 
coasts of an academic valley. Reasonably speaking, it has to be accepted that Russian 
“Gibridnaya voyna” has got its own strategic and operational stages pursuing of the full 
devastation of enemy’s legitimate power over appropriate territory, population and natural 
wealth. However, it could be similar or dissimilar in strategic and operational stages with 
westernized interpretations of “hybrid warfare”, they come together in their finite goals. 
Consequently,  Nagorno-Karabakh conflict holds apparent facets of both interpretations that 
hereinafter will be combined in one, common “hybrid warfare” concept. If Mr. Hoffman was 
talking about enemy’s modes of fighting mixed with simultaneity and fusion of different forces 
on various battlespaces by paying one’s paramount vision on operational part of conflict, 
Russian “Gibridnaya voyna” mostly relies on vulnerability and importance of psychological, 
diplomatic, political, informational, economic, financial and cultural victory over enemy in the 
strategical part of conflict. Meanwhile, Nagorno-Karabakh conflict during these almost three 
decades since its re-ignition has attested to both factors of “Hybrid warfare” and “Gibridanya 
voyna”. As a result of long academic observation and qualitative research with my thesis 
                                                          
22 The title of the source – “Gladiators of the hybrid war” written by Igor Nikolaevich Panarin // URL: 
http://www.inesnet.ru/wp-content/mag_archive/2016_02/ES2016-02-060-65_Igor_Panarin.pdf // Retrieved at 
29.11.2017 
23 The title of the article – “Network-centric warfare and Globalization” written by Aleksandr Gelyevich Dugin // 
URL: http://federalbook.ru/files/OPK/Soderjanie/OPK-7/V/Dugin.pdf // Retrieved at 30.11.2017 
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advisor, we have realized that our definition of “hybrid warfare” in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
should be as follows: “The new type of warfare that lacks of internationally recognized peace 
treaty based on mutual interests and separated into two significant levels: a) strategical – mostly 
puffed up by factors of an orthodox ‘Gibridnaya voyna’ for politico-psychological supremacy 
over enemy and total obliteration of its full value governance; b) tactical-operational - fully 
captured by Frank G. Hoffman’s ‘hybrid warfare’ concept based on multimodality, simultaneity, 
criminal activities, terrorism and other new types of unconventional methods for gaining 
economy of war and final battlespace victory”. Consequently, our initial task will be a revelation 
of these two stages of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and make visible some factors of mixed 
hybridity within the historical background and recent situation in this region.  
Nowadays, social mass media plays very crucial role in the interpretation and basic 
understanding of this conflict. For us, firstly to this extend aforementioned Hoffman’s 
“disruptive technology” converts to the “disruptive social behaviour”. In the case of Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict it is not just a simple criminal activity like Ramil Safarov has done within 
NATO-sponsored training seminar in Budapest24 or like Monte Melkonian who was popular 
with one’s terroristic leadership and massacres in “ARABO” which was division of special 
fighters under aegis of Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (hereinafter 
ASALA)25 and Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide in the 1980s. Therefore, 
“disruptive technology” should be defined as criminal activity itself which converts to the 
“disruptive social behavior” that chiefly laid on “false patriotism”.  
In comparison with very well-organized Orthodox and Frank G. Hoffman's 
interpretations, NATO's definition of "hybrid warfare" is varying by its simplicity and lack of 
academically systemized definition, yet there are an exuberance of articles upon this hot and 
most discussed topic issued by its such influential think-tanks as the Strategic Communications 
Centre of Excellence and RAND Corporation. For instance, "Russia and  Hybrid warfare –going 
beyond the label"26 might be sampled as one of the most popular and fresh articles written by 
Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith. This article chiefly collects all probable previous definitions, 
makes a comparative analysis and comes to final definition by rational choice to detect a sponsor 
or perhaps initiator of hybrid wars. All arrows were directed onto Russia and its new type of 
                                                          
24 The title of the source – “Azeri killer Ramil Safarov: Concern over Armenian anger”, 3 September 2012 // URL: 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-19463968 // Retrieved at 03.12.2017 
25 The title of the primary source – “The ASALA: A continuing international threat // CIA document approved for 
release // URL: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0005462031.pdf // Retrieved at 05.12.2017 
26 The title of the article - "Russia and Hybrid Warfare – Going beyond the label" written by Bettina Renz and 
Hanna Smith in 2016 // p.2 // URL: file:///C:/Users/Dns/Downloads/ap_1_2016.pdf // Retrieved at 06.12.2017  
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struggle with the West by mixing all of the new, secret and even irregular strategies, operations, 
tactics and tools for gaining of extension of its diplomatic, economic and geopolitical influence. 
The similar disclosure can be attached to such articles as "Hybrid warfare in Baltics: Threats and 
Potential Responses"27 written by Andrew Radin and "Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare: 
And What Can Be Done About It"28 written by Christopher S. Chivvis, which differing with its 
variations in the parts relating to the conceptualization of NATO's response to so-called "Russian 
Hybrid Warfare". And the last, perhaps the biggest collection of NATO's "hybrid warfare" 
definitions and written discussions on its novelty found its existence in the book called "NATO's 
Response to Hybrid Threats"29 edited by Guillaume Lasconjarias and Jeffrey A. Larsen.  
On the recent action sponsored by NATO and organized by the Atlantic Council for 
discussion of the annexation of the Crimea and military support of Ukraine, to participants it has 
been told that "there is no coordinated definition of the terms connected with hybrid warfare". In 
other words, representatives of 28 members of the North Atlantic Alliance could not agree about 
the accurate definition of what they face. Then, how leaders of NATO can count on the 
development of effective military strategy if they can not define what, according to them, is the 
threat of day? And it once again confirms one obvious simplicity and unwillingness of NATO 
and other western representatives making decisions which want to forget about all "hybrid" and 
to focus on specifics and interdependence of threats which they face.  
Pursuant to the majority of latest news, quotations, and articles arisen from NATO 
sponsored sources, warfare, whether it be ancient or modern, hybrid or not, is always complex 
and can hardly be subsumed into a single adjective. Any effective strategy has to consider this 
heavyweight environment and find ways of its right control and navigation without contextual 
pruning.30 
 
 
                                                          
27 The title of the source – “Hybrid warfare in Baltics: Threats and Potential Responses” written by Andrew Radin in 
2015 // URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1500/RR1577/RAND_RR1577.pdf 
// Retrieved at 10.12.2017 
28 The title of the source - "Understanding Russian Hybrid Warfare: And What Can Be Done About It" edited by 
Christopher S. Chivvis in 2016 // Testimony presented before the House Armed Services Committee on March 22, 
2017. // URL: https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT400/CT468/RAND_CT468.pdf // 
Retrieved at 13.12.2018 
29 The title of the book - "NATO's Response to Hybrid Threats” written by distinguished analysts whose names were 
mentioned in each chapter of academic research // https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195405/fp_24.pdf // Retrieved at 
13.12.2017 
30 The title of the article – “Hybrid war – does it even exist?” // NATO Review - 2016 // 
https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2015/Also-in-2015/hybrid-modern-future-warfare-russia-ukraine/EN/ // Retrieved 
at 13.12.2017 
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Key aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
 
Prior to pass to the literature review of signs, treatises, and possible fresh research over 
"new type" of war in Nagorno-Karabakh, it would be academically useful to make a brief 
overview of its key aspects. Why is this region so important? This question must be responded 
by more fresh and independent research, because of exuberance in the number of journals, 
books, and articles edited by one-sided or subjective authors and their possible directors. Unless 
there are fresh approaches, effective mediation and useful academic researches to the peaceful 
resolution of conflict, factors of hybrid warfare might rope into itself permanent tactical-
operational re-engagement of neighboring countries as well. Unfortunanately, the significance of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's peaceful resolution based on the fact that geopolitical games 
bisecting this region might be flamed up by new regional and even full-scale world war amidst 
leading powers of the international arena. 
Unfortunately, the importance of Nagorno-Karabakh region is still being dated back to 
the deep centuries. Both major sides of conflict just adore making persistent flashbacks within 
deep historical frictions. Therefore, it is continuing to re-ignite those negative feelings and 
mutual disdain between representatives of these nations. Actually, Nagorno-Karabakh region 
became more important by the leap-up of post-WWI nationalism. Armenians were enticed by the 
West to get their dream-state on the Eastern Anatolia as a result of the collapse of Ottoman 
Empire. Meanwhile, not only the West but also Armenians were encountered with opposite 
nationalism installed by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Armenians had initiated anti-Turkish 
movements, crimes, pillages and mass casualties in order to hinder the consolidation of Turkey 
and finally were swept away in the majority from Anatolia. Aftermath, Nagorno-Karabakh 
region, Western part of Azerbaijan and Persia became a haven of Armenian minority. Totally 
speaking, one nation in the face of Armenians was caught by decentralization and dissemination 
almost over the world.  
Indeed, the struggle of these two nations is too similar to one another, because both of 
them were fighting against Russian and Ottoman Empires. Even in the post-WWI period, there 
has been achieved an agreement. As a result, in May, 1918, after disorder of the Zakavkaskiy 
Seym црут territories of South Caucasus strove for full independence, Azerbaijan has agreed to 
concede to Armenia, historically Azerbaijani city of Irevan (nowadays known as Yerevan), the 
National Council claimed that without Yerevan Armenia will have no real capital from now on.  
In return, Armenia agreed to discard all its claims on the mountainous section of Yelizavetpol 
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gubernia (around Ganja) and Nagorno-Karabakh region. According to Svante E. Cornell, the 
inception of a rigid phase of conflict was dealing with border delays within post-WWI peace 
negotiations. After incorporation of Transcaucasus into the body of Soviet Empire in 1920-1921, 
the borders amidst Azerbaijan, Armenia, and even Georgia were not determined immediately. 
The basic reason for the delay was dealt with the status of Nagorno-Karabakh and Nakhichevan. 
The drawing of the border between these two nations was quite problematic. Originally the 
pendulum, appear, has shaken in favor of Armenia as the revolutionary committee of Soviet 
Azerbaijan in 1920 under the Soviet pressure has made the statement that Karabakh, Zangezur, 
and Nakhchivan have been transferred to the Armenian control. That times Stalin who later 
became a commissar for nationalities made the decision public on December 2, but the 
Azerbaijani communist leader Nariman Narimanov then denied the transfer. Four months later, 
the pendulum swung back. On March 16th, 1921, an agreement between Republican Turkey and 
Soviet Russia determined that both regions were to be under the authority of the Azerbaijani 
Soviet Socialist Republic, in exception of Zangezur which was left within Armenia. In 1924, the 
Nakhichevan has obtained the status of an autonomous region (NASSR) whereas Nagorno-
Karabakh had been granted the status of an Autonomous Oblast (NKAO).31 That is where we 
can also find out some signs of the real importance of Nagorno-Karabakh region and obvious 
reasons for ineludible conflict. Despite all drawbacks, it is quite apparent that even mere 
understanding of conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh as itself has undergone a lot of changes and tests 
completed by great powers en route achieving one's political goals. Correspondingly, the main 
aspects of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict should be enumerated as in following details:  
a) Academic disputes over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh are still far away from 
modern provisions of International Law and not capable to escape from insisting of their own 
legitimacy and debates over latecomers; 
b) Ethnic, psychological, religious and cultural factors of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
were being undergone some transition periods as ("civil war" (within USSR) - "interstate war" 
(after collapsing of USSR), and, nowadays (an incomprehensible conflict impregnated with new 
factors of the hybrid warfare); 
 
 
                                                          
31 The title of the article – “Undeclared war: The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reconsidered” written by Svante E. 
Cornell who holds Ph.D. at the Department of International Relations, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, 
Turkey // p. 2 // URL: http://isdp.eu/content/uploads/images/stories/isdp-main-pdf/1997_cornell_undeclared-war.pdf 
// Retrieved at 17.12.2017 
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Literature review 
 
Due to the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh region with its legal and social status was far 
away from fresh research, associated with overviews on new types of warfare and its myriad 
impact on social behavior, lead current academic atmosphere to the vacuum of database 
simplicity mostly preferring by historians. Today, it is almost impossible to expose new 
governmental reports, books, projects and even articles based on deep academic research over 
fresh approaches and estimations for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. While seeking those sort of 
secondary literature that would cover our expectations we have stumbled with a few amounts of 
books and articles partly related to the factors of hybridity in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's 
strategical and operational parts. Frankly speaking, most of them were merely organized for 
overarching comparison of the military, cultural, economic, political and social status of 
conflicting sides, their historical prevalence over one another. There are still too little signs of 
legal appreciation for conflict's kinetic and new-tactical narratives. Probably, the earnest and the 
freshest launching of novel and distinguished interpretation of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with 
some of its critical moments could be found in the book which was named quite differently with 
ambiguous contents. This is about "Oil Wars"32 edited by Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl, and 
Yahia Said that firstly was published by Pluto Press in 2007, London. Now, I would like to 
provide my thesis with an overview of its relating content which was called – “Oil and conflict: 
the case of Nagorno Karabakh”, written by Mary Henrietta Kaldor. She has got a title of 
Commander of the Order of British Empire and currently serving as Professor of Global 
Governance at the London School of Economics, where she is also working as the Director of 
the Civil Society and Human Security Research Unit.33  
She is very popular with her New-Wars term, which was leaked into one's seminal book - 
"New and Old Wars". This book has basically altered the specter we understand contemporary 
war and conflict. In the context of globalization, this path-breaking book has shown that what we 
think of as war, that is to say, the war between states in which the aim is to inflict maximum 
violence is becoming an anachronism. In its place is a new type of organized violence which 
could be described as a mixture of war, organized crime and massive violations of human rights. 
                                                          
32 The title of the book – “Oil wars” edited by Mary Kaldor, Terry Lynn Karl and Yahia Said // URL: 
http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page
=165 // Retrieved at 22.12.2017 
33 The title of the source – The London School of Economics and Political Science: Marry Kaldor // URL: 
http://www.lse.ac.uk/researchandexpertise/experts/profile.aspx?KeyValue=m.h.kaldor%40lse.ac.uk // Retrieved at 
22.12.2017 
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The actors are both global and local, public and private. The wars are fought for particularistic 
political goals using tactics of terror and destabilization that are theoretically outlawed by the 
rules of modern warfare. That is why she is considered to be one of the modern key contributors 
of "hybrid warfare" conception. Kaldor's analysis offers a basis for a cosmopolitan political 
response to these wars, in which the monopoly of legitimate organized violence is reconstructed 
on a transnational basis and international peacekeeping is reconceptualized as cosmopolitan law 
enforcement.34 The case of Nagorno-Karabakh was described by Prof. Kaldor in a quite 
distinguished style, saturated even with some statistics over human casualties and massive 
crimes. It again endorses her vivid sensitivity to human rights violations. Nevertheless, it is 
already not secret almost for all of us how during two centuries this conflict has ditched the vast 
majority of innocent people from either side. Before the war in the early 1990s, Nagorno-
Karabakh had a population of around 180,000. Since then, some 15–20,000 people have been 
killed and over a million people have been forced to flee their homes from Armenia and 
Azerbaijan as well as from the Nagorno Karabakh region.35 
Ms. Kaldor has also paid special attention to the new format of Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict by denoting it as a ''New War". She has underscored that the war in Nagorno Karabakh 
is typical of a ‘new war’. It cannot easily be categorized as ‘international’ or as ‘civil’. 
Technically, it was ‘civil’ up until the collapse of the Soviet Union and became ‘international’ 
after the establishment of two independent states – Armenia and Azerbaijan. In practice, it is 
both local and global, involving a host of global actors such as Russian mercenaries, Armenian 
diaspora volunteers, and Afghan mujahideen, not to mention international agencies and NGOs 
like Christian Solidarity, chaired by Baroness Caroline Cox. Likewise, it cannot easily be 
categorized as state or non-state. The war involved fractions of the Soviet army, volunteer 
militias and paramilitary groups, and criminal gangs as well as the newly established armies of 
Azerbaijan, Karabakh, and Armenia. It is best explained in terms of the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and the struggle among competing networks for the remnants of the state apparatus. These 
networks used the ideology of extreme nationalism to mobilize popular support. As we see here, 
the first part of Kaldor's "New War" is mostly puffed up with the identification of strategical part 
                                                          
34 The title of the book – “New and Old Wars” written by Mary Kaldor // Brief overview of book by Stanford 
University Press, 2007 // URL: 
https://books.google.ru/books/about/New_and_Old_Wars.html?id=XVgVstFi0XUC&redir_esc=y // Retrieved at 
22.12.2017 
35 The title of the  content – “Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh” written by Mary Kaldor, from the 
book “Oil wars” // p. 157 // URL: 
http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page
=165 // Retrieved at 22.12.2017 
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of the war, and she did not forget to categorize its ever-upgrading actors.36 Notwithstanding, the 
lack of systemized analysis over particular efforts of these actors during the conflict and within 
post-conflict period was the main shortcoming of this part of the research. Undoubtedly, our 
thesis will contribute to this part of research through identification of mere factors of "hybrid 
warfare" by indicating and explaining of those particular efforts undertaken by major actors of 
conflict. 
On the second phase, Prof. Kolder redirected us to the depiction of operational part of the 
conflict in the initial phases of Nagorno-Karabakh war a little before and after the collapse of 
Soviet Union. For her, a key event in the escalation of the conflict in 1989-94 was Operation 
Ring, carried out by the Soviet forces. Operation Ring involved units of the Soviet 23rd 
Motorised Rifle Division, together with Azeri special police OMON (Special Police Militia led 
by Rovshan Javadov) and internal security troops, in massive operations against Armenian 
villages near the border with Nagorno Karabakh in the north. Pursuant to Ms. Kaldor's consented 
idea with Eric Melander37 'officially, the purpose was to neutralize illegal guerrilla formations in 
the area; but in practice, Operation Ring amounted to systematic ethnic cleansing' (Melander 
2001:68).38 A Soviet observer noted that the tactics were very similar to those used by the Soviet 
army in Afghanistan. Hereinafter, we cannot be sure and academically convinced how it could 
be called a "systematic ethnic cleansing" without crystal-clear facts and at least a piece of 
internationally proven evidence to them, though it has simultaneously filtered and fastened by 
comparative analysis with the case of Soviet intervention in Afganistan. Even though concrete 
names of one of them were not indicated by Prof. Kaldor, in addition to former Soviet troops, 
many volunteer groups were formed. Some were criminal gangs. Others were fanatics.  In 
Armenia, they were called "djogads" (hunter’s groups) or “fedayeen”, meaning fighters willing 
to sacrifice themselves for the cause. They were joined by volunteers from the American-
Armenian diaspora. She has argued that on the Azerbaijani side, some independent entrepreneurs 
established their own brigades with Russian assistance. But actually, it was not a direct help by 
Russia, despite heavy weapons and artillery, which mostly were out of order, left in Ganja city of 
                                                          
36 The title of the content – “Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh” written by Mary Kaldor, from the 
book “Oil wars” // p. 159 // URL: 
http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page
=165 // Retrieved at 25.12.2017 
37 Eric Melander - Professor at Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University, Sweden // 
http://katalog.uu.se/profile/?id=AA106 // Retrieved at 22.02.2018 
38 The title of the content – “Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh” written by Mary Kaldor, from the 
book “Oil wars” // p. 161 // URL: 
http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page
=165 // Retrieved at 25.12.2017 
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Azerbaijan. The most notorious was Suret Husseinov, who organized a coup against the 
nationalist President Elchibey in June 1993, which paved the way for the return to power of the 
veteran communist leader Heydar Aliyev. In addition, villagers organized themselves in self-
defense units. These volunteer groups were complemented not by Russian mercenaries, but 
Chechens and Afghan mujahideen.39 Reportedly, after a visit to Afghanistan by the Iranian 
Deputy Interior Minister in July 1993, some 1000 Afghan mujahideen from the Iranian backed 
Hezb-I-Wahdat were recruited (See Kechichian and Karasik, 1995). Both sides had access to 
equipment left behind by the departing Soviet forces, with Azerbaijan inheriting more material 
than Armenia. However, the Russian government ‘compensated’ Armenia for its supposed 
military inferiority in deals arranged between Presidents Lev Ter Petrosian and Boris Yeltsin, as 
came to light in evidence given to the Russian Duma in 1997. By the end of the war, both sides 
had established ‘real’ armies (Ter Petrosian, quoted in De Waal 2003). In Karabakh, the Minister 
of Defence, Serge Sarkisian, now Minister of Defence in Armenia, and the military commander, 
Samvel Babayan, were able to forge the various paramilitary groups into an effective fighting 
force. In Azerbaijan, Aliyev disbanded the independent brigades and established an army mainly 
based on inexperienced press-ganged recruits. Despite huge efforts, this force was not able to 
recover territory lost to the Karabakh army, which by the end of the war had succeeded in 
occupying a large part of Azerbaijan’s territory. In addition to the territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh, it captured the territory connecting Nagorno Karabakh to Armenia, known as the 
Lachin corridor.40 But, of course, tactical-operational part of conflict does not limit itself to 
aforementioned non-linear methods. Respectively, it has been evolving one’s character and 
hugely filled with other old factors of hybrid warfare, by simultaneity, fusion, multimodality, and 
criminality of one's nature. 
In order to avoid any scarcity of relevant sources, it is quite necessary to dig out some 
fresh approaches from historical books and corresponding conflict's insightful analysis. Perhaps, 
the most notorious and objective history handbook of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still "Black 
Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace and War" (Oxford University Press, 2015), 
written by Prof. Thomas de Waal which has been translated into Armenian, Azeri, Russian, and 
                                                          
39 The title of the article – “The Mujahedin in Nagorno-Karabakh: A Case Study in the Evolution of Global Jihad” 
by Michael Taarnby 9/5/2008 // pp. 9-10 // URL: https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/57530/WP%2020,%202008.pdf // 
Retrieved at 07.12.2018 
40 The title of the content – “Oil and conflict: the case of Nagorno Karabakh” written by Mary Kaldor, from the 
book “Oil wars” // p. 162 // URL: 
http://economic.free.fr/crisis/%CA%AF%D3%CD%D5%BD%D5%F9%20%D3%A2%CE%C4%B0%E6.pdf#page
=165 // Retrieved at 07.12.2018 
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Turkish. Tom de Waal is a senior fellow with Carnegie Europe, specializing in Eastern Europe 
and the Caucasus region. He is the author of numerous publications about the region.41 The 
palpable scientific variable of this book is quite remarkable in its depiction of facts and 
impregnable throughout one's comparative analysis. If 1988-1994 period was described as the 
clash of civil, ethnic and intrastate wars, chaotic operational movements, the verbiage of state 
apparatuses and as a cocktail of different non-linear methods en route achieving appropriate 
goals, the 1994-2001 was interpreted as "No war, no peace" period. The major goal and central 
point of our thesis to catch - where, when and why Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was being 
injected with newly-studied factors of "hybrid warfare". One moment was very peculiar, and it 
has been outlined by Prof. Waal that the high point of Heydar Aliev’s presidency in Azerbaijan 
came in November 1997, when three months before, he had made a highly successful visit to 
Washington, where the Brezhnev-era veteran was feted by such former Cold Warriors as 
Zbigniew Brzezinski and Henry Kissinger.42 Even this meeting was presented as a strengthening 
of the main export oil pipeline running from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan, 
other hot topics such as the future of diplomatic negotiations over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
and use of all possible methods for a peaceful bargain was on the agenda as well. The following 
paragraphs were mostly concentrated on conflict's strategical part, in particular, on the domestic 
and contr-state rivalries for power and governance. The role of mediators was used as a political 
instrument for the fortification of ruling parties from either side. That is where it was beginning 
to use some signs on factors of an Orthodox version of "hybrid warfare", which was called as 
"Gibridnaya voyna". The two sides struggled toward a compromise arrangement to be approved 
at the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (hereinafter) CSCE summit in 
Budapest in December 1994. The plan was to give the organization a mandate to create its first-
ever international peacekeeping force, specifically for Nagorny Karabakh, in which the Russians 
would play a major, but not an exclusive, part. Azerbaijan seized this opportunity. The Russians 
had invited both presidents to come to Moscow before the Budapest meeting. Azerbaijani 
government sent its deputy foreign minister, Tofik Zulfugarov, ahead to elucidate what the 
agenda of the Moscow talks was to be. Mr. Zulfugarov said that he concluded the Russians were 
trying to undermine the coming agreement in Budapest. Aliev, therefore, pleaded illness and did 
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not come to Moscow, causing Ter-Petrosian to stay away as well.43 According to Zulfugarov: “If 
they had flown to Budapest from Moscow, no decision on deploying an international force 
would have been worked out.”44 Undoubtedly, this book has played a very crucial role in 
constructing the roadmap of my academic research, at least, being hiddenly filled with some 
minor, but significant signs of "hybridity". Probably, the second most interesting fact was dealt 
with the fall of Levon Ter-Petrosian's efforts to make a braver plea in front of his nation for 
prosperous economic development of Nagorno-Karabakh region and peoples of either country. It 
was late, but even the most radical opposition members Vazghen Sargsyan and Karen 
Demirchian have put their consent on peaceful meditation and even some mutual concessions 
were discussed within the "Goble Plan" which was named in honor of a former U.S. State 
Department specialist on the Caucasus, Paul Goble, who had written a briefing paper in 1992 in 
which he proposed the idea of a territorial exchange to resolve the Karabakh dispute.45 Basically, 
in return for Armenia’s being given the “Lachin corridor” linking it to Nagorny Karabakh, 
Azerbaijan would receive a land corridor across Armenia’s southern Meghri region connecting it 
with Nakhichevan.46 But again, the problems arose from the deep operational part and radical 
Armenians from Diaspora did not let to such efforts to be realized. They have endorsed it with 
such "false patriotic" arguments as Armenian lands will not be sold out. As the most horrible 
result from all of this, we can use Waal's specially mentioned "massacres" when after the U.S. 
Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott visited Yerevan en route Istanbul, Vazghen Sargsyan, 
and Karen Demrichyan were assassinated. The fight for power was getting quite a perilous way. 
This dangerous period had masterfully been interpreted by Prof. Svante E. Cornell who 
holds a Ph.D. in Peace and Conflict Studies from Uppsala University, a B.Sc. with High Honor 
in International Relations from the Middle East Technical University in Ankara, Turkey, and an 
honorary doctoral degree from the Behmenyar Institute of Law and Philosophy of the National 
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Academy of Sciences of Azerbaijan. He is also a member of the Swedish Royal Academy of 
Military Science. Currently, Dr. Cornell directs the Institute for Security and Development 
Policy and to be considered one of its co-founders. He is Research Director of the Central Asia-
Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program, the Joint Center operated by Institute for 
Security and Development Policy  (hereinafter ISDP) in cooperation with the American Foreign 
Policy.47 Respectively, in his seminal "Report no. 46" edited in 1999 in the Department of East 
European Studies at the Uppsala University, Mr. Cornell has undoubtedly refreshed and enriched 
the literature over history and legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. What we have caught 
from this interesting report was dealt with its 7th paragraph. Here we can detect quite unique 
emblems of official documents which will separately be examined within primary sources of our 
research. The most influential one which held obviously a strategical struggle for power between 
conflicting sides was Section 907 of the United States Freedom Support Act. Unfortunately, 
today this document remained unexplored within the context of modern warfare types, in 
particular, by a discourse of "hybrid warfare". When we have underscored simultaneity within 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the idea was chiefly about a contemporaneous deployment of 
diplomatic and military efforts on each strategical and operational parts, but Section 907 has also 
propped up the co-existence of fusion and multimodality, whereas Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
has encountered with the revelation of war's level and its qualification. According to the author, 
while the conflict was stretching by mutual strikes on authorities, trans-border political 
battlespaces of Azeri-Armenian hybrid confrontation reached even American Congress. In mid-
1992, the Freedom Support Act that was a long-term programme of economic assistance to the 
former Soviet Union was enacted. It included a section, the by now infamous section 907(a), 
which prohibited all US assistance to Azerbaijan due to its ‘blockade of Armenia’. The Congress 
implicitly defined Azerbaijan as the aggressor in the conflict and section 907 must be interpreted 
as a punishment to Azerbaijan for its policy. The act stipulated that “United States assistance 
may not be given to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, and so reports 
to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps to cease all 
blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh”.4849 In the 
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initial phase, it was apparent Armenian political and diplomatic victory saturated by 
humanitarian assistance. Indeed, the Armenian organizations in the US took pride in their 
success but deplored their inability to curtail US assistance to Turkey. In the words of a leaflet 
from the Armenian Assembly of America, ‘with the help of our friends in Congress, we secured 
an $85 million earmark in US assistance for Armenia in 1996...we are currently advocating for 
an increase to $95 million in assistance for next year. We achieved our second legislative goal 
with the passage of the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act...which prohibits American foreign aid to 
any country that blocks the delivery of US Humanitarian assistance to a third country, is now the 
law of the land’.5051 Azerbaijani response to this sort of Armenian hybrid method was a bit late 
but very mind-blowing. Herein, the hybridity of methods was hidden in the meshing up of 
geographical, geopolitical and economic factors. If Armenia was consuming its lobbyists' 
reputation in order to break enemy's psychological and legal prevalence, Azerbaijan has mixed 
one's future energy projects with Nagorno-Karabakh region and bound itself to the Western 
appetite that still seeks to get rid of energy dependence on Russia and the Middle East. Heydar 
Aliyev's ingenious plan was absolutely different from other post-Soviet dictatorships. He was 
very rough and even despotic on domestic issues but parallelly was overarchingly democratic 
and open-minded in one's foreign policy. Aliyev’s strategy was clear: to attract a high level of 
private American interests in Azerbaijan, confident that this would increase the importance of 
the country in US foreign policy. In this strategy, Aliyev clearly counted on the influence of 
‘Texas Oil’ in the domestic US politics, to counterbalance the Armenian lobby. Texas oil 
interests had a clear concern in attracting US attention to Azerbaijan for several reasons. First of 
all, the Caucasus and indeed Azerbaijan remained unstable areas, and there was at all times a risk 
involved in the multi-million dollar investments the oil companies undertook in the country. The 
fate of oil companies was increasingly tied to the fate of Aliyev’s regime, as certain Azerbaijani 
opposition figures claimed they would renegotiate the contracts should they come to power. And, 
in turn, the stability of the Aliyev regime depended partly on eliminating threats to it from 
abroad — especially from circles in Russia; and secondly on the resolution of the Karabakh 
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conflict. The absence of a resolution to the conflict and the predominance of the Armenian 
position internationally could seriously threaten Aliyev’s regime. Hence it was in the interest of 
the oil multinationals to engage the US government in Azerbaijan, thereby, first of all, increasing 
the security of the Aliyev’s regime by increasing US stakes in the country, which in turn would 
lead to the US administration expressing its support for Aliyev. Moreover, involving the US in 
Azerbaijan entailed supporting the Azerbaijani attempts at removing section 907 from US 
legislation. Removal of section 907 would make the oil companies eligible for government-
backed loans and financial assistance; more importantly, however, the US oil companies got 
clear signals from Baku that European or Middle Eastern oil firms might be favored over 
American ones if the ban persists.52  
Being on a plateau of its academic propaganda, Armenian political scientists did not 
prefer to compare the past and today of Nagorno-Karabakh War to the newly-emerged and ever-
upgrading elements of Hybrid Warfare. As an example, we can call to witness of Sergey 
Minasyan’s recent article (“Hybrid” vs. “Compound” War: Lessons from the Ukraine Conflict)  
under the auspice of PONARS Eurasia that is an international network of scholars advancing 
new approaches to research on security, politics, economics, and society in Russia and Eurasia 
which based at the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (hereinafter IERES) at 
the George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs. Currently, he is 
Deputy Director and Head of Political Studies Department at Caucasus Institute in Armenia. 
According to his article, it is futile to look for elements of Hybrid Warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh, 
explaining it with Azerbaijan’s conservative position, especially relative to its modern defense 
system model. For him, the Azerbaijani leadership has kept in reserve the option of using large-
caliber multiple-launch rocket systems and tactical missiles as a remote safeguard in case of any 
large-scale military hostilities. To this end, we do partially share the same position with him 
upon the simplification of Azeri leadership, but this idea does not matter for the obscure 
existence of hybridity from either side. He prefers to estimate a status quo as a “low-intensity 
conflict”, but at the same time argues that within probable open full-scale conflict, especially in 
the tactical-operational part, here can be emerged bygone elements of hybrid warfare, such as re-
deployment of Turkish “volunteers” of Special Military Groups without their own insignia or 
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under Azeri military uniform.53 Subsequently, it is inevitable not to reveal the lack of co-existed 
comparative analysis upon Russian military “volunteers” without or with the insignia of 
Armenian military uniforms. Altogether, these contradictions are surging a coexistence of more 
fresh hybrid warfare’s factors and their international correlation.  
The last and technologically freshest source relating to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s 
tactical-operational part was written by Prof. Azad Garibov. He is a leading research fellow at 
the Foreign Policy Analysis Department of the Center for Strategic Studies (hereinafter SAM), 
(Baku, Azerbaijan) as well as editor-in-chief of the Istanbul based biannual academic journal - 
Caucasus International. He is also an adjunct faculty member of the Department of Political 
Science and International Relations of Khazar University (Azerbaijan) where he teaches EU 
related courses such as the EU in global politics, comparative politics of European countries, and 
basics of EU law. He received a BA in International Relations from Baku State University and 
an MSc in International Politics from the University of Glasgow (UK). Azad Garibov is a 
frequent contributor to various electronic and printed academic journals and newspapers, 
including Eurasia Daily Monitor, The National Interest, and the Journal of Turkish Weekly. He 
co-edited and co-authored the book ‘The Caspian Sea Chess-Board: Geopolitical, Geo-economic 
and Geostrategic Analysis’, published jointly by SAM and the Italian Institute for International 
Political Studies (Milan, 2014). His areas of interest include politics and security issues in the 
South Caucasus and Central Asia, trans-Eurasian energy and transport corridors as well as 
Caspian affairs.54 
Mr. Garibov should be considered as a new-thinker over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and 
must be differed from previous researchers. He has written a prolific article explaining the role 
of innovative military hardware in Nagorno-Karabakh's battlespaces. “Karabakh: A New Theater 
for Drone Warfare?” held not only the comparative character but also reveals a modern 
understanding of military confrontation and its role in international relations. The evidence was 
given on the basis of last and probably the most violent skirmish between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia in April 2016 after more than two decades of "no war, no peace period". One the 
distinctive features of the recent escalation, which has come to be known as the “Four Day War,” 
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was the extensive use of sophisticated military hardware, including unmanned aerial vehicles 
(hereinafter UAV) or "Kamikaze drones", for surveillance and reconnaissance missions, as well 
as for use in ground attacks. In fact, the Karabakh conflict may be the first-ever inter-state armed 
conflict in which drones have been deployed on specifically combat missions. While reports of 
downed enemy drones in and around Karabakh have been fairly commonplace in recent years, 
the deployment of UAVs to the so-called “Line of Contact” (hereinafter LoC) received ample 
media coverage only after the recent fighting. According to Azeri local media coverage, 
Azerbaijan has downed three Armenian drones since the beginning of April, one of which was 
destroyed during the Four Day War, while two others were shot out of the sky in the following 
weeks (Azvision.az, April 7, Ann.az, April 19). Armenia claimed it had downed ten Azerbaijani 
UAVs during the four days of fighting, but only two cases were confirmed to date with video 
and photos (Ng.ru, April 22). Pursuant to author's standpoint, if the 1991–1994 war was fought 
with mostly insurgent tactics, a possible new war in Karabakh promises to be a conflict of 
modern weaponry, in which having a technological edge over the enemy and effectively 
deploying sophisticated military hardware could be crucial in defining the outcome of 
operations. Drone deployment is one of those fields where Azerbaijan currently has an ostensible 
edge over its rival. Although Azerbaijan was the major employer of drones in the recent fighting, 
the relatively higher “casualty rate” among Armenian UAVs could be explained by their 
technological inferiority. Azerbaijan’s economic capabilities (the country’s $4.8 billion military 
spending for 2015 dwarfed Armenia’s $447 million military budget—Bloomberg, April 6) have 
enabled it to create a much larger and technologically superior drone fleet. Azerbaijan also 
remains to be better at mastering the effective deployment of UAVs in actual combat, as proven 
by the increasing precision of its strikes on enemy positions and improved operational command 
in the battlefield.55 
 
Review of primary sources: Thematic analysis of the official documents 
 
Initially, it is useful to specify those more engaged primary sources, related to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s hybrid aspects, in two different levels: a) international and b) 
domestic official documents infiltrated as an input to the process of the conflict itself that is still 
being born by too complicated and highly hybrid outputs. After the collapse of Soviet Union 
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domestically confirmed official governmental documents5657 of USSR lost almost all their legal 
imperatives. Aftermath, they were being altered by internationally recognized and unanimously 
adopted resolutions, communique, memorandums and etc. The main reason for this sort of 
changes was the upgrading nature of international relations and the inception of multi-polar 
world strengthened by a socio-political interconnectedness and an economic interdependence. 
Since the dissolution of USSR up-today, there had been adopting for more than twenty 
substantial international documents dedicated to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Hereinafter, our 
task will be binding on whether international or domestic official documents that hold mere, but 
simultaneously, concealed factors of threat adorned by the new hybrid warfare concept.  
The hybrid fight, which in this case has been interpreted as “gibridnaya voyna” for 
supremacy between conflicting bureaucracies, has begun even in the strategical part of the full-
scale war in 1992 and scattered its products all over battlespaces whether diplomatic or military. 
In that times, the newly-emerged Republic of Armenia was very strong with its "lobbyists" on 
the diplomatic field of war. They had quite influential socio-political powerpoints in the heart of 
such international actors as the United States, France and Russian Federation that was a 
succeeder of USSR in the legal, political, economic and socio-cultural phenomenon of an 
international community. The fact that strategical part of conflict faced its first mutual hybrid 
challenges can be affirmed by 907 section of U.S. Freedom Support Act issued in 1992. It was 
officially called as “Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets 
Support Act” assisted by such pro-Armenian organizations as U.S. Civilian Research & 
Development Foundation in the highest consideration with the Armenia School Connectivity 
Program and adopted by the United States Congress without even one objection on August 6, 
1992.58 Section 907 was dedicated to the U.S. official governmental restriction on assistance to 
Azerbaijan. It has been juridically kept under the law as follow: 
                                                          
56 The title of the official decree "On establishment of the Nagorny Karabakh Autonomous Oblast" of the Azerbaijan 
Central Executive Soviet Committee of July 7th, 1923 // URL: 
http://www.azerbaijan.az/portal/History/HistDocs/Documents/en/06.pdf // Retrieved at 29.01.2018 
57 The status of Nagorno-Karabakh as an autonomous oblast within the Azerbaijan SSR was stipulated in the 
Constitutions of the USSR of 1936 and 1977. In accordance with the Constitutions of the USSR and the Azerbaijan 
SSR, the legal status of the NKAO was governed by the Law “On the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast”, 
which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet of the Azerbaijan SSR on 16 June 1981 following its submission by the 
Soviet of People’s Deputies of the NKAO. As a national territorial unit, the NKAO enjoyed a form of administrative 
autonomy, and, accordingly, had a number of rights, which, in practice, ensured that its population’s specific needs 
were met. Under the Constitution of the former USSR, the NKAO was represented by five deputies in the Council 
of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It was represented by 12 deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the 
Azerbaijan SSR // http://mfa.gov.az/en/content/812 // Retrieved at 30.01.2018 
58 The title of the primary source – “Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets 
Support Act of 1992” // p.1 // URL: https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/STATUTE-106/pdf/STATUTE-106-
Pg3320.pdf // Retrieved at 30.01.2018 
30 
 
  
"United States assistance under this or any other Act (other than assistance under title V 
of this Act) may not be provided to the Government of Azerbaijan until the President determines, 
and so reports to the Congress, that the Government of Azerbaijan is taking demonstrable steps 
to cease all blockades and other offensive uses of force against Armenia and Nagorno-
Karabakh."59 
 Only in 2002, the Senate adopted an amendment to the Act that would ensure the 
President of U.S. with the ability to waiver Section 907.60 As a result, there were in an orderly 
way adopted four waivers of section 907 (in 200261, 200362, 200463, 200564) of the Freedom 
Support Act of 1992 under the George W. Bush administration. All these waivers were adopted 
under the following principles:  
a) the necessity to support U.S. efforts to counter international terrorism; 
b) to promote the operational readiness of U.S. Armed Forces or coalition partners to counter 
international terrorism; 
c) to ensure Azerbaijan's border security; 
d) not to undermine or to hamper ongoing efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan or be used for offensive purposes against Armenia;  
Yes, it is too apparent that all efforts made by Armenian lobby to keep in force this 
section and Azerbaijan's ex-president Heydar Aliyev's strict foreign policy to avert the 
commitments of it was a pure confirmation of an orthodox "gibridnaya voyna" in the strategical 
part of the conflict for the primacy between governing authorities of either side. In 1992, Heydar 
Aliyev was leading the New Azerbaijan Party in the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic which 
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was a landlocked exclave of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Nakhichevan was in a blockade as well, 
because Armenian military forces kept separated this exclave in order to attain tactical and 
operational prevalence over Azerbaijan. Despite all these artificial barricades, Mr. Aliyev was 
deeply engaged in Baku’s internal fight for supremacy over the whole country and finally got 
what he struggled for. Unfortunately, American double standards could not pass away 
Nakhichevan’s blockade, but again Mr. Aliyev was very strong and in that time-freezing moment 
he got “impossible humanitarian aid” from the USA and convinced them to look through parallel 
and more real Armenian blockade of Nakhichevan. Unsurprisingly, when Mr. Aliyev was asked 
by Ms. Betty Blair about his feelings and personal opinion for newly-elected American 
President, Bill Clinton, ex-president has responded as follow:  
“I'll never forget his reply to my request for help when I was Speaker of Parliament of 
Nakhchivan. When he became President, I sent a Congratulatory Letter to him explaining the 
difficult situation that existed for us in the Autonomous Republic of Nakhchivan because of the 
Armenian blockade. Immediately, he organized a planeload of aid and sent it to us.”65   
 After adoption of 907 Section of U.S. Freedom Support Act, not only Heydar Aliev with 
small authority in Nakhichevan but also capital, Baku controlled by Azerbaijan Popular Front 
immediately reacted and called this document as an unfair policy of American double standards. 
This fact endorses another internal hybridity of strategies used by Heydar Aliyev to defeat 
current authorities from Baku and to regain control over the country. There is another crucial 
document that leads us to the deep insight of time-worn and yet inactive factors of hybrid 
warfare within a tactical-operational level which was labeled as terrorism and criminal activities 
for supervising of conflict’s economy, illegal trade with natural sources, looting, smuggling and 
achievement of short-time political goals. They were wielding the same multimodality, 
simultaneity and catastrophic dimensions of Frank G. Hoffman’s hybrid warfare. These factors 
were caught by myself in a “Letter dated 9 May 2012 from the Permanent Representative of 
Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General” signed personally by 
Ambassador Permanent Representative, Mr. Agshin Mehdiyev.66 In Appendix to this letter, I 
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was again able to refresh my memory by atrocious evidence of "Armenian terrorism" which 
time-by-time became conflict's psychological breaking moment and periodically kept conflict's 
operational level in the highest degree of hybridity. Aftermath, it led even to the involvement of 
many illegal paramilitaries, such terrorists as Shamil Basayev, Monte Melkonian and other paid 
soldiers from Lebanon, Iran, Russia, Afganistan, and Turkey. Within thematical analysis of this 
letter I have encountered with the following paragraph:  
“There are more than sufficient facts which expose the methods of nefarious fabrications 
used by the Armenian propaganda, and these have repeatedly been brought to the attention of the 
international community. Suffice it to recall the famous interview of 15 December 2000 with 
President Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia, who in answer to the question as to whether things could 
have happened differently and whether he had any regrets about the deaths of thousands of 
people as a result of Armenian attacks against Azerbaijani civilians, frankly said that he “has 
absolutely no regrets”, since “such upheavals are necessary, even if thousands have to die”.6768 
In lieu of to collect repeating word combinations, the thematical analysis as a very strong 
method indulges us to entitle even this small paragraph as “Azerbaijani view of Armenian 
propaganda”. Even this official standpoint on propaganda and its role and capacity within 
conflict empowers the role of mutual assessments on it as the main guideline to the ever-
changing factors of hybrid warfare. This sort of propaganda activities are still being considered 
and disseminated by Armenian diplomats within Collective Security Treaty Organization 
Parliament Assembly (hereinafter CSTO PA) inter-parliamentary hearings. For instance, former 
member of PA (hereinafter MP) Arman Saghatelyan who was also serving as Press Secretary of 
the President of the Republic of Armenia told the reporters at the hearing of CSTO on “Issues of 
effectively countering collective security system to hybrid wars in the contemporary 
circumstances” that he believes during this whole period Armenia has acted successfully and 
properly pursued its interests. Speaking about the 2016's April war and the work done in that 
period, he stated that we can state that we are in a better position than Azerbaijan, which is an 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://mfa.gov.az/files/media/Documents%20of%20international%20organizations%20on%20the%20Armenia-
Azerbaijan%20conflict.pdf // Retrieved at 05.02.2018 
67 The name of document – “DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS ON THE ARMENIA-
AZERBAIJAN CONFLICT”, “Letter dated 9 May 2012 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the 
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General”, pp. 358 – 359 // MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF 
THE REPUBLIC OF AZERBAIJAN DEPARTMENT FOR ANALYSIS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES // 
http://mfa.gov.az/files/media/Documents%20of%20international%20organizations%20on%20the%20Armenia-
Azerbaijan%20conflict.pdf // Retrieved at 09.04.2018 
68 See also URL: http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/02/24/president-interview-andtragic-anniversary/%209vpa // 
Retrieved at 05.02.2018 
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encouraging fact.69 It was one of those ever-upgrading facets of propaganda based on an 
underestimation and humiliation of defensive capacity of the enemy in front of members of the 
military block that is far away from Azerbaijan's interests and contemporary foreign policy. Mr. 
Saghatelyan also underscored that there is a necessity for the CSTO member states to possess 
unified approaches and methods to face the challenges in hybrid wars because for him it is 
obvious that military component is gradually losing its position to such forms of influence as 
cyber attacks and information-psychological factors. Additionally, Former Defence Minister of 
Armenia, Vagharshak Harutyunyan, in attendance of the discussion, highlighted that the hybrid 
warfare is backed by the military power of a state.70 
He stated that “If a country lacks military power, it cannot run a hybrid war. As far as 
Armenia is concerned, we have managed to ensure our security for 25 years in spite of the fact 
that Azerbaijan poses a military threat to us and has petrodollars. Regardless of its powerful 
economic potential, that country is unable to solve the problems it is facing. This comes to show 
that the Armenian side is able to ensure its security with all methods, starting from military to 
non-military channels.” This sort of statements issued by Armenian officials confirms the fact 
that propaganda and its new forms usually fastened by “fake news” and “cyber attacks”71 even 
today might be a very crucial factor of hybridity within conflict and it can rope other parties as 
well.72 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
69 From the news issued by Armenian online news agency “Panorama.am” // “Karabakh conflict has always featured 
hybrid warfare elements” // URL: https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2017/09/30/Karabakh-conflict-hybrid-
warfare/1842846 // Retrieved at 05.02.2018 
70 From the news issued by Armenian online news agency “Panorama.am” // “Karabakh conflict has always featured 
hybrid warfare elements” // URL: https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2017/09/30/Karabakh-conflict-hybrid-
warfare/1842846 // Retrieved at 05.02.2018 
71 The mutual cyber attacks were increased after a military helicopter of the Armenian armed forces was shot down 
by Azerbaijani servicemen in the airspace of Azerbaijan, said Faig Farmanov, Head of the Electronic Security 
Center under the Communications and Information Technologies Ministry // URL: 
https://www.azernews.az/nation/73378.html // Retrieved at 09.02.2018 
72 From the news on CSTO’s inter-parlamentary hearings on “Issues of effectively countering collective security 
system to hybrid wars in the contemporary circumstances”  // URL: 
https://www.panorama.am/en/news/2017/09/30/Karabakh-conflict-hybrid-warfare/1842846 // Retrieved at 
09.02.2018 
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Research approach: Hypotheses of the study 
 
In modern academic circles of international relations, new concepts, fresh theories, and 
novel ideas are persistently being encountered with drastic criticism. Therefore, it will not be 
able to fully get rid of obstacles within one's academic implementation. Undoubtedly, hybrid 
warfare concept has already been attached to many conflict studies and even oversimplified in its 
rational juxtaposition. By being cautious about it, we will devote ourselves to use deductive 
research approach in order to confirm one's hypotheses emerged as a result of critical 
observation over Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The major reason is based on the uniqueness of 
deductive approach which will explore a known "hybrid warfare concept" and test its validity in 
given circumstances. It has been admitted that “the deductive approach pursues the path of logic 
most tightly. The reasoning starts with a concept and leads to new hypotheses. These hypotheses 
are put to the test by confronting them with observations that lead to their confirmation. 
When we used to examine key aspects of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it has already 
been underlined that significance of this region is being partially neglected. Despite one fact that, 
there are a plenty of academic treatises that focused on a revelation of the regional importance of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflict is still being involved in an interlaced stalemate. By observing 
old and new factors of "hybrid warfare" in conflict's both strategical and tactical-operational 
parts, we came to the following hypotheses: 
a) Factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict are rapidly evolving and it 
damages domestic & foreign policies of either side;  
b) Strategical and operational parts of conflict are differing from each other but come 
together in their ultimate aims and pave the way for the most complexed belligerency within 
hybrid warfare norms;  
c) The mediation and peace-building efforts of influential actors and international 
organizations remain weak, dormant and ineffective against future threats of hybrid warfare in 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region; 
d) Without a productive mediation process, for the peaceful resolution of conflict, and 
internationally recognized, unanimously signed and legally tested peace treaty based on mutual 
interests, it will almost be impossible to eschew those new factors of hybrid warfare which might 
rope into itself permanent tactical-operational re-engagement of neighboring countries as well; 
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Research Questions 
 
As well as in every academic research, arisen hypotheses of our critical observation over 
appropriate circumstances should also be interrogated. Though there is one common research 
question related to the exposure of factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, 
we would interrogate our hypotheses by following sub-questions of research:  
a) Why is this region so important for the international community and how a new full-
scale war might destabilize future regional, and followingly, global integrational processes? 
Critical response is striving through almost every chapter of research by indicating the following 
hypotheses which endorse a rapid evolving of factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict: Being an inseparable part of South Caucasus, Nagorno-Karabakh region intersects with 
the nearest borders of such internationally very crucial energy projects as Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
oil pipeline, TANAP (hereinafter Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline) etc., and again with 
such internationally-backed integrational projects as TACIS (hereinafter Technical Aid to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States)  and TRACECA (hereinafter Transport Corridor Europe-
Caucasus-Asia). It seems an international community is still not aware of a danger of losing the 
easiest connection between Europa and Asia with a possible full-scale war in Nagorno-Karabakh 
region. Historically, it is not a secret or a novelty how one small region could be a reasonable 
subject for the new World Wars. It sounds very rigid but the reality is not escapable. The new 
dangerous factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can easily rope into itself 
other neighboring countries as well, even by the creation of new military blocks and systems. 
Consequently, it will not be possible to way back from simmering battlespaces of the possible 
New Hybrid World War;  
b) Do the factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict prevent its peaceful 
resolution? Almost in every step of peaceful mediation process within Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict since 1994 armistice, we would stumble with artificial or derivative obstacles. 
Aftermath, these obstacles stood up in the epicenter of hybrid strategies and tactics of Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict. In the second empirical chapter of our thesis, we will find out these strategies 
and tactics by making a comparative flashback to the historical background of conflict's kinetic 
and apathetic facets within international mediation process, mostly leading by OSCE MG; 
c) What is the best choice to eschew these factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict: full-scale war or peace treaty? Alternative propositions for the peaceful 
resolution of the conflict will also be explored within both the theoretical and the empirical 
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chapters of our research, by modeling the position of these motions for peace and prosperity 
within a relevant system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and making comparative analysis amidst 
various alternative conflict models on peaceful resolution; 
 
Methods of the study 
 
Within structural designing of every academic research, it is necessary to point out the 
methodology used to come to the general hypotheses accompanied by critical interrogation of 
observing facts. In the case of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, our observations came to the 
aforementioned hypotheses by using following methods:  
a) Thematic analysis of primary sources: Though it is a method for identifying, 
analyzing and reporting patterns within data73, it will go beyond simply counting 
phrases or words in the texts of official governmental documents and moves onto 
identifying implicit and explicit ideas which will hold old&new factors of hybrid 
warfare within the primary sources. Thematic analysis is a widely used method of 
analysis in qualitative research and allows for the rich, detailed and complex 
description of existing data; 
b) System modeling: In order to prove a dichotomy of hybrid warfare factors in 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s strategical and tactical-operational parts, it is necessary 
to dig out its system model which will be analyzing in the 1st Chapter of our thesis. 
Consequently, we will be able to achieve a hybridity over conflict’s nature by re-
building up its inputs (which are the aspects, basically demands and supports, that go 
into the system. These are the things that are needed to use, create, or maintain the 
system), a process (that will be painting what happened, happens and will be able to 
happen), outputs (which will be focused on what comes out of the system. What is the 
result of using the system? Which sort of decisions and actions of a system must be 
proportioned with the factors of hybrid warfare?), and feedback (that will characterize 
what monitors, controls or might destroy the system by a mixture of arisen 
drawbacks. How do we know the system is working or not? How do we make 
changes to the system? How does the system control itself?); 
c) Comparative analysis of alternative conflict models for a peaceful resolution: This 
method will also be used in the 2nd Chapter of our thesis and will be bound by 
                                                          
73 The name of source – “How to use thematic analysis”, Braun and Clarke (2006), p.79 // Retrieved at 10.02.2018 
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empirical data of research. The special goal will be to find out full academic response 
how to get rid of dangerous factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh and how 
to reach its peaceful resolution by comparing alternative conflict models; 
 
Limitations of the study 
 
Prior to commencing systematic analysis of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in order to reveal 
old and new factors of hybrid warfare that mostly being infiltrated by inputs into the process 
itself, it is necessary to delimit the boundaries of our research by academic feedback arisen from 
outputs of hybrid process within a conflict. This thesis is hugely dedicated to the revelation of 
the factors of hybrid warfare which has already been defined and academically made crystal-
clear in its destination. The main idea will be framed within this academic definition in order to 
propose the alternative methods for the attaining of finite peace and prosperity between two 
conflicting nations, Azerbaijanis and Armenians. The achieving of internationally guaranteed, 
accompanied and recognized peace treaty, at least, will be the best resolution of mutual national 
hatreds based on obnoxious, thorny, newly-enhanced, hugely-developed and technologically 
upgraded factors of hybrid warfare. 
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Chapter 1. The system modeling of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
 
 The system modeling of conflicts as a traditional method for understanding of political, 
military-technological, economic, social, psychological, legal and cyber natures and behavior of 
interstate struggles was chiefly connected and even arisen from "systems theory" in political 
sciences firstly conceived by David Easton. In his most sensational academic work "The political 
system: An inquiry into to the state of the political science", Dr. Easton has academically cleared 
out that political science has lacked a systematic theoretical scheme which would give meaning, 
coherence, and direction to research. The main idea was dealt with separation between social and 
political activities, at least for analytical purposes, and examine it as though for the moment it 
were a self-contained entity surrounded by, but clearly differentiated from, the environment or 
setting in which it operates. Easton's system is being alive because of its inputs of various kinds. 
These inputs will be transformed by process of the system to outputs, and it, in turn, has got 
results both for the system and for the environs in which there is still an existing system.74 
Systems theory became popular not only within political science but also has contributed 
greatly to the development of peace and war-related studies. It has created collateral academic 
stream within conflict studies and assisted the freshest approach to its distinguished analysis. 
Originating approximately in the same period, each of these scientific movements has influenced 
the other to a degree that may seem astonishing to outsiders, and both have been divided by a 
fierce methodological dispute. The parallel development has yielded several overlaps, among 
which an interesting coincidence can be observed. Despite David Easton's bravest theoretical 
inception, a number of the founders of General Systems Theory were also the forerunners of 
peace and conflict studies. On the basis of universal ethical motivations, the first peace 
researchers attempted to create holistic methodologies and more detailed models enabling 
humanity to identify, and eventually to control, the processes leading to the outbreaks of war.75 
Similar activities, albeit subdued by the political goals, were also carried out in government-
sponsored strategic studies centers, where so-called systems analysis was elaborated. Numerous 
                                                          
74 "The political system: An inquiry into to the state of the political science" by David Easton // New York, Alfred 
A. Knopf, Inc., 1953.-xiii, p. 320 // Retrieved at 19.02.2018 
75 The names and academic works of leading founders of General Systems Theory is available to be viewed in the 
seminal article called “The History and Status of General Systems Theory” edited by Ludwig Von Bertalanffy // The 
Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 15, No. 4, General Systems Theory (Dec. 1972), pp. 407-426 // Stable URL: 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/255139 // Published by Academy of Management, DOI: 10.2307/255139 // Retrieved at 
19.02.2018 
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obfuscations have been made at the introduction of mathematical models in peaceful researches. 
The relation varied from a naive charm up to absolute denial.76 
Using D. Easton's combination of political activity within one system which is separated 
from social life, we would also merge all actions within the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict under 
the same system which also exists because of its inputs, the core process, and the final outputs. 
In comparison with the system of D. Easton, in our case, it is almost impossible to separate 
completely the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict from social life, because of the high level of hybrid 
warfare factors, all these actions within the conflict are already bound. Despite all shortcomings, 
we will be able to model the system of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, trying to find the high 
degree of hybridity and its excessive negative consequences for the character of the conflict. The 
alternative system modeling of conflict will be constructed on the basis of David Easton’s 
systems theory as follow: 
Figure 1.
 
In our case, we will put in the center not the political system, but the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict itself. The basic idea will be binding chiefly with methodological benefit from system 
modeling of political environment that will be replaced with the system of Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict. The positive result will be attained with academic clarification, proof of gaps and high 
                                                          
76 "Applications of Systems Modelling in Peace Research" by Czesław Mesjasz // Abstract // Retrieved at 
19.02.2018 
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level of hybrid warfare factors which are still wielding potential danger that might lead to 
whether the full crash of the system or its total replacement with another complicated one:  
Figure 2.  
 
For detection of hybrid warfare factors, it is a very energetic method to make up a 
systematic layout of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Talking more about its inputs, it is very 
significant to differ them from demands and support derivated from initial effects of those inputs 
that time-by-time became a primary entrance to the system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The 
freshest and probably the most violating inputs of this conflict should be considered following 
historical facts: 
A) a civil war between Azeri and Armenian population (within USSR) for the status of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh region that was under the jurisdiction of USSR from the 1920s 
up to 1991, with the status of the autonomous oblast. It is no secret that Armenians as 
a populace and even by their high-stand diplomats or representatives in state 
apparatus of USSR, many years were struggling for the annexation of Nagorno-
Karabakh region; 
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B) a full-fledged interstate war after the collapse of USSR from 1991 to 1994. Even, we 
have already proven the old and not examined or maybe neglected factors of hybrid 
warfare within this wartime period by crucial primary sources, it is too obligatory to 
analyze post-war period and its contribution to the system; 
C) a post-war period, from 1994 to the end of the 1990s, encompassed by diplomatic 
chivvy that ended up with the crash of peaceful negotiations and with the criminal 
alteration of the peace-pursuing Armenian government; 
D) No war, no peace period saturated by contagious, new factors of hybrid warfare, from 
the beginning of the 2000s up to 2016s April war. This period was too passive and 
ineffective that mostly paved a pathway to the more accelerated enhancement of those 
hybrid warfare factors and deepened mutual national hatred between Azeris and 
Armenians; 
 
1.1.The history of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
 
As in every conflict between two or more nations, the basic questions usually derived 
from the context of territorial embracement of so-called “firstcomers”. Historically, it is very 
difficult even now to determine the real percentage of national identities perpetuating by local 
tribes of South Caucasus. Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of Azerbaijan had been 
filling with a plenty of different national minorities for more than thousands years ago. The vast 
majority of autochthons were Caucasian Albanians that were initially far away from Christianity 
and Islam and held their own religions that were called as Zoroastrianism and fire worship.77 For 
instance, in modern Azerbaijan, it is still popular to be called as a "land of fire".  
Probably the most interesting and objective commencement to the academic analysis of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict history has been done by pro-Armenian anthropologist Nora 
Dudwick who has specialized on the South Caucasus. She has encountered with several 
academic impediments which were mentioned in her seminal article "The case of the Caucasian 
Albanians: Ethnohistory and ethnic politics", where two aspects of the accompanying public 
discussion were very problematic. First, such discussions frequently began by a recital of the 
events of almost two millennia ago. Second, they were accompanied by such Armenian 
accusations as the Azerbaijanis had "falsified history" in order to appropriate Armenian lands, 
                                                          
77 Read the essays on the history and culture of Caucasian Albania: IV century. BC - VII century. AD written by 
K.V. Trever, Kamilla Vasilievna 
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culture, and history. Pursuant to her ideas, this polemic between Armenian and Azerbaijani 
scholars suggests something about the role of ethnographers and ethnography in the Soviet 
Union. The transmutation of political into academic discourse was encouraged by the 
responsibility of Soviet ethnography to convey a sense of ethnic harmony within the family of 
Soviet peoples. When interethnic and inter-republic tensions were denied free political 
expression, conflicts could be projected into the past and fought on the pages of academic 
journals. Disagreements between the Armenian and Azerbaijani versions of their general history 
also reflect more shipped project. For each person, this project consists in the definition of the 
personality for the future by means of concrete interpretation of the past.78 
According to official Azeri sources, Nagorno-Karabakh is one of the ancient regions of 
Azerbaijan, that was existing even within the Caucasian Albania. The name of this inseparable 
part of Azerbaijan consists of two different Azerbaijani words: "gara" (black) and "bag" 
(garden). The word Karabakh given by the Azerbaijan nation to a part of their native lands was 
used for the first time 1,300 years ago (in the 7th century).79 At first, Karabakh was used as a 
historical-geographical definition, but it later transformed to cover a larger geographical area. By 
the way, this aspect is very typical for Azerbaijan: Nakhchivan city - Nakhchivan region, Sheki 
city - Shaki region, Ganja city - Ganja region, Lenkoran city- Lenkoran region and etc. When 
Karabakh is a subject of disputes, at first, there is being derived a question of the location of 
Karabakh. What part of Azerbaijan includes Karabakh? The academic reply to this question is 
still carrying very huge significance, and it is necessary to understand the problem of Nagorno-
Karabakh prepared by Armenians. The academics and researchers of the Institute of History 
named after A.Bakykhanov of ANAS addressed themselves to the origins in order to answer the 
question. When Karabakh khanate of Azerbaijan included this territory its regent Mirza Jamal 
Javanshir in consideration of this question in his work the "History of Karabakh" wrote: 
"According to the ancient historical books the frontiers of Karabakh are: from the south the river 
Araz - from Hudapharin Bridge to Sinig Bridge.80 At present, the population of Gazah, 
Shamseddin and Demerchi-Hesenly lives near this bridge and Russian Tatars call it using the 
Russian term “Krasniy Most” that is the Red Bridge. From the east - the Kur River, which flows 
                                                          
78 Dudwick Nora. The case of the Caucasian Albanians: Ethnohistory and ethnic politics. In: Cahiers du monde 
russe et soviétique, vol. 31, n°2-3, Avril-Septembre 1990. Regards sur l'anthropologie soviétique. p. 377 // URL: 
https://www.persee.fr/doc/cmr_0008-0160_1990_num_31_2_2237 // Retrieved at 25.02.2018 
79 From the New Azerbaijan Party’s online interpretation on the etymology, territory, and borders of Karabakh // 
URL: http://www.yap.org.az/en/view/pagetabs/1 // Retrieved at 25.02.2018 
80 The title of the article – “KARABAKH: Etymology, territory and borders” // Institute of History named after 
A.Bakykhanov of ANAS // URL: http://www.yap.org.az/en/view/pagetabs/1 // Retrieved at 25.02.2018 
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into the Araz River in Javad village and flows into the Caspian Sea. From the north - the Goran 
River, which flows from the Yelizavetpol frontier of Karabakh to the Kur River, crosses it in 
many parts and riches of the Araz River. From the west - the high mountains of Karabakh called 
Kusbek, Salvarti, Erikli. Such a detailed description of the territory and frontiers of Karabakh at 
the first stages of Russian occupation and colonization are explained by the following factors: 1) 
this fact is described by an official person directly connected with the government of Karabakh, 
in other words, this fact is reflected in an official document composed by an official 
representative of Russia; 2) on the other hand this fact is not only based at practices and realities, 
but it also finds reflection in the references. It is not occasional that ancient books are used to 
prove the position of Mirza Jamal. There was a general definition of Karabakh, which was not 
used only for Daghlig Garabagh, but for both mountainous and plain parts. In other words, the 
word combination of "Daglig Garabag"(Mountainous Karabakh) is a product of the subsequent 
periods, the name given to one of the parts of Karabakh as a result of separatist intentions. 
According to afore-initiated Azeri standpoint, even an ordinary logic proves this fact: If there is 
"Daglig Garabag" then there must be flat or low-lying Karabakh too. The reality is that there are 
both Daghlig Garabagh and Low-lying Karabakh (that is flat Karabakh) in Azerbaijan. And 
always both low-lying (flat) and Daglig (mountainous) Karabakh during all historical periods 
were the motherland of one nation - the nation of Azerbaijan, the nation who has in its language 
the words "gara" and "bag". Hundreds of the most ancient and rarest models of folklore, which 
are the brilliant musical pearls of the nation of Azerbaijan, were created in Karabakh and are 
related to Karabakh.81 
On the other hand, Armenian scholars claim that Albania (not to be confused with the 
modern state of Albania) covered a relatively small territory north of the Kura river. They also 
argue that Utik (the Armenian name of the territory that covered low-lying Karabakh and 
territories of modern Gazah-Tovuz-Shamkir regions of Azerbaijan82), Artsakh (the name of 
Nagorno-Karabakh in Armenia83) and Siunik (according to the "geography of the VII century in 
Armenia", "Sunik" consisted of 12 provinces, but sources of Southern Syunik are also referred to 
as modern Zangazur city of Azerbaijan84) the disputed provinces south of the Kura , were 
                                                          
81 From the article edited by Institute of History named after A.Bakykhanov of ANAS and published in the official 
site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan // URL: http://mfa.gov.az/content/801 // 
Retrieved at 03.03.2018 
82 The Soviet Soviet Encyclopedia, vol. IX, p.469, article: Uti // Retrieved at 03.03.2018 
83 The name of Nagorno-Karabakh region has also been indicated in the article edited by the Armenian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs as the “Artsakh” // http://www.mfa.am/en/artsakh/ // Retrieved at 03.03.2018 
84 Zangezur - article from the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (3rd edition) // Retrieved at 03.03.2018  
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ethnically Armenian, and had been part of the Armenian kingdom of the Ervanids since the forth 
century BC. They also underline other historical moments as well as the partition of "Greater 
Armenia" between Byzantium and Iran, in 387 AD. According to them, in 428, the Sassanids 
reorganized their Transcaucasian territories into the three regions of Iberia, Albania, and 
Armenia, and Albania was administratively strengthened by the addition of Utik and Artsakh. 
Only then Albania came to include territory on both sides of Kura river. By not mentioning 
historical de-ethnicization of Albanian tribes by Armenian clergy, modern Armenian historians 
mostly pay attention to an alphabet that was allegedly invented by the famous Armenian monk 
Mesrop Mashtots. But in reality, Albania was the first state in the Transcaucasus to adopt 
Christianity, and that its Church was initially autocephalous. A lingua franca was also used by 
the Albanian tribes even before Albania was baptized. An alphabet has already been invented 
and was existing, to which Mesrop Mashtots only added a few modifications.85  
Pursuant to Nora Dudwick's research on the historical analysis of conflict over Nagorno-
Karabakh region, the territorial issue was the most symbolically and emotively laden. But her 
academic reasoning was very contradictory because talking a few about de-ethnicization of 
Albanians by small Armenian tribes with the active cooperation of Arabs86, she has decided that 
provinces south of the Kura river, were, in fact, Armenian whether Utik or Artsakh. But anyway, 
we do agree with her just on one moment that the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh region 
will not be altered on the basis of events some thousand years in the past.87  
Therefore, it will be academically productive to analyze more close period of conflict 
between Azeris and Armenians over Nagorno-Karabakh region. Unsurprisngly, the creation of 
modern Armenian state was chiefly implemented at the expense of Russian Empire and also 
resettlement of Armenians on the lands occupied by Russia from Iran and Turkey was not a 
casual event, but rather was a natural result of Russo-Armenian relations which in the Armenian 
historical literature were popularized only as trade relations. The Armenian-Russian relations 
extend with a Russian conquer of Kazan (1552) and Astrakhan (1556), the Turkish wars (1635-
1639, 1711, 1768-1774, 1787-1791, etc.) and become stronger by the next Russian attempts of 
                                                          
85 Dudwick Nora. The case of the Caucasian Albanians : Ethnohistory and ethnic politics. In: Cahiers du monde 
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gaining of Caspian lands. During these events, there has been twisted the process of the 
resettlement of Armenians to Russia and creation here of the Armenian colonies. In this case, the 
big role was played by the state Decree of Peter I of October 10, 1724. This Decree provided the 
agreement on allocation of lands under settling and resettlement of Armenians on the lands 
occupied by Russia. This political line of Peter I has been continued by his successors during the 
whole century. For ANAS, some time later, the Armenian nationalists have put forward the false 
and compelled problem for "self-determination of the Karabakh Armenians" and carry out the 
open-armed aggression against the peace Azerbaijani population living on their initial ancient 
lands - Karabakh unfounded allegations of the Armenian geopoliticians and their mercenaries 
became widespread that Karabakh belongs to Armenia. However historic facts represent 
incontestable proofs of the return. The earliest of such documents has been signed on May 14, 
1805, which was called as Kurekchay Treaty, between the Karabakh khan Ibrahim and Russian 
Empire about a transfer of this khanate under the power of Russia who was brightly showing that 
the empire has won only the Azerbaijani lands where Armenians from Turkey and Iran have 
moved later on. None of these documents contained mentions of the Armenian or Armenian 
possession in Karabakh as though they pass under the power of Russia. According to conclusive 
Azeri viewpoint, the publication of this document would become the correct answer to the 
Armenian falsifiers and their paid lawyers.88 The victory of Russia in the Russian-Iranian war of 
1804 — 1813 and the "Gyulistansky contract" which has led to the partition of Azerbaijan 
resolutely have advanced resettlement and association of Armenians. After Erivani's taking 
during the Russian-Iranian war in 1826-1828 this plan began to be realized and the project of 
resettlement has already been prepared by the Armenian Catholicos Nerses Ashtareketsi. In 
preparation and introduction of this plan, the big role was played also by A.S. Griboyedov.89 
In November, 1827, to Egizar Lazaryan who was in Tabriz and has been invited from St. 
Petersburg for implementation of the leadership in resettlement of Armenians, Nerses wrote: 
"Now I have asked the faithful defender of our Armenian nationality mister A.S. Griboyedov 
about that he did not forget my request for our captured Christians and that wherever he will 
visit, would promote their acceptance under a powerful Russian flag … I have also asked his 
Highness of mister Paskevich and now I write mister Griboyedov A. S. and also I ask your 
highness to incline mister Ivan Fyodorovich Paskevich to that during truce I have not forgotten 
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to include in the agreement article providing free return of the Armenians living in the cities and 
the villages of Iran to the homeland under the auspices of Russia."90 
The XV article of the "Turkmenchaysky contract" signed on February 10, 1828, provided 
resettlement of Armenians. From the XV article: "His Highness Shah … grants general 
forgiveness to all population and officials of the area called Azerbaijan … Besides, since this 
day, within one year they have the right together with the family to pass from Iran to Russia 
without any obstacles from local chiefs and officials and also to sell movable goods, without 
being levied any duty and taxes. As for real estate, for his sale or some voluntary decision on 
him, five years are defined".91 
For the organization of resettlement of Armenians in Nakhchivan and Irevan, the 
committee on resettlement has been created. There have been defined huge privileges for 
immigrants, in which they were exempted from taxes and a compulsory military service within 
six years and have been paid by grants of the contribution received from Iran. After some 
preparatory activities resettlement has begun. The number of the Armenians moved from Iran 
made 40-50 thousand people. In the course and after the Russian-Turkish war of 1828-1829 from 
Turkey 90 thousand Armenians have been moved. Resettlement of Armenians from Turkey and 
other eastern states has been continued also during the subsequent period. Transcaucasia was the 
main direction of resettlement. In 1911 N.I. Shavrov wrote: "From 1 million 300 thousand 
Armenians living now in Transcaucasia over one million are not indigenous people, and is 
moved by us".92 At resettlement of Armenians in Transcaucasia special attention was paid on 
that, where exactly to place them. A.S. Griboyedov wrote: "From the areas occupied by the 
Russian army — Tabriz, Hui, Salmaz, Maragi of all Armenians need to be lodged in 
Nakhchivan, Irevan, and the Karabakh region". This recommendation of Griboyedov has been 
adequately implemented. Shavrov wrote: "Armenians accommodated, generally on fertile lands 
of Elizavetpol (Ganja) and Irevansky province where them was insignificant a little. A mountain 
part of the Elizavetpolsky province (Nagorno-Karabakh) and the coast of the lake Gyoycha have 
been populated with these Armenians ". Thus, change of ethnic structure of the called territories 
was a result of settling by their Armenians. According to the historical data of 1823, from 20 
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thousand families of the Karabakh region (the territory of the former Karabakh khanate), only 
1,5 thousand were the Armenian families. After resettlement, the ethnic proportion of the 
population is sharply changed. In 1832 64,8% of the population of Karabakh were 
Azerbaijanians, and 34,8% became Armenians. This policy purposefully proceeded. In the 
eighties of XIX century in the national structure of the Shusha County there were 41,5% of 
Azerbaijanians, Armenians there were 58,2%. According to a population census of Russia in 
1897, these figures have made 45 and 53%, and in 1917 — 40,2 and 52,3%.9394 
At the beginning of 20th century, even within Russian Empire, there were being emerged 
little but very explosive cells of mutual distrust and contempt between Azeris and Armenians. 
The main reason was dealt with the earnest desire of Azeri population to create a modern 
democratic state within internationally recognized borders. On May 28, 1918, after 120 years' 
submission of Russia, the Azerbaijani people have created the independent state in Northern 
Azerbaijan. In the Declaration of independence, the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic declared 
that it is an heiress-at-law of the lands of Northern Azerbaijan occupied by Russia on the basis of 
Gyulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828) treaties. Again, in the same Declaration of 
independence it has been noted: "From this day the people of Azerbaijan have sovereign rights, 
Azerbaijan consisting of East and Southern Transcaucasia and is the full independent state".95 
The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic (hereinafter ADR) which was the first secular 
democracy in the Muslim world has published legally and politically reasonable map of the 
territory. The Azerbaijan Democratic Republic sought to restore the legal power in all historical 
territory of Karabakh which was an integral part of Azerbaijan. At the same time just announced 
Armenian (Ararat) Republic has put forward the unreasonable claims for Karabakh. The 
government of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic has rejected these claims. On January 15, 
1919, after the appointment of Khosrov bek Sultanov to the post of Governor-General of 
Karabakh (along with Zangezur), new democracies of Transcaucasia in Azerbaijan and Armenia 
sought for the final solution of the dispute that could be found at the Paris Peace Conference. 
The candidacy of K. Sultanov was also approved by General W. Thomson, Head of the British 
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Retrieved at 20.03.2018   
94 See also: A Record on Karabakh Province in 1823 collected by a civil servant, Mogilevsky, and a colonel, 
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troops quartered in Baku representing the Allied Powers.96 In August 1919, the Karabakh 
Armenians and the ADR Government signed a temporary agreement that “mountainous part of 
Karabakh, ... inhabited also by Armenians, considers itself in the boundaries of Republic of 
Azerbaijan.”97 The resolution was based on the recognition of “cultural self-determination”98 of 
the Armenian population of Karabakh. Georgian Bolshevik newspaper Borba noted that “the 
agreement between Armenians and Muslims in Karabakh is already a fact...In the present case, 
we see the first serious attempt at resolution of the Armenian-Muslim conflict not by means of 
violence but by means of negotiation”.99100 For us, it was the most unforgivable blunder of that-
times Azeri leadership, because the negotiations were basically stressed on the willing of 
Armenians to ensure from the Azeri government the cultural and territorial transformation of 
Irevan (which was the main administrative center of Irevan khanate on the territory of 
Azerbaijan) from Azerbaijan into the newly-emerging state of Armenia. In return, Armenians 
have obliged themselves to stay away from territorial claims over Karabakh, but they again did 
not implement one's commitments. In those years, the borders of each country were not 
definitely proven by the international community and if Armenia was struggling to get some 
territories from Eastern Anatolian region of Ottomans where they have argued an alleged 
existence of the "Greater Armenia", the Azeri population sought for international support in 
order to gain independence from centuries-long occupation by Russian Empire. 
Despite all obstacles, Azeri movement for independence from Russian Empire was 
backed by the international community in the same level as it was en route to Armenian one 
from Ottomans. Therefore, in early 1920, the Paris Peace Conference has recognized Karabakh 
as an internal part of Azerbaijan in order to empower a new strong state against new Bolshevik 
threat from Russia.101 The territorial friction over the mountainous part of Karabakh resumed 
after the Sovietization of Armenia and Azerbaijan. On July 5, 1921, the Caucasus Bureau of the 
Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of the Bolsheviks, consented on the finite 
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legal status of this territory. The most significant document in this context was the July 5, 1921 
decree of Caucasus Bureau of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of the 
Bolsheviks, in which Stalin, along with several Armenian members, such as A. Nazaretyan and 
A. Myasnikyan, agreed on retaining mountainous Karabakh within Azerbaijan, not “transferring” 
or “ceding” it to anyone and leave it within the borders of Azerbaijan SSR”.102 Only on July 7, 
1923, the Central Executive Committee (hereinafter CEC) of Azerbaijan SSR issued a decree 
“On the Formation of the Autonomous Oblast of Nagorno-Karabakh (AONK103)”.104105 
Meanwhile, the 1936 Constitution of Soviet Union brought new provisions on autonomous 
entities, establishing a list of all autonomous oblasts and republics within the USSR.106 
Nevertheless, article 24 of the 1936 USSR Constitution reconfirmed that Nagorno-Karabakh 
Autonomous Oblast (hereinafter NKAO) was an integral part of Azerbaijan SSR.107  
In Soviet times, the authorities of the Armenian SSR had repeatedly raised the issue of 
the transfer of NKAO to Armenia with Moscow. This happened in 1945, 1964 and 1968, but met 
with resistance from the Azerbaijani side, which to some extent had the support of Moscow.108 
Nonetheless, Armenian attempts to secure the consent of Moscow on this issue continued.109 The 
new 1977 USSR Constitution did not deliver further regulations for the autonomous units of the 
USSR. In this Constitution, NKAO once again remained constant as an autonomous oblast of 
Azerbaijan SSR. Pursuant to the Article 110 of the 1977 USSR Constitution, the Council of 
Nationalities had to be elected on the basis of the following representation: 32 deputies from 
each member Republic, 11 deputies from each Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each 
autonomous region, and one deputy from each autonomous area.110 
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 Unfortunately, Mikhail Gorbachev's policy of "perestroika' and "glasnost" has not been 
continued with the advent of positive results. The tensions amidst other different nationalities of 
USSR were getting rapidly enlarged as well. However, one thing was certain: Armenians and 
Azerbaijanis were able to live and develop peacefully for several decades of Soviet rule, without 
many of the domestic problems that affected the whole of the Soviet Union. In all three periods 
of the development of autonomy, we can see that it was managed by the same system of 
governmental bodies; their names were changed but the essence of their function was not. From 
the Congress of Soviets up until the NKAO Soviet of People’s Deputies, the legislative power 
was mostly illusory, and decisions and legislation were adopted on the basis of the party 
arrangements, as in the rest of the USSR. Thus, it can be concluded that the reasons for the 
failure of autonomy were not discrimination on the part of the central Azerbaijani government, 
nor the lack of access to minority rights, but rather the Soviet system of administration and 
Armenia’s separatist goals. 111 
 
1.2. Basic reasons for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's systematic hybridity 
 
The seepage of systematic hybridity is connected to the demands and support emerged 
from the fastest dissemination of inputs’ negative and too small positive effects. The short period 
of civil war was memorized by such internal demands within Soviet bureaucracy as how 
urgently cope with different local conflicts between national minorities that were mostly based 
on territorial claims and mutual ethnic cleansing. So-called Armenian "irredentism policy" was 
too organized and did not hesitate to use all methods to annex Nagorno-Karabakh region from its 
historical roots that were dilated into the heartland of Azerbaijan. Within civil war period of 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the greatest demand was documented in All-union referendum112 
undertaken by that times President of USSR, Mikhail Gorbachev to keep together Soviet 
Socialist Republics as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics in which the rights and 
freedom of an individual of any nationality will be completely guaranteed. This referendum was 
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held on March 17, 1991, and revealed major intentions of conflicting national minorities. In the 
case of conflict between Azeris and Armenians for Nagorno-Karabakh region, everything was 
overwhelmingly complicated, but one thing was quite crystal-clear that Armenians had seized 
the great historical moment for the next betrayal behind the back of the Soviet Union, how 
quickly to declare its independence and to demonstrate, in advance, the artificial, allegedly 
historical borders of ones new state, where they through the unilateral referendum, planned to 
include the Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (hereinafter 
ASSR). One of the basic reasons for systematic hybridity within conflict had emerged from this 
initial stage of the civil war period. There were appeared two opposite supports that infected the 
newly-forthcoming system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with irregular methods fulled by a 
high level of hybridity. Mikhail Gorbachev, who, previously, even at the beginning of his rule, 
was encircled by such Armenian advisers as Abel Geyzovich Agambegyan, Karen Nerserovich 
Brutenz, Georgy Khosroevich Shakhnazarov, Elena Georgiyevna Bonner and etc., unfortunately, 
became dependent on their chiefly pro-American assumptions. Unsurprisingly, on February 26, 
1988, he had met in Kremlin such aggressive and sentimental Armenian nationalists as Zori 
Balayan and Silva Kaputikyan, and then, as an unexpected result, he had decided to freeze their 
demands for annexation but sent Deputy Head of the CPSU113 Department Karen Brutenz to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh region for the support to other local Armenians.114115 Despite all 
contradicting steps, Mr. Gorbachev had backed Azerbaijan that was not against the keeping up of 
USSR as a unified country and confirmed it by votes of its population in All-Union 
referendum.116  
Meanwhile, in the strategical part, it was the next sample for staying in a power, but 
operational stage became complicated after the decision to commence the "Operation Ring".117 It 
was a joint operation leading by Soviet Internal Security Forces that were getting directives from 
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newly-established Security Council of USSR and by OMON118 from Azerbaijan SSR. The basic 
goal was to disarm and prosecute illegal Armenian guerrilla fighters who called themselves as 
"fedayeen" and to supplement passport checking. The false concept of the Armenians about the 
displacement and isolation of the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians lost its former euphoric 
popularity even in the eyes of Mikhail Gorbachev and he realized that everything was and will 
be done for the sake of seceding from the USSR, with the joint occupation of foreign territories 
in the name of expanding its borders. Armenians had lost Gorbachev's support on their quite 
opposite demands on annexation of Nagorno-Karabakh region to the Armenian SSR. But it was 
late, the situation around Nagorno-Karabakh region had already been raped by real signs of the 
upcoming full-scale war. According to such pro-Armenian academics as Erik Melander, the 
Operation Ring was done for ethnic cleansing and total expulsion of Armenians from north-
western part of Nagorno-Karabakh region. But indeed, it was a result of a filthy policy of 
Armenian lobby in the USA and has found its collateral endorsement by the report submitted to 
the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives and The Committee on Foreign 
Relations of U.S. Senate introduced by The Department of State. They were not hesitating to 
condemn even without one real evidence the USSR Interior Ministry forces and Azeri OMON 
detachments on attacking some Armenian settlements in Nagorno-Karabakh and forcible 
deportation of over 1,000 residents to Armenia, causing death, injuries, and loss of property. 
Armenians had exchanged support on their illegal activities from Soviet to American one and 
then after the dissolution of Soviet Union, there had ignited a full-scale war, mostly, by remnants 
of the Soviet army. 
 
1.2.1. Possible rebirth of old hybrid warfare’s factors: Intermediate development 
 
The second phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict had brought the next new demands 
and supports into the system, that was, again and again, proving the co-existence of irregular, 
hybrid and operationally complicated methods for the occupation of Nagorno-Karabakh region. 
We have already analyzed local strategical confrontations for superiority within one's 
governments from either side which creates basic demands that might be overviewed or 
understood just within one system. In comparison with new Azeri movement for independence 
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from USSR led by activists of Popular Front, Armenians were not fighting just for the security 
within an independent state and its territorial integrity.  If for Azerbaijani leadership the basic 
demand was to defend its borders from invasion and further occupation, the Armenians were 
demanding special safety for their allegedly isolated and forcefully deported comrades in 
Nagorno-Karabakh region. The same demand could be introduced and obtrusively inundated by 
the Azeri government as well, to defend its fellow citizens that had really and already been 
deported from Yerevan and its surrounding districts. Unsurprisingly, this process has not begun 
after "Perestroika" or from a finite collapse of Soviet Union but had quite deep and unbearable 
history of injustice from the beginning of the 1900s. Unlike the vindictive Armenians, the 
leaders of Popular Front of Azerbaijan had not rationally appreciated this fact and did not make 
reciprocal steps to demand the rights for life and property of deported Azeris who, even prior to 
the Revolution, had made up 43 percent of the population of Erevan.119 
The deportation process was bureaucratically replaced by the term of "resettlement" of 
the Azerbaijani population from Armenia to Azerbaijan. It was closely connected with the 
attempts of the Soviet leadership after World War II to expand their borders at the expense of 
Turkey. This shameful process has mostly begun from Erevan which was wielding such 
destructed historical Azeri monuments as the Palace of Irevan khans, Azerbaijani tombstones in 
Urus village, the Fortress Agtala near Lori mahal of the Irevan khanate (nowadays - the 
Tumanyan area Republic of Armenia) and etc., that were irrefutable historical evidence. In 
conjunction with the resolution of this problem, active work was carried out among Armenian 
national groups in the United States, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East in order to 
repatriate them to their “historical homeland”. In turn, the possibility of mass repatriation gave 
the leadership of the Armenian SSR a convenient excuse to hope to expand the boundaries of the 
republic not only at the expense of the territory of Turkey but also of neighboring Azerbaijan.120 
Thus, in a letter to Stalin in November 1945, the first secretary of the Communist Party of 
Armenia, G. Arutinov, made a proposal to separate Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan and 
incorporate it into Soviet Armenia.121 In response, the first secretary of the Communist Party of 
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Azerbaijan SSR, M. J. Bagirov, made counterclaims, and after that, the issue was withdrawn.122 
In comparison with such national minorities in Armenia as Kurds, Russians, Greeks, after the 
last census of 1979 within the Soviet Union, Azeris were the largest minority in Armenia making 
up 5,3% (approximately 160,800 people) of Armenia’s population.123 During history, it still was 
the smallest amount of Azeri population, because of well-organized deportation and alleged 
repatriation policy of Russian Empire against Ottoman and Persian Empires. The possible 
creation of Armenian state would be served as a geopolitical fore-post and strategical buffer zone 
in order to cut deep Turkic links from the Caucasus and further Central Asian countries. The 
treaties of Gulistan124 and Turkmenchay125 are still serving as a basic historical evidence to this 
sort of academic disposition. The next and final stage of mass expulsion of Azerbaijanis from 
Armenia has commenced in 1987 from the district of Kafan. (Thomas De Waal, 1996, p.19) 
Pursuant to Azeri statistics, about 40,897 Azerbaijani families were totally deported and 216 
people died. The vast majority of the victims were from northern areas, where refugees came 
from former Kirovoabad (today: Ganja) district, especially to district Gugark, where 11 people 
were killed.126  
If first civil war period of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ended up with quite negative 
decisions to make a war for an outbreak of occupation within the internationally recognized 
territory of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the second wartime phase can be considered as the most 
violent action arisen from previous demands and supports that poured out of conflict itself. 
Unfortunately, it has ostensibly finished with 1994 armistice which for us cannot be 
academically examined and overviewed as a systematic output that will be capable to bear with 
future positive feedback from the international community and local population from either 
conflicting side. It was just a transformation to another, new system which will be controlled by 
distinguished demands and supports and will again be perplexed by the ever-upgrading factors of 
hybrid warfare. The full-scale military operations for the occupation and further annexation of 
Nagorno-Karabakh region to Armenia has taken place between 1991 and 1994, which was also 
labeled as a Nagorno-Karabakh war. The significance of strategical confrontations for the 
holding of superiority within one's government and its role in negotiations were altered by 
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heavyweight of operational craftsmanship and insidious, tricky and irregular tactics that had 
mostly breached all pillars of international humanitarian law, its proper conventions and other 
relevant laws of war. The use of guerrilla fighters without military insignia from both sides, a 
gathering of ex-terrorists within such special divisions as already mentioned "ARABO", the 
terroristic acts far away from a battlespace saturated by such intimidations as the bombing of 
metro stations in Baku, subversive acts for cutting the ties amidst strategically close districts 
were major proof of first hybrid warfare factors that faced not only simultaneity, but also 
criminality of actions. After an achieving a decision to sign a so-called "Bishkek Protocole" on 5 
May 1994, there was emerged the next doubtful actions en route "mediation of negotiations for a 
peaceful resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict", but was no systematic output that must be 
labeled as a positive result and end of a conflict. It has just frozen hot military operations, paved 
a quite intertwined road for a peaceful resolution and threatened with a possible rebirth of old 
hybrid warfare factors. Meanwhile, in the third phase of the conflict, we have been encountered 
with the transformation of not only decisions and supports, but also the replacement of old 
hybrid warfare factors with the new ones those mostly differed with multi-modality, criminality, 
high probability of implementation, and huge damage to the real peaceful resolution of conflict.  
The third phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict can also be analyzed as an input of its 
ever-changing system that also attested to the new demands and supports arisen from the post-
war actions which engaged foreign actors as well. The main discernible goal was to attain a 
peaceful resolution of conflict but in reality there was appeared another system filled with 
various decisions and actions. Even in 1992 within a wartime period, there has been achieved a 
decision to form a special Minsk Group by the CSCE, now Organization for Security and Co-
operation in Europe (hereinafter OSCE) to bear and promote a negotiated resolution to the 
conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. The Helsinki Additional 
Meeting of the CSCE Council on 24 March 1992, proposed the Chairman-in-Office to meet as 
soon as possible in a new conference on Nagorno-Karabakh under the aegis of the CSCE to 
ensure an ongoing forum for negotiations towards a peaceful settlement of the crisis on the basis 
of the principles, commitments and provisions of the CSCE.127 The Conference would have to 
take place in Minsk. The Ministers agreed that the CSCE must play a major role in promoting a 
peace process relating to the conflict. They agreed that the situation in and around Nagorno-
Karabakh requires further CSCE action. Although the planned conference was overrated and not 
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taken place, Minsk Group of OSCE was lasting to act as a new actor for peaceful resolution of 
conflict.128  
Only on 6 December 1994, the OSCE Budapest Summit of Heads of State or Government 
agreed to set a co-chairmanship for the process. Deploring the continuation of the conflict and 
the human tragedy involved, the participating states welcomed the confirmation by the parties to 
the conflict of the cease-fire agreed on 12 May 19, 1994, with the mediation of the Russian 
Federation in the teamwork with the Minsk group of CSCE. They confirmed their commitment 
to the relevant resolutions of the United Nations Security Council and welcomed the political 
support given by the Security Council to the CSCE's efforts towards a peaceful settlement of the 
conflict. For this purpose, they have urged parties of the conflict to enter intensive negotiations 
on an including direct contacts. In this context, they pledged to redouble the efforts and 
assistance by the CSCE. They have resolutely supported intermediary efforts of the Minsk group 
of CSCE and have expressed a satisfaction with the most important contribution of the Russian 
Federation and efforts of other certain members. They agreed to harmonize these into a single 
coordinated effort within the framework of the CSCE. Based on this objective, they have sent the 
acting Chairman-in-Office to consultations with the state parties and have as soon as possible 
acted as Co-chairmen of the Minsk conference to provide the general and coordinated basis for 
negotiations and to carry out full coordination in all intermediary and negotiation actions. The 
co-chairmen, guided in all of their negotiating efforts by CSCE principles and an agreed 
mandate, was joint to chair meetings of the Minsk Group and jointly reported to the Chairman-
in-Office. They would regularly brief the Permanent Council on the progress of their work. As 
the first step in these efforts they have urged Co-chairmen of the Minsk conference to take 
immediate measures for assistance, with support and cooperation of the Russian Federation and 
other certain members of the Minsk group, to presumption of ongoing ceasefire and, relying on 
the progress which is already reached during the previous intermediary actions to hold the fastest 
negotiations on the conclusion of the political agreement on the termination of armed conflict 
which realization would allow to eliminate the main consequences of the conflict for all parties 
and to allow convocation of the Minsk conference. They also asked the Co-chairmen of the 
Minsk Conference to proceed a cooperation with the parties for further implementation of 
confidence-building measures, especially in the humanitarian sphere. They have emphasized the 
need of that the participating states undertook as individually, and within the relevant 
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international organizations of a measure for humanitarian assistance to the population of the 
region with paying of special attention to simplification of a difficult situation of refugees. They 
have agreed that according to reasons of the parties in the conflict the conclusion of the 
agreement mentioned above would also allow developing multinational peacekeeping forces as 
an important element for the implementation of the agreement. They have declared the political 
will with the appropriate resolution of the Security Council of the United Nations of 
multinational forces on peacekeeping of CSCE after the agreement between the parties on the 
termination of armed conflict. They asked the acting chairman to develop as soon as possible the 
plan of creation, drawing up and functioning of such forces organized on the basis of chapter III 
of the Helsinki document of 1992 and in full accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. 
For this purpose Co-chairmen of the Minsk conference and the Minsk group would be assisted 
the acting chairman and with assistance of the Secretary general; after the corresponding 
consultations he would also create in Vienna group of high level of planning for pronouncement 
of recommendations, in particular, of the size and characteristics of force, command, and control, 
material support, distribution of units and resources, rules of interaction and arrangements from 
the involved states. He would try to obtain support from the United Nations on the basis of the 
stated readiness of the United Nations to provide technical consultations and expert knowledge. 
He would also try to obtain a continuation of political support from the Security Council of the 
United Nations for possible expansion of peacekeeping forces of CSCE. On the basis of such 
preparatory work and the relevant provisions of chapter III of the Helsinki document of 1992 and 
after consent and official request of the parties of the acting chairman through Co-chairmen of 
the Minsk conference the Permanent Council would adopt the final decision on creation of 
peacekeeping operation of CSCE.129 For the implementation of the Budapest decisions, that 
times Hungarian Chairman-in-Office Marton Krasznai issued on 23 March 1995, the mandate for 
the Co-Chairmen of the Minsk Process.130 
Only in 1997 two options of settlement — package and stage-by-stage have been offered 
conflicting parties. The first of them has been rejected by Azerbaijan, the second — self-declared 
Nagorno Karabakh Republic (hereinafter NKR). Moreover, the consent of Armenia to this option 
of settlement became the reason of criminal change of the power in Armenia. This change was 
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other evidence to the surpassing of operational hybridity by the bloody and partially terroristic 
struggle for supremacy in the strategical part of a conflict. In this phase, additional game to look 
innocent in front of the international community has paralyzed the effectiveness of mediation 
process and opened new doors for the fastest spreading of such new hybrid warfare factors as 
fake news, the promotion of false patriotism, propaganda, and disorientation of popular attention 
from internal economic and social problems. Intermediaries have hurried to submit the new offer 
on settlement and when it has been rejected by Azerbaijan, negotiation process has come to a 
standstill. The Minsk group of OSCE for all this time managed to execute only one of the 
functions, namely providing the permanent forum for negotiations on the peaceful resolution of a 
crisis. As a result, the demands for a peaceful negotiation could not find its real supporters to the 
resolution of conflict and dormant decisions on the convening of permanent summits had not 
ended up with an evolutional action of the international community.  
 
1.3. New factors of hybrid warfare as a destroyer of an unstable system 
 
Initially, for this chapter, it will be a quite cunning step to refresh the readers' memory by 
those emerging new factors of hybrid warfare which were arisen chiefly from the result of our 
distinguished academic definition over the nature of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and its close ties 
with this new hybrid warfare concept. One of the most exciting new factors within dispute over 
Nagorno-Karabakh region is occurring between current Armenian and Azeri governments, which 
we do agree to call as an image-making game. This game has got two arenas, first one is an 
international, and the second is a local one. Diplomats from either side, almost in every 
diplomatic meeting, under the roofs of international communities do not hesitate to condemn one 
another by using internal social, economic and political problems, lack of democracy and mutual 
digital propagandas as the main impediment en route to success within negotiations for the 
peaceful resolution of conflict. That is why each leadership is still using the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict itself as a trigger of emergent mobilization and an alternative escape from domestic 
uprisings based on internal economic and social disorders. 
Concerning Azerbaijan, in this sense, there must be mentioned 2015s devaluation of 
Azerbaijani National Currency - manat. According to economist Shirin Mirzeyev from the 
Center for Economic and Social Development (hereinafter CESD), starting from February 21st, 
2015 the official exchange rate of the dollar to the manat has been set at 1.05 manat, which was 
33.86 percent more than the exchange rate set before the beginning of the weakening process of 
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the rate. Central Bank of Azerbaijan has had face a dilemma to depreciate manat since the sharp 
dropping of a crude oil price in the world market in fall of 2014; either going sharp depreciation 
or having gradual devaluation. In fact, Central Bank has announced that sharp depreciation 
would not be in the government’s agenda in the near future. Just 2 days after the Central Bank’s 
governor’s official declaration on not going to sharp depreciation, the national currency of 
Azerbaijan has lost its value against to major foreign currencies by 33.86 %. Manat’s rate 
dropped to 1.05 from 0.78 against to US dollar.131 
Azerbaijan’s currency has dramatically plummeted after moving to a floating exchange 
rate, causing a rush on dollars and shops as customers try to buy goods before prices increase. 
Close to the end of 2015, the manat lost 32% to the dollar following the central bank’s decision 
to stop protecting its value in the face of falling oil prices. The bank said it had lost more than 
half its foreign reserves trying to defend the national currency. Contemporaneously, opposition 
leaders criticised authorities for allowing the manat to fall so dramatically. “Azerbaijan has 
moved to a floating exchange rate but someone forgot to teach it how to swim,” said Natiq 
Cafarli, an economist, and member of the opposition Republican Alternative.132 Residents of 
Baku were angry at the sudden announcement and scrambled to convert their manats into foreign 
currency or durable goods. “This is such a miserable situation for the whole nation,” one said. 
“Everyone wants to buy dollars and only a few (banks and exchange offices will) sell … There 
are almost no dollars left at exchange points.” An employee at Baku’s Bina shopping market said 
the shop had had to close to avoid losing money. Others wanting to buy dollars and euros found 
many exchange offices shut or not selling hard currencies, while several banks put a $500 limit 
on exchanges.133 Consequently, it has entailed massive uprisings of the unemployed population 
and there had been emerging domestic economic, social and political chaos. 
Beginning from 12th January 2016, people launched massive protests in some regions of 
Azerbaijan. Protests took place across Azerbaijan in the latest sign of mounting frustration over 
unemployment, price hikes and other economic woes in Azerbaijan. Demonstrators showed their 
grievances,  basically, including anger over price rises on essential items as flour and bread. The 
protesters' rallies took part in the districts of Fuzuli, Aghsu, Aghjabadi, Siyazan, and Lankaran 
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on the 13th of January. The forces of internal security services were deployed to suppress the 
rallies by demonstrators, using rubber bullets and tear gas. Reports say there were detentions in 
several districts. As per witnesses, at least two protesters were detained in Siyazan and in 
Lankaran district. The police detained several more demonstrators, some of them were 
reportedly found guilty of taking part in an unsanctioned rallies protesting high unemployment 
and were sentenced to one month in jail. Several demonstrators have been fined and released. 
Currency devaluation always comes with the double whammy of reduction in spending power 
and rising of prices. As a result, the cost of many items, such as tomatoes and grapes, has shot 
up, in some cases by as much as 100 percent. Flour and bread prices increased by 25 percent. 
And these were the main reasons for the people to walk the streets and join the rallies. A man 
from Fuzuli, south of Azerbaijan said while protesting: “We are here because of we are hungry.” 
Three demonstrators were attempting to commit suicide because of bank loans, they could no 
longer make payments on. These demonstrations were the sparks for the reforms, that had to be 
done by the government immediately. People still protested against price hikes and demanded 
employment and the protest was getting bigger, including other regions of the country.134 The 
opposition leaders have proposed a package of proposals to the government, that unhesitatingly 
will assist to re-pave more stable economic circumstances that based not only on such natural 
resources as gas and oil but on the non-oil sector as well. Unfortunately, Azeri government has 
chosen another irregular strategy to get rid of these domestic problems. The arrows were directed 
onto neighboring enemy, in particular, to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia. The 
process has been commenced under the intensive support of Azeri media, and there has been dug 
out another parallel information war that made those new factors of hybrid warfare more visible. 
The preliminary media performance was getting enhanced even from the end of 2014.  
In comparison with Azeri authorities, the Armenian leadership was powerless in front of 
unsatisfied Armenian population who had successfully got a victory on 2015's protests against 
hikes in electricity rates, concomitant with extra demands on immediate alteration of ruling 
government and adoption of the new Constitution. According to the interesting Armenian view 
of these situations, penned by Nona Shahnazarian, Research Fellow, Institute for Archaeology 
and Ethnography, National Academy of Sciences, Armenia, the following acts exposed the 
Armenian public’s pent-up frustration on series of problems, including the government’s alacrity 
to admit Russian control over the economy. While the rallies soon moved away, there has been 
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emerged various consequences and positive impacts. First of all, the government almost was 
obliged to respond to the people’s requirements by showing its consent to subsidize the hike 
from the state budget. Nevertheless, the fact that the government was weak to remain stable at 
lower unsubsidized prices intensified the poor condition of the country’s energy sector, as well 
as Armenia’s overall economic servility to Russian geopolitical interests.135 Though the internal 
economic crisis was temporarily humiliated, the beginning of 2016, has aspired to the 
development and further enhancement of previous demands on the alteration of leading 
authorities and even current Constitution, the border clashes with Azerbaijan were already being 
perceived to be used for transitory distraction of population from ever-uprising economic 
stagnation. But anyway, the conclusions were quite different from one another, if the Azeri 
leadership has gained its perspectives en route distraction, the Armenian one was filled just with 
two-year stamina to keep within the government. As a result, 2018 Armenian Velvet Revolution 
have totally crashed the durable resistance of this sort of hybrid warfare factors.136  
According to Armenian scholar Samvel Martirosyan, at the beginning of 2015, the 
information war has also been escalated. Information flow from both sides intensified, which 
assisted both Armenia and Azerbaijan to strengthen their domestic campaigns and attempt to 
influence the international community.137 But this type of confrontation was mostly a product of 
tactical-operational struggle and led to the emergence of such utmost hybrid warfare factors as a 
simulation of patriotism (which is usually called as false patriotism) by dissemination of fake 
news from either side's media outlets and from other international information agencies. 
According to the re-edited article of Alexander Murinson who is an independent 
researcher holding a Ph.D. from the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of 
London that was titled as "Forbes buys into the fake news: promotes Russia-vassal Armenia" 
from prominent Azeri online news agency, News.az, which commenced one's activity since 
October 2009, the importance of fake news within Nagorno-Karabakh conflict was scrutinized as 
well. Pursuant to this article, Forbes plainly published “fake news,” on October 30, 2017, in the 
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piece, “Azerbaijani Aggression Should not Be Rewarded With U.S. Aid,” written by such virtual 
unknowns as Movses Ter-Oganesyan and Suren Sargsyan.138 Identified as “Caucasus experts,” 
the writers weaved demonstrable digital propaganda, evocative of the Soviet Union and its 
Russian successor. They would have the reader believe that Armenia is an independent and 
prosperous wonderland while Azerbaijan is some regional Muslim boogeyman, undeserving of 
U.S. foreign aid. Mildly, the reality was far from how Forbes portrayed. Dr. Murinson has also 
underlined that Azerbaijan, with its own well-allocated foreign aid budget, receives a relatively 
small amount of foreign aid from the U.S., predominantly in the form of naval materiel and 
training. Peruse a map and one easily discerns the national interest of the U.S. to defend 
Azerbaijani offshore oil and gas fields from Russian and Iranian invasion — commodities that 
contribute crucially to the energy security of Europe and to Western markets. U.S. support of 
Azerbaijan, in general, sought to safeguard it from Russian and Iranian intrusions and to promote 
its efforts to integrate this geopolitically and geostrategically important region with the West. 
The writers also try to sell a skewed and dishonest account of the wars and bilateral issues 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The News.az also re-asserted that the reality is that Nagorno-
Karabakh is a region of Azerbaijan occupied by Armenia. It is not an independent region. No 
nation with internationally recognized territory de-jure adopts the "independence of Nagorno-
Karabakh region" — not even Armenia. Fake news cannot stand up to the light of facts, even at 
the hands of the Kremlin and when the venerated Forbes delves into it. In an environment where 
astute readers must pay such close attention to where their information emanates, Forbes makes 
it that much more difficult.139  
To this end, the forthcoming new factors of hybrid warfare in the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict take part in the last no war, no peace period of dispute that became the last input into the 
system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. These new factors had brought more recent and earnest 
demand for a peace treaty between Armenia and Azerbaijan that would be based chiefly on the 
obligatory provisions of international law and resolutions on the conflict itself. The systematic 
analysis of conflict gave us otherwise concealed opportunity to reveal another new factor of 
hybrid warfare that must be called as "a lack of internationally recognized peace treaty". But, 
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there were no real decisions to sign this sort of treaty that probably might be encouraged by such 
international actors as UN, EU, OSCE MG etc. The lack of an international peace treaty 
alongside with absence of critical decisions on peaceful resolution of conflict has been 
noiselessly destroying the already unstable system of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict for more than 
three years. Additionally, it has amplified quite extraordinary and technologically-evaluated 
battlespaces filled with drones and other unmanned aerial military vehicles, which would be 
separately and in a more detailed way analyzed in the second chapter of our thesis.   
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Chapter 2. Imperfect principles for peaceful resolution: The role of new factors of 
hybrid warfare 
 
Prior to pass to the post-war principles of ineffective international meditation for peaceful 
resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it would be a very pragmatic decision to make a 
flashback on such peculiar documents as Zheleznovodsk Declaration signed on 23 September 
1991, within the civil war period that was a joint communiqué on the results of the mediating 
mission of President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian Federation and President Nursultan 
Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and Tehran Communique within full-scale war period which was a 
joint statement of the heads of conflicting parts under the auspice of Iranian President Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani.  
According to the Zheleznovodsk Declaration, it was a civil war and the central authorities 
of the USSR had been unable to work out and implement effective measures to normalize the 
situation in the region. Huge mistakes have been made that has led to the aggravation of 
confrontation between the parties and to increase in mistrust in federal bodies. In the 
circumstances, there was a need of mediation for the efforts directed to the creation of conditions 
to start the negotiation process capable gradually to lay the foundation for normalization of a 
situation in the region. Upon agreement with the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides, the leaders of 
the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan took upon themselves the role of mediators. On 
September 20-23, 1991, the mediating mission, led by President Boris Yeltsin of the Russian 
Federation and President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan, visited Baku, Gyandzha, 
Khankendi (Stepanakert), and Yerevan. The sides were seeking the peaceful settlement of the 
conflict that must be guided by the principles of noninterference in internal affairs of sovereign 
states and the undeviating observance of civil rights of citizens, irrespective of their nationality 
and in accordance with international legal norms. Through mediation, some problems of the 
gradual settlement of the conflict were discussed. The main results of discussion were as 
follows:140 
a) the sides believed that the necessary and binding conditions for the settlement of the 
conflict were a ceasefire; 
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b) the repeal, before January 1, 1992, of all unconstitutional Azerbaijani and Armenian 
enactments concerning Nagorno Karabakh; 
c) the recognition of the authority of legitimate bodies of power; 
d) the withdrawal from the conflict zone of all armed forces, except units of Soviet 
Interior Ministry and Soviet Defence Ministry troops;141 
When this term has expired, the presence of all armed forces and their activity would be 
considered as illegal for all parties and would be suppressed by troops of the Soviet Ministry of 
Internal Affairs, and members of armed forces would bear responsibility. It was entrusted to a 
working group of observers to develop measures for ensuring ceasefire, to neutralize all armed 
forces, certain as illegal, to create security guarantees for all citizens living in a conflict zone. For 
acceptance of the coordinated measures and for normalization of a situation in a zone of the 
conflict the temporary working group, including authorized representatives of the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan, has been created. The working group has begun activities from 
October, 1. The Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Armenia ensured the eventual return 
of deported people to their homes, beginning with the fully vacated villages. The sides 
guaranteed safety in places of permanent residence. Talks on this problem had to begin from 
October 1991. The sides involved in the conflict has begun an immediate release of hostages. 
This process had to be completed within a period of two weeks, upon the expiry of which 
persons involved in holding hostages may be prosecuted under the law. Control over compliance 
with this provision was exercised by authorized representatives of the mediating sides. Together 
with federal bodies, the sides guaranteed to normalize all railway, air traffic and communications 
systems within two weeks. All sides, with the cooperation of mediators, would start negotiations 
to ensure the free and mutually beneficial functioning of all highways. During the talks, the sides 
arrived at a unanimous decision to guarantee the flow of impartial information into the conflict 
zone. It was decided to set up an information group, consisting of representatives of the Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan authorized to prepare official information about developments in the 
conflict zone. The supreme bodies of the government of Azerbaijan and Armenia would approve 
authorized delegations which immediately would begin bilateral negotiations on a constant basis. 
The sides believed the negotiation process would begin once bilateral treaties have been prepared 
and signed between the Russian Federation and the Azerbaijan Republic, the Russian Federation 
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and the Republic of Armenia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan and the Republic of 
Armenia. The working group of observers was entrusted with preparing, within a month, 
proposals for the subsequent stages of settling the conflict. The working group of observers 
would regularly inform the top leaders of the four republics on progress and on realizing the 
measures envisaged by this communiqué. The provisions contained in this communiqué cannot 
be viewed as the right of the mediators to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign states - the 
Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Armenia.142 
Nonetheless, everything has seemed to be normal, Armenians were envisaging the great 
consent to this sort of mediation and ostensibly run away from their illegal territorial claims. But 
unfortunately, the reality has got absolutely miscellaneous faces. Just two months later, there has 
been used another irregular tactical-operational method in order to cut aforementioned peaceful 
negotiations and unimpeded receipt of reliable and independent information. On November 20, 
1991, Azerbaijani Mi-8 Helicopter was shot down near the Karakend village of Khojavend 
district in Nagorno-Karabakh region, which was carrying a team of 19 peacekeepers alongside 
with 3 crew members. All 22 on board were killed in the crash. The observers for Russia and 
Kazakhstan, statesmen of Azerbaijan and TV reporters - have died. The causes of the accident 
were found out by the investigation. On the eve of an accident, the Armenian side has refused to 
continue negotiations unless Azerbaijan would stop to overlap natural gas supply to Armenia. 
For the first time, the energy dimension of the conflict was deeply infiltrated into the hotspot of 
hybrid warfare factors, that after became the most appetizing holder of its ongoing shares. 
Subsequently, the Azerbaijani parliament would also consider a question of suspension of 
negotiations with Armenia at an extraordinary session on November 26. The observers for 
Russia and Kazakhstan working in Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (hereinafter NKAO) 
according to the Zheleznovodsk communique flew accompanied by representatives of the 
leadership of Azerbaijan from Agdam to Khojavend for acquaintance with the situation which 
has become complicated in this area. The first version of the causes of the accident has been 
transferred to TASS (one of the largest Russian News Agencies) with reference to commandant's 
office of the special area of NKAO: the helicopter has exploded, having flown in fog on the rock. 
The chairman of the commission on investigation of the causes of accident Adil Agayev has said 
in the TV-inform program on November 21 that the helicopter has been shot from the earth with 
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a large-caliber weapon, the video equipment and weapon from the accident site were stolen.143 In 
response to Agayev's statement People's Deputies of the USSR from Armenia and such NKAO 
activists as Zory Balayan, Victor Ambartsumyan, Heinrich Igityan, Sos Sargsyan have accused 
the Central Television of the USSR of tendentiousness and have hinted at non-participation of 
national liberation army of Artsakh (Armenians called the Nagorno-Karabakh as Artsakh). 
According to them, "not accidentally immediately after accident on the place of the tragedy there 
was the former second secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, the former adviser of 
Najibullah Victor Polyanichko who was engaged two years in “seditious activity” in Karabakh" 
(he headed the Organizing committee founded by Azerbaijan on management of NKAO). On 
November 21 at 18:30 the commission of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR headed by 
the first deputy commander-in-chief of Interior Ministry Troops of the USSR major general 
Vyacheslav Ponomarev has taken off for Agdam. Amidst killed officials were also such 
important Soviet governmental representatives as the head of department of internal affairs of 
NKAO Vladimir Kovalyov, the military commandant of NKAO major general Nikolay Zhinkin, 
the prosecutor of NKAO Igor Plavsky, the deputy minister of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan 
Seylau Serikov, group of the Russian observers — the colonel of Interior Ministry Troops of the 
USSR, and such representatives of RSFSR colonel Kocherov and Mikhail Lukashev. In Baku, a 
funeral of the dead has taken place on November 22. Among the killed statesmen there was an 
Attorney-General of Azerbaijan Ismet Gaibov, the state adviser of Azerbaijan Mamed Asadov 
(before the Minister of Internal Affairs of the Republic), the Head of Department on press 
relations Osman Mirzoyev, TV reporters — Ali Mustafayev and Fakhraddin Shakhbazov. After 
messages about the tragedy apprehended by Azerbaijanians as "the next intrigues of the 
Armenian terrorists" in Baku spontaneous meetings have begun. Except for the ordinary 
contingent of protesters students and workers of Academy of Science of Azerbaijan have taken 
to the streets. Requirements of protesters — to the Supreme Council and the president Ayaz 
Mutalibov to bring order to Karabakh or to retire. The leaders of the republic have made the 
decision to convene on November 26 an extraordinary session of Armed Forces of Azerbaijan. In 
the agenda were a) the announcement of martial law in the territory of the republic; b) about a 
recall from Soviet Army of the military personnel and officers — Azerbaijanians; c) about the 
suspension of negotiations with Armenia. Even earlier the deputy chairman of Armed Forces of 
Armenia Babken Arartskyan has said to representatives of Azerbaijan that the Armenian side 
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refuses continuation of the negotiations planned for November 22. Negotiations would be 
resumed only after the termination by Azerbaijan of a blockade of the gas pipeline supplying gas 
to Armenia. The deputy chief of staff of Interior Ministry Troops of the USSR general Starikov 
has reported that the issue of withdrawal of Interior Ministry Troops of the USSR from the area 
of state of emergency would not be resolved in the nearest future as "there was no such a leading 
power that could put the end to the Karabakh problem". According to Starikov, and from now on 
Soviet Internal Armed Forces would be on the party of those to whom the danger threatens (that 
is between the devil and the deep sea), but "would be able to answer force with force". It was the 
next official endorsement of weakness in front of upcoming irregular methods that sought to 
maximally gain the economy and psychological predominance of war. Being in a heartland of 
irregular casualties, the warfare type bedraggled with nefarious factors of hybridity, again, has 
absolutely gained the highest level of criminality, multimodality, and simultaneity.144  
In comparison with weightless and incendiary Russian-made mediation, on May 7, 1992, 
there were held a meeting of the heads of the Azerbaijani Republic and the Republic of Armenia 
by an official invitation of Iranian President A.H. Rafsanjani to Tehran. The parties began by 
expressing gratitude to the Islamic Republic of Iran, international and regional organizations and 
other countries for their efforts at peace settlement and stability. To develop bilateral relations 
and to ensure security in the region, the parties agreed to organize meetings of representatives of 
both countries at the highest level and periodically the leaders of the regions and responsible 
military representatives. The parties expressed their desire to resolve all problems related to the 
normalization of the bilateral relations at various levels by means of peaceful means based on the 
principles of CSCE and international law. Taking international legal standards and the UN 
Charter as the basis, the parties stressed the need to ensure peace and stability on the borders of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, pointing out that this is beneficial for both countries. Observing the human 
rights and the rights of minorities, the parties drew the attention of each other to the issues of 
solving the problems of Armenian and Azerbaijani refugees. The parties also agreed that within a 
week after the arrival of the special representative of the President of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. M. Vaezi in the region (Baku, Yerevan, Nagorno-Karabakh), after the negotiations with the 
interested parties and with the support of the heads of the states of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the 
truce would be established and at the same time, all communication roads would be opened in 
order to meet all economic needs. In case of consent for the implementation of the reached 
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agreement, besides the observers of the Islamic Republic of Iran, observers of the CSCE and 
others would be engaged. Positively assessing the work of the summit in Tehran, the sides 
agreed that all questions connected with bilateral relations should be solved by means of 
meetings and consultations of responsible persons at different levels and through negotiations. 
The leaders of the two countries, while appreciating the efforts of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 
expressed the hope that the Islamic Republic of Iran would continue its efforts until the peace 
and stability are established in the region.145 
For the sake of completeness of our study, it is quite obvious to come to the next 
academic inference that even pre-war negotiations were partly stuffed with old factors of hybrid 
warfare that even in that times were hindering the normalization of a situation over Nagorno-
Karabakh region and finite peaceful resolution of conflict. Now, it is time to scrutinize some 
substantial norms and principles which were being emerged within an international mediation 
process. Although we have already mentioned the creation process of OSCE MG and its debuted 
meetings on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, it will be more broadened approach to make a 
comparative analysis of different principles of an international mediation and to direct our 
sharpest and academically the most critical arrows to the role of ongoing new factors of hybrid 
warfare within these principles. Today, OSCE MG is being co-chaired by the USA, Russia, and 
France. All these countries have got their own benefits from being involved in the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict's mediation process. But, prior to their co-chairmanship, alongside with 
Russia, the basic role was being played by Sweden, Finland, Italy, Hungary and other pro-
European countries. Unfortunately, the principles of this sort of international mediation were 
overwhelmingly contradictory. These contradictions became pregnant from those new factors 
which were getting deepened after full engagement of such geopolitical enemies as USA and 
Russia. France is still playing a role of European Union representative and shown an alleged face 
of an independent mediator. The first timid step has been undertaken within Lisbon Summit of 
OSCE held in 1996. There were signed a Lisbon document that shaped the inner scheme of 
Lisbon principles for Nagorno-Karabakh conflict's resolution. 
According to the statement of the acting chairman of OSCE, three principles maintained 
by all member states of the MG have to become a part of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh 
conflict: 
                                                          
145 The title of the book - "The Karabakh conflict - Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality" third times edited 
by Ali Abasov and Haroutiun Khachatrian, APPENDIX #3 // JOINT STATEMENT OF THE HEADS OF STATE 
IN TEHRAN, p.90 // URL: http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/books/book-1/Abaso_Khachatrian.pdf // Retrieved at 
12.05.2018 
70 
 
a) territorial integrity of the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic; 
b) the legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh defined in the agreement based on self-
determination which gives to Nagorno-Karabakh the most advanced stage of self-governance 
within Azerbaijan; 
c) the guaranteed security for Nagorno-Karabakh and all its population, including mutual 
obligations for ensuring compliance with provisions of settlement by all Parties;146 
Meanwhile, the Armenian side has not forgotten to give its doubtful consent to this 
statement by underlying the following conclusions on self-determination principle:  
a) The statement does not reflect either spirit or the letter of the mandate of the OSCE 
MG established by the Budapest summit of 1994 in which negotiations with the purpose of 
achievement of the political agreement were offered. The problem of the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh was a subject of discussion in direct negotiations which still should be finished; 
b) The statement predetermines the status of Nagorno-Karabakh that contradicts the 
decision of Council of ministers of CSCE of 1992 according to which this question is within the 
competence of OSCE MG which would be called after the conclusion of the political agreement; 
c) The Armenian side is convinced that the solution can be found on the basis of the 
international law and the principles stated in the Helsinki Final Act, first of all on the basis of the 
principle of self-determination; 
d) For the benefit of achievement of a compromise solution the Armenian side is ready to 
continue the most intensive negotiations both within the Minsk Group and on the basis of the 
direct contacts coordinated by Co-chairmen of this group;147 
In the interim, the post-Lisbon period of negotiations was firstly encountered with an 
unexpecting attempt to make an accelerated political shock therapy on the principles of 
sovereign governance within one's territorial integrity. Between 20-24 September 1997, the 
international mediators of the Minsk Group, mostly encouraged by Russian Federation, has 
presented a new plan for a peaceful settlement, according to which "Nagorno-Karabakh would 
become an associate state within the territorial formation of Azerbaijani Republic". It was a first 
rejected heavyweight document of international mediation and major reasons for this sort of 
destination were high-level of inconsistency with the previous Lisbon principles. Additionally, 
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Azerbaijan was beware to lose its internationally recognized sovereignty over Nagorno-
Karabakh, that has already been recognized as a region within national borders of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan.148 
Despite the fact that Lisbon principles seemed to be doubtful from Armenian perspective, 
after the preparation of an aforementioned document upon “Associate state”, Levon Ter 
Petrosian's administration has given its consent to commence the process of peaceful settlement. 
In the same time, the process of mediation has again stumbled with one of the old factors of 
hybrid warfare, which was terrorism, that has already been explored in our thesis by the facts on 
the assassination of such L.Ter-Petrosian's supporters as Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and 
Parliament Speaker Karen Demirchyan.149 Aftermath, Levon Ter-Petrosian had been forced to 
retire and there had been emerged the next, quite opposite to Lisbon Principles, the scenario of 
Armenian foreign policy on Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. When in 1998, under the aegis of 
Minsk Group mediation process, the principle of "Common State" had been declared, the next 
highest contradiction has appeared.  
The ex-Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE, Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek, 
met on 8 October 1998 in Warsaw with the French, Russian and United States Co-Chairs of the 
OSCE MG. The Co-Chairs informed the Chairman-in-Office about a new approach to resolving 
Nagorno-Karabakh's status under their consideration that sought to apply creatively the concept 
of a common state.150 In accordance with this new "Common State" principle of the OSCE 
Minsk Group, the parties would conclude an agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, 
which would include the following provisions:  
a) Nagorno-Karabakh would be a state and territorial formation in a form of a common 
state with Azerbaijan within its internationally recognized borders. Azerbaijan and 
Nagorno-Karabakh would sign an agreement on the delimitation of the subjects of 
jurisdiction and mutual delegation of powers between state bodies, which would have 
the force of the constitutional law. Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would form a 
Joint committee into which representatives of presidents, prime ministers, chairmen 
of parliaments, for the definition of policy and activity relating to the sphere of joint 
maintaining would enter; 
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b) Nagorno-Karabakh would have the right for implementation of direct external 
relations in economic, trade, scientific, cultural, sports and humanitarian areas with 
the foreign states, with the regional and international organizations connected with 
these problems at the relevant representation abroad. Political parties and public 
organizations in Nagorno-Karabakh would have the right to establish a connection 
with political parties and public organizations of the foreign states. Nagorno-
Karabakh would take part in the implementation of a foreign policy of Azerbaijan on 
the questions infringing on its interests. Decisions on such questions could not be 
adopted without the consent of two parties;  
c) The government of Nagorno-Karabakh could have the representatives in embassies or 
consular establishments of Azerbaijan in the foreign states in which it would have 
special interests and also to send the experts to the structure of the Azerbaijani 
delegations for participation in the international negotiations if they concern the 
interests of Nagorno-Karabakh. Borders of Nagorno-Karabakh will correspond to 
borders of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Their possible 
specifications or changes could be a subject of special mutual arrangements between 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. Borders between Azerbaijan and Nagorno-
Karabakh would be mutually open for free movement of unaided citizens of each 
other. At implementation of trips and maintaining business contacts, they would not 
be assessed with customs or other duties. Granting the right to the full-time residence 
would be referred to the competence of the relevant governments;  
d) Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh would not use force or threat of use of force for 
settlement of disputes. In case of the disputes or disagreements insuperable within 
Joint Committee, the party could request an advisory opinion of the Acting chairman 
of OSCE which would be considered as an acceptance of the final decision. The 
status of Nagorno-Karabakh would include also the rights and privileges which were 
listed below as they would be issued in the Agreement on the status of Nagorno-
Karabakh approved by the Minsk conference;151  
Following the Paragraph V of the concomitant document upon Agreement on the 
cessation of armed conflict issued by OSCE MG alongside with an Agreement on the status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the conflicting parties would promote the safe and voluntary return of 
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refugees and internally displaced persons to their former places of residence in the separation 
zone, as were widely set out in Annex 2 to the same document. The Parties would negotiate the 
safe and voluntary return of all other persons, other than those covered by this Agreement, who 
were refugees or displaced as a result of the conflict and tension between Armenia and 
Azerbaijan after 1987. Correspondingly, there had been given a diplomatic response to the 
problem with definition of "People of Nagorno-Karabakh", which would have own Constitution 
adopted by those people of Nagorno-Karabakh on a referendum. This Constitution would 
incorporate provisions of the Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh. Azerbaijan, 
respectively, would make changes to the Constitution for incorporation of this agreement. The 
provision of this agreement or those parts of the Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani Constitution 
which incorporate it could not be changed without the consent of all three parties. In the territory 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, just the Constitution and laws of Nagorno-Karabakh would be valid. 
Laws, rules and executive decisions of Azerbaijan would be valid for territories of Nagorno-
Karabakh if they would not contradict the Constitution and laws of the last. Nagorno-Karabakh 
would have own flag, the coat of arms and the anthem. According to the Constitution of 
Nagorno-Karabakh, it would form the legislative, executive and judicial authorities. Citizens of 
Nagorno-Karabakh would have as the identity card of the passport of Azerbaijan with a special 
overprint Nagorno-Karabakh. Only the government of Nagorno-Karabakh or authorized by him 
for this establishment would have the right to issue such passports. Citizens of Nagorno-
Karabakh of the Armenian origin would be able to emigrate to Armenia and in case of moving 
there on permanent residence to obtain the Armenian citizenship according to laws of this 
country. The population of Nagorno-Karabakh would have the right to elect representatives in 
parliament of Azerbaijan and to participate in an election of the president of Azerbaijan. 
Nagorno-Karabakh would be the free economic zone, to have the right for issue of own bank 
notes which would be in use along with the Azerbaijani bank notes and also to release own 
brands. Nagorno-Karabakh would have the right for free and free transport connections and 
communication with Armenia and Azerbaijan. It would also have national guard (security forces) 
and constabulary forces formed on a voluntary basis. These forces could not work out of 
Nagorno-Karabakh without the consent of the government of Azerbaijan. The army, security 
forces and police of Azerbaijan would not have the right to enter on the territory of Nagorno-
Karabakh without the consent of the authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh. Armenian would be the 
main official language in Nagorno-Karabakh, and the second official language - Azerbaijani. 
The citizens of this region could also use other native languages in all official and informal 
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cases. The budget of Nagorno-Karabakh would consist of the means received from own sources, 
where the government of Nagorno-Karabakh would encourage and guarantee capital investments 
of the Azerbaijani and foreign companies and persons.152 
Unsurprisingly, the "Common State" principle of OSCE Minsk Group was undoubtedly 
criticised by Azerbaijani government and was rejected, on the basis of non-compliance with 
previous Lisbon principles that assured the territorial integrity of either side. Almost 80 percent 
of "Common State" principle was to damage the sovereignty of the Republic of Azerbaijan over 
Nagorno-Karabakh region, by alleged remaining of territorial integrity. The problem was also 
dealt with seven districts adjacent to the Nagorno-Karabakh region which were occupied as well 
and undergone collateral damage from the previous war. Although initially, Armenia has 
willingly demonstrated its consent to the "Common State" principle, furthermore it has also 
denied signing aforementioned agreements, being in a high apprehension to lose those extra-
occupied, contiguous districts as well. The ridiculous moment might also be observed in the 
special auxiliary agreements on the status of Lachin corridor, Shusha and Shaumyan (which was 
a separate district within AzSSR and was liquidated on February 12, 1991, by the decision of the 
Supreme Council of the AzSSR, and included into the Goranboy region) districts.153 
Pursuant to these agreements of "Common State" principle, the question of the use of the 
Lachin corridor by Nagorno-Karabakh for providing free information between Nagorno-
Karabakh and Armenia would be a subject of the separate arrangement if with the consent of 
Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh other decisions concerning a specific mode of Lachin district 
were not made. Otherwise, Lachin district would have to remain constant as a completely 
demilitarized zone. The parties would have also agreed that all Azerbaijani refugees would be 
able to return to places of the accommodation in Shusha. Their safety would be guaranteed by 
the relevant authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh. They would have the equal rights with all citizens 
of Nagorno-Karabakh, including the right for the creation of political parties, for participation in 
elections of all levels, to be elected to the state legislature and to local governments, to be 
accepted on public service, including in law enforcement bodies. The same rights would be 
acquired also by the Armenian refugees at their return in Shaumyan. Residents of Shusha and the 
                                                          
152 The title of the official document No. 18 - "About the principles of a comprehensive settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh armed conflict" adopted by OSCE MINSK GROUP CO-CHAIR // The comparative analysis between 
Paragraph I, Agreement on the status of Nagorno-Karabakh  and Paragraph V, Agreement on the cessation of armed 
conflict // URL: http://www.vn.kazimirov.ru/doc18.htm // Retrieved at 14.05.2018 
153 The title of the article - "Armenian-Azerbaijan conflict: Demographic and migration aspects" written by Arif 
Yunusov, Candidate of Historical Sciences, Head of Department of Conflictology and Migration of the Institute of 
Peace and Democracy of Azerbaijan // URL: http://www.ca-c.org/journal/16-1998/st_10_junusov.shtml // Retrieved 
at 14.05.2018 
75 
 
city of Shaumyan would have the guaranteed access on roads, communication and other relations 
with other Azerbaijan and Nagorno-Karabakh. The authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh and 
Azerbaijan would render assistance to placement and activity respectively in the city of Shusha 
and the city of Shaumyan of representative offices of Bureau on democratic institutes and human 
rights of OSCE.154 The main reason of ineffectiveness of the "Common State" principles was a 
deterioration of the pillars of initial Lisbon principles on territorial integrity and inseparable state 
sovereignty over the internationally recognized territories. Azerbaijani state administration led 
by President Heydar Aliyev was aware of a coming danger and momentarily refused to sit 
around the negotiation table covered with this sort of jug-handled documents. 
The latest and most peculiar negotiations were held on 29 November 2007, in Madrid, the 
capital of Spain, at the OSCE ministerial conference. Right there, the famous "Madrid 
Principles" had first been introduced to the foreign ministers of the Azerbaijan Republic and the 
Republic of Armenia. According to the famous Armenian online news agency "ARAVOT", 
these principles was a code name of the basic proposals that have been offered to Foreign 
Ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan.155  
On July 10, 2009, within the Group of Eight Summit in L'Aquila presidents of the 
countries co-chairmen of OSCE Minsk Group, for the first time have officially made some 
changes and partially published the updated version of "Madrid principles" that were for half a 
year kept under secrecy.156  
According to the "ARAVOT", the document was firstly published in the Armenian press, 
in particular, in the newspaper Haykakan Zhamanak in June 2011, and was strongly secured the 
"Madrid Principles" in the following clauses: 
a) The final status of the Nagorno-Karabakh region (hereinafter NK) would be defined by 
a plebiscite which means free and fair (genuine) will of the population of NK. Terms and details 
(modality) of a plebiscite would be coordinated by parties during further negotiations. The 
population of NK was understood as inhabitants of all nationalities living in NKAO in national 
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proportions of 1988. During the plebiscite, there would not be a restriction in a formulation of a 
question;  
b) During the intermediate period before defining the final legal status of the NK, its 
residents would have appropriate rights and advantages which would be determined in 
accordance with the stated principles in the Peace agreement. According to international law, the 
inhabitants of NK must have a right to social and economic activity in democratic society, 
protection and monitoring of one's security. The population of NK would have a right to elect 
officials for governance during the intermediate period. These officials would carry out 
legislative and executive power and also would create courts. Also they would have the right to 
organize elections in the areas provided under the Peace agreement. The intermediate authorities 
of NK would have the status of the observer at those sessions of OSCE where the issues 
concerning the NK would be discussed. They could enter those organizations in which 
internationally recognized status is not obligatory. The NK could also receive financial aid from 
foreign countries and the international organizations;  
c) The Armenian forces would be withdrawn from all territories, adjacent to the former 
NKAO. The Armenian forces would also be withdrawn from Kelbadzhar district. Limited 
military connection would be deployed in that territory which would be defined by the 
International Transitional Commission, before signing of the Peace agreement. Control over 
Kelbadzhar district would be exercised by the International Transitional Commission where 
representatives of Armenia and Azerbaijan would enter. The commission would carry out 
continuous international monitoring of Kelbadzhar district. The departure of the population from 
Kelbadzhar district would be encouraged. The expulsed Azerbaijanians would return to 
Kelbadzhar district after signing of the Peace Agreement; 
d) The corridor of the coordinated width would have to connect Armenia and Karabakh. 
Until the solution of the final status of NK, this corridor would keep that status which existed at 
the time of the signing of the document. After determination of the final legal status of NK, the 
status of a corridor would be settled, considering the final status of NK; 
e) On the basis of provisions of the Peace Agreement, all internally displaced persons and 
refugees would have the right for return on a voluntary basis since that moment when the 
Commissioner of the UN for refugees declares that safety of former residences is ensured. All 
persons which would have come back to the settlements without discrimination would have 
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Their coexistence would have to be promoted by all 
77 
 
parties, pursuing the aim to weaken tension and also to settle an economic, political and social 
status of Armenians and Azerbaijanians;  
f) Before entry into force of the Peace Agreement, the International peacekeeping 
operation for monitoring of demilitarization and safety of areas would be carried out. 
Peacekeeping units would be created from troops. Granting troops for peacekeeping activity 
would be carried out on a voluntary basis. Each party would have the veto on the choice of other 
party. In the document, there was also a conclusion where, besides the generalizing estimates, it 
was noted that the Basic principles provided creation of 4 commissions. The first would develop 
"Details of the implementation of a plebiscite", the second must specify "Future status of a 
corridor", the third has to develop "Full transfer of Kelbadzhar district to the Azerbaijan" and the 
fourth would discuss "The additional issues concerning the realization of the Basic principles";157 
This time, the main reason for the failure of the mediation policy of the OSCE Minsk 
Group, which was set out in the so-called Lisbon, Madrid and other principles, was basically 
dealt with parallel co-existence of the factors of hybrid warfare which even led to the 
underestimation and misinterpretation of such political term as the referendum and 
incompatibility of its usual form within Nagorno-Karabakh conflict’s character. The derivative 
reasons were also the incomprehension and bias with the concept of the plebiscite, the similarity 
upon the old principles of the “Common State” and the protracted nature of the negotiations. The 
parties even were not ready for a full-fledged peace scheme of negotiations, which would be 
based on a real mutual trust and reciprocal respect of the decisions taken by both sides. That is 
why the talks in Kazan, held on June 25, 2011, did not yield any results in the way of signing an 
agreement on the peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict on the basis of the 
agreed Madrid principles.  
 
2.1. The core activities of other international organizations within conflict 
 
In recent years, the political role and value of various international organizations with 
European identity has increased in settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, and, first of all, 
such as the European Union (hereinafter EU) and the Council of Europe (hereinafter CE). 
Recognizing the priority of such organizations as UN, CIS, NATO, Organization of the Islamic 
Cooperation, Collective Security Treaty Organization, OSCE and its Minsk group (hereinafter 
                                                          
157 The title of the primary source - "Madrid principles, the Kazan document, or Lavrov's proposals?" edited by 
Emma Gabrielyan // Generalization - in the "Aravot" on April 20. Emma Gabrielyan The newspaper "Aravot" 
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OSCE MG), European ones, nevertheless, is still trying to make the most feasible contribution to 
the peaceful settlement, proceeding from own purposes, functions and priorities.  
Nowadays, the policy of the EU and CE in the South Caucasus, and in particular in the 
settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is covered by the principles of the new European 
Neighbourhood Policy and based on the premise that the South Caucasus is a unique region in 
which the value approaches and humanitarian ideals of the new European foreign policy are 
interwoven in a peculiar way with both pragmatic considerations of geopolitics and geo-
economics, and with stereotypes of relations between Europe and Russia and the Islamic world. 
The current EU leadership as the milestone of its existence is still possessing a solution to the 
problem of ensuring energy security close to its geopolitical zone of influence. The main value 
of the new independent states of the South Caucasus lies in the ability of the European Union 
(after the collapse of the USSR) to directly develop, without Russia's participation, energy 
deposits that belong to them, and also to lay through the territories of these countries ways of 
supplying energy carriers from the regions of the South Caucasus and Central Asia to the states - 
members of the EU, bypassing the territory of Russia.158  
According to the independent Azeri standpoint, France is still the unofficial EU 
representative within the Minsk Group, because the European Union Special Representative 
(hereinafter EUSR) has never worked visibly with Paris to establish a strong EU position on the 
resolution process. Therefore, in order to promote the functionality of the Minsk Group, it is not 
necessary to find a new format, but rather to re-work the current options. On the one hand, the 
EUSR and the French Co-Chair, with the participation of the heads of the EU delegations in 
Azerbaijan and Armenia, could find a working framework to improve the EU's role in Nagorno-
Karabakh resolution. The delegation heads, member-state ambassadors, and the EUSR could 
meet every month, and then present the results to the EU institutions. Secondly, the EUSR could 
informally attend, or attend with 'observer status', the meetings of the Minsk Group Co-Chairs. 
This would mean slightly changing the format: 3 Co-Chairs + 1 EUSR. Unfortunately, 
discussions over the EUSR's engagement in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict ended with criticism 
of Azerbaijan following the 2007 incident, when the Azerbaijani Foreign Minister recalled the 
then-EUSR from his unauthorized visit to Nagorno-Karabakh. This incident has since been cited 
                                                          
158 The title of the source - "The European Union and the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh territory", Report 
prepared for the Committee on Member States’ Obligations // Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 
Berlin 4-5 November 2007 // Stefan Wolff, Centre for International Crisis Management and Conflict Resolution, 
University of Nottingham // URL: 
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by EU officials as evidence that Azerbaijan opposes increased EUSR mandate within 
international mediation of OSCE MG. Azerbaijan's demand is that the EUSR promotes inter-
community dialogue in Nagorno-Karabakh; otherwise, the de facto Nagorno-Karabakh 
authorities will cite these visits as a sign of recognition or international support.159 At this 
moment, we have again observed an intermediate development of the concomitant image-
making game within international community proven as a co-existing new hybrid warfare factor. 
Nevertheless, the realization of these inter-community negotiations was characteristic of an end-
stage peace process, but they are crucial at this current stage given the decreasing tensions and 
trust-building. However, Nagorno-Karabakh Armenians are monopolizing the right to speak on 
behalf of the territory by the coloring of their alleged innocent image, and are refusing to accept 
the Azerbaijani community as part of Nagorno-Karabakh. Therefore if EUSR wants to make the 
contribution to settlement process, it has to begin with further assistance to contacts between 
Azerbaijanians and Armenians. In addition, other alternatives include: that the EU stimulates 
dialogue through Parliamentary Assembly of Euronest (further EURONEST), to intensify 
bilateral contacts between Azerbaijanians and Armenians in parliamentary measurement. The 
European Commission (hereinafter EC), through the Eastern Partnership (hereinafter EaP) and 
other mechanisms, can increase its role. The European Parliament (hereinafter EP) has adopted 
resolutions on the conflict, suggesting increased engagement. Its resolution 'On the need for an 
EU strategy for the South Caucasus' (20 May 2010) said "frozen conflicts are an impediment to 
the economic and social development and hinder the improvement of the standard of living of 
the South Caucasus region, as well as the full development of the EaP of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (hereinafter ENP); whereas a peaceful resolution of the conflict is 
essential for stability in the EU Neighbourhood". The same resolution called for the withdrawal 
of Armenian forces from occupied Azerbaijani regions surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh.160 Also 
of importance is how the EU uses its influence in conflict resolution, either directly or indirectly. 
A direct impact stems from deliberate EU actions as a foreign policy actor, i.e. diplomatic 
activism. Indirectly, for the prospective member countries affected by secessionist conflicts, the 
EU offers a single currency and visa-free regimes, making territorial disputes less relevant to the 
daily life of the affected population. Until now, the EU has acted indirectly in conflict resolution; 
                                                          
159 The title of the source - "Azerbaijan is disappointed with EU’s role in Nagorno-Karabakh" edited by Gulshan 
Pashayeva // URL: https://www.euractiv.com/section/azerbaijan/opinion/azerbaijan-is-disappointed-with-eus-role-
in-nagorno-karabakh/ // Retrieved at 16.05.2018  
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80 
 
in this regard, despite the fact that both Azerbaijan and Armenia may sign Association 
Agreements and thereby get more benefits from the EU until the conflict is resolved, neither 
country will really benefit in concrete terms. Negotiations on the Association Agreements with 
both Azerbaijan and Armenia were launched in July 2010, and so far 24 of the 28 negotiations 
have been successfully completed with Armenia, and 13 with Azerbaijan. For the Association 
Agreements to come into force, they must be ratified by the EP as well as by EU countries' 
national parliaments. EP resolutions adopted at the end of March 2013, has also contained 
recommendations for the Council, the EC and European External Action Service (hereinafter 
EEAS) regarding the negotiation of Association Agreements with Azerbaijan and Armenia. The 
text includes links to confidence-building measures, taking into account the recommendation that 
EUSRs can and must engineer inter-community meetings.161 The language echoed the 'Madrid 
Principles' in calling to end the occupation and all activity in the occupied territories, urging 
Armenia to put an end to any kind of settlement-building initiative designed to increase the 
Armenian population in the occupied territories, to provide accurate data on ethnic representation 
in Nagorno-Karabakh’s population, and to take immediate steps toward peaceful resolution. 
Unfortunately, only 6 of this 14 principles have been agreed and made public. These were: the 
return of the occupied territories surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijani control; granting 
interim status to Nagorno-Karabakh and guaranteeing security and self-governance; the right of 
all internally displaced persons (hereinafter IDPs) and refugees to return to their places of origin; 
opening a corridor between Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh; defining the future status of 
Nagorno-Karabakh through a legally-binding expression of will; and international security 
guarantees, including a peacekeeping operation. It has also been noted by Azeri vision that the 
EU missed an earlier opportunity for similar progress. For no what, in 2006, both countries 
signed ENP Action Plans, which focused primarily on political and economic transformation 
rather than resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue. While Azerbaijan's Action Plan includes "the 
respect of and support for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of internationally-
recognised borders of each other," representing the first priority area, in Armenia's Action Plan 
conflict resolution is only seventh in the priority list, and entails the competing principle of 'self-
determination of peoples'. In terms of EU leverage, the ENP Action Plans did not include clear 
statements or demands from the conflict parties. The signing of the Association Agreements with 
Azerbaijan and Armenia should be conditional on a serious commitment by both parties to 
                                                          
161 The title of the source - ''European Neighbourhood Policy, working towards a stronger partnership: EP's position 
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resolve the conflict. The principle of territorial integrity should be included in the texts of both 
agreements, as well as the Madrid Principles, tied to expectations of results. Azeri vision has also 
been kept under this sort of diplomatic disposition in order to make its own image of diplomatic 
cheerleader more liable, to get rid of EU criticism arisen whether from itself or other EU 
institutions and to ensure the EU guarantees on international mediation and more secure 
circumstances for a presumption of peaceful negotiations. Howbeit, for Armenians the 
guarantees will also be helpful, especially regarding the security of Nagorno-Karabakh's 
Armenian population, which Armenia has repeatedly questioned.162 
The main activities of another weighty European Organization of the Council of Europe 
had been incepted from the Resolution № 1047 of  its Parliamentary Assembly (hereinafter 
PACE)  in 1994 on the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh. PACE has welcomed an armistice signed 
on 12 May 1994 and hoped that it would be followed up as soon as possible by a peace 
agreement between the warring parties. The conflict, which broke out in 1988, has already 
resulted in almost 20 000 deaths and more than one million refugees. It has also welcomed the 
agreement signed on 26 July 1994 by the Ministers of Defence of Armenia and Azerbaijan and 
the commander of the army of Nagorno-Karabakh, in which they affirmed their commitment to 
observe the ceasefire and their eagerness to accelerate the signing of a political agreement, and 
calls urgently on all the warring parties to refrain from any hostile act which might jeopardize 
the fragile ceasefire  that has been in force since 12 May 1994. Finally, it calls on the warring 
parties to organize the return home of refugees on an urgent basis and to respect minority rights 
as advocated in its Recommendation 1201163 and urgently calls on Azerbaijan and Turkey to 
immediately end the blockade of their means of communication with Armenia.164165  
                                                          
162 The title of the article - "Challenges for the EU in the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict: An 
Azerbaijani perspective" written by Zaur Shiriyev // pp.3-4 // URL: 
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163 "Additional protocol on the rights of minorities to the European Convention on Human Rights", 
Recommendation 1201 (1993) // Assembly debate on 1 February 1993 (22nd Sitting) (see Doc. 6742, report of the 
Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Rapporteur : Mr Worms ; and Doc. 6749, opinion of the Political 
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164 Conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh", Resolution 1047 (1994) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
// URL: http://semantic-
pace.net/tools/pdf.aspx?doc=aHR0cDovL2Fzc2VtYmx5LmNvZS5pbnQvbncveG1sL1hSZWYvWDJILURXLWV4
dHIuYXNwP2ZpbGVpZD0xNjQ1OCZsYW5nPUVO&xsl=aHR0cDovL3NlbWFudGljcGFjZS5uZXQvWHNsdC9
QZGYvWFJlZi1XRC1BVC1YTUwyUERGLnhzbA==&xsltparams=ZmlsZWlkPTE2NDU4 // Retrieved at 
17.05.2018  
82 
 
Aftermath of this resolution and recommendations, were kept by the next official 
documents adopted by PASE of the Council of Europe. Amidst them, there were such 
documents: as the next PASE Recommendation №1251166 (1994), that, particularly, was directed 
to the deployment of international observers in the war zone, a renovation of political dialogue 
with the authorities of Armenia and Azerbaijan and starting of co-operation programmes to 
Armenia and Azerbaijan by placing experts at their disposal who could help draw up a political 
status for Nagorno-Karabakh based on a mutual goodwill of either side; the Recommendation 
№1263167 (1995) on "Humanitarian situation of the refugees and displaced persons in Armenia 
and Azerbaijan" that was encouraged by the further PASE Resolution №1059168 (1995) on it; a 
comparative PASE report wherein the conflict over the Nagorno-Karabakh region dealt with the 
OSCE Minsk Conference169, fastened by further PASE Recommendation №1690170 (2005) and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
165 See also Doc. 7182, report of the Committee on Relations with European Non-Member Countries, Rapporteurs: 
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the Resolution №1416171 (2005) on it; and the freshest reply from the Committee of Ministers 
enrisched in PASE Doc. 10685 on 26 September 2005.172 
Comparatively analyzing, we have found out that the farthest engagement in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is still being held by such geopolitically opposite and 
geostrategically conflicting military organizations as North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(hereinafter NATO) versus Collective Security Treaty Organization (hereinafter CSTO). Talking 
more about NATO's role in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict it has to be taken into academic 
consideration that each of the conflicting sides participated within such NATO-sponsored 
programs as the Partnership for Peace (hereinafter PfP) from 1994 that is a program targeted at 
an establishment of credibility between NATO and other European states and the post-Soviet 
countries and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (hereinafter EAPC), which is another post-
Cold War entity of NATO, playing a role of multilateral forum constructed to enhance relations 
between NATO and non-NATO European countries and those parts of Asia on the European 
rimland.  
Being in the highest proportion to Neil Silviter's seminal article on NATO's role in the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, we might approve that NATO has built very good relations with 
either side within aforementioned peacekeeping programs. Despite maintaining steady relations 
with both nations, NATO’s 2008 Bucharest Declaration whipped up some controversy by noting 
its support for the “territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova.”173 The statement has backed Nagorno-Karabakh's 
existence within Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and therefore prompted Armenian President 
Serzh Sarkisian to boycott NATO’s 2010 Lisbon Summit, which ultimately reiterated the 
controversial clause in the summit’s declaration.174 Controversy aside, NATO has largely played 
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a neutral role throughout the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and has continually adjourned to the 
leadership of the OSCE Minsk Group to resolve the conflict. Today, the pivotal formulas of the 
Minsk Group mandate have not come to accomplishment, most notably, with the establishment 
of a multinational OSCE peacekeeping force. In lieu of a proper peacekeeping force, the Line of 
Contact (hereinafter LoC) between Armenia and Azerbaijan was kept uncrippled by military 
deterrence, which has paved a tremulous ground for peace, with its subsequent constant ceasefire 
violations that have varyingly evolved into the military hassle. The necessity for an 
internationally-mediated peacekeeping force was also one of the Madrid Principles launched by 
the Co-Chairs of the Minsk Group in November 2007. In a recent Chatham House report on the 
conflict, Associate Fellow of the Russia and Eurasia Programme, Laurence Broers notes that 
“The inability to install a credible ceasefire support infrastructure is the single most debilitating 
weakness of the international mediation effort today.”175 Confirmed with recent collisions in 
Nagorno-Karabakh, the territory is not the frozen conflict and is capable to turn into full-scale 
war quickly. As the Transatlantic region is already intense in connection with the continuing 
crisis of refugees and also a set of the conflicts along its periphery, the NATO is not able to 
afford one more regional conflict. Considering that this conflict can have wider consequences for 
the relations between NATO and Russia, the NATO has to continue to support efforts on the 
achievement of the resolution. For this purpose, NATO can use the reliable platform for 
interaction both with Armenia and with Azerbaijan. Within the special programs of the 
Individual Partnership Action Plans176 (hereinafter IPAP), the NATO can focus obligations of 
IPAP on coincidence to tasks of the Minsk mandate, therefore, applying the diplomatic pressure 
promoting the implementation of the mandate of OSCE better. As it concerns the crucial 
multinational presence of peacekeepers, members of NATO should continue to respect a primacy 
of OSCE. Nevertheless, the Alliance can offer expanded support for the implementation of this 
project. Having wealth of experience in the field of peacekeeping, NATO can provide experts 
and the advanced practice to the formation of supervising peacekeeping presence and also lobby 
expanded presence of group which will be headed by the Minsk group of OSCE. Thanks to an 
active position concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, NATO can not only support a neutrality but also 
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work on the creation of more effective mechanisms of stabilization in a conflict zone - measures 
which can also help long-term prospects for peace.177 
In contrast, CSTO has got a very well-designed relationship just with Armenia which 
became its full member from 1994, almost together with Azerbaijan.  On 2 April 1999, only six 
members of the CSTO signed a protocol that was updating the treaty for another five-year 
period. To the opposite, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Uzbekistan has denied to sign and withdrew 
from the treaty instead. The main reason was a parallel co-existence of GUAM Organization for 
Democracy and Economic Development created in 1997 by the highest American assistance 
within the international community. Notwithstanding a geographical proximity of CSTO to the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, its policy was destined far away from this region, even to compare 
to its geopolitical enemy, NATO. Unsurprisingly, in his last press conference, the Chief of the 
CSTO Joint Staff, Anatoly Sidorov has underpinned that Nagorno-Karabakh is not a Collective 
Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member, and therefore the organization will not provide 
military assistance to Khankendi. He has also noted that a CSTO agreement was signed and 
updated with Armenia, and, correspondingly, the CSTO has certain commitments to Yerevan. In 
addition, Anatoly Sidorov stressed that the CSTO does not have the authority to intervene in a 
conflict without a respective request by the organization’s member country which a party to this 
conflict.178 The main geopolitical challenge arose from CSTO's non-remembrance and a 
reluctance on its solidarity with OSCE MG principles on territorial integrity and UN principles 
on non-intervention of other state's internal affairs. 
As a last one-sided actor, with the face of a weighty international organization, the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference (later became the Organization for Islamic Cooperation) 
(hereinafter OIC) has played a role of diplomatic custodian of the Republic of Azerbaijan around 
the tables of an international community. In comparison with Azerbaijan, Armenia has lacked 
this sort of spiritual support, if Armenian lobby abroad has not been considered as a prototype of 
OIC. According to the last reports of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Azerbaijani Republic, 
the OIC was the first organization which has admitted the fact of aggression of Armenia against 
Azerbaijan. Summits of the organization always held a problem of Nagorno-Karabakh in the 
center of attention and adopted quite accurate statements demanding respect for rules of 
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international law. The first resolution on Armenian-Azerbaijani, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 
has been adopted at the 21st conference of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the organization 
which has taken place in Karachi (Pakistan) in 25 - 29 April 1993. It has resolutely announced 
attacks of Armenia on Azerbaijan and occupations of its territories. In the document scales and 
gravity of the humanitarian problems caused by the aggression of Armenia against the 
Azerbaijani Republic which created the threat to the international peace and safety have been 
stated and demanded an immediate withdrawal of armed forces of Armenia from all occupied 
Azerbaijani territories. Moreover, the resolution urged Armenia to respect territorial integrity and 
sovereignty of the Azerbaijani Republic. This document also contained an appeal to that forcibly 
displaced persons could return to the houses for safety, respect, an advantage and also asked 
member states, the Islamic Development Bank and other Islamic institutions to render urgent 
financial and humanitarian aid to the Republic of Azerbaijan.179 The organization also asked the 
UN Secretary-General and the president of the Security Council to use all efforts for the adoption 
of the resolution condemning aggression of Armenia and demanding an immediate withdrawal 
of the Armenian military formations from all occupied territories of Azerbaijan. In addition to 
this, two more OIC resolutions condemning the Armenian aggression were adopted in turn, 
wherein the first was adopted in December 1994 at the next, the Seventh Islamic Summit held in 
Casablanca, the Kingdom of Morocco180, and the second in 1997 in Jakarta (Indonesia) at the 
next conference OIC Foreign Ministers.181 If the first two resolutions were similar in their 
endogenous and exogenous interpretations, then the political outcome of the latter was more 
significant and had a rather specific character. Firstly, the name of the resolution was correctly 
chosen: "On the aggression of the Republic of Armenia against the Republic of Azerbaijan". 
This time, the document expressed concern about the seriousness of humanitarian problems 
regarding the existence of one million people who were forcibly deported and refugees in the 
territory of Azerbaijan and asked the international community to give urgent financial assistance 
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to resolve this problem.182 Also, the latest resolutions were wielding more spiritual character 
especially such as Resolution № 3/43-C183 on Protection of Islamic Holy Places Destruction and 
Desecration of Islamic Historical and Cultural Relics and Shrines in the occupied Azerbaijani 
territories. It must be underscored that a spiritual support would not be effective without 
economic and political ones, and despite one fact that there has also been adopted such 
resolutions as Resolution № 6/37-E184 and № Resolution 10/37-POL185 which reaffirmed the 
position of the OIC members states stated also in the previous Resolution 10/11186 for Economic 
and Political Assistance to the Republic of Azerbaijan, in reality, there was no plausible material 
support and its positive results.  
To conclude, it must be understood that all of these external actors from the international 
arena have still been bringing one's logic, goals, and competitive policies to the Nagorno-
Karabakh region and to a bleeding local conflict on it. The role of these organizations in the 
collateral emergence of the new hybrid warfare factors still seems to be untraceable, and possible 
revelation is not excluded from our thesis.   
 
2.2. The 2016 "April war" as an igniter of the new factors of hybrid warfare 
 
To propel our analysis of no war, no peace period, it is inevitable to reveal the most 
violent post-war actions taken within 2016 four-day "April War". The severe skirmish has begun 
on the night of April 2, then turned into protracted fighting and has officially ended on April 5, 
with the achievement of the arrangement on truce during the meeting of chiefs of the General 
Staff of Armenia and Azerbaijan in Moscow. Despite it, collisions and shelling continued on an 
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extent of almost all April 2016, therefore, another name of the conflict — "April war" is a little 
more proper.187 We once again will sum up the results of this escalation of the Azerbaijani-
Armenian conflict which was the most bloody from coming into force of the agreement on 
termless armistice on May 12, 1994. Initially, both sides were condemning one another on 
inception of shelling with heavy artillery, but reality was being interpreted by western, local and 
Russian news agencies and think-tanks in various and opposing trajectories. According to the 
Azerbaijani news agencies and the statements of the official representatives of the Ministry of 
Defence, the blitzkrig war was ended up with the liberation of strategically and tactically 
significant highes and surrounding villages of the occupied territories of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan.188   
The Minister of Defence of Azerbaijan Zakir Gasanov has stated that the army of 
Azerbaijan did not set as the purpose to wage full-scale war, and just had to respond to a problem 
of suppression of weapon emplacements of the Armenians shooting the peaceful Azerbaijani 
population.  Further, the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan has declared the liberation of several 
strategic heights in Karabakh, including the villages of Seysulan, heights around the village 
Talysh and also the height of Leletepa on the direction to the Fizuli district of Azerbaijan. 
According to the statement of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan, heights around the village 
Talysh could create a danger to Geranboy district of the country and city of Naftalan, and the bar 
to Leletepa has been cleared for the safety of the city of Goradiz.189 Immediately, the Armenian 
news agencies has initiated a process of fake and partly-true news dissemination over the digital 
space of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict in order to keep emerging fear of Armenian population far 
away from closer districts and to control full propagandistic engagement of Armenian lobby 
abroad. For instance, the notorious Armenian news agency ARMENPRESS was differing with 
its highest presence on Armenian digital propaganda and dissemination of fake news. Pursuant to 
its operations-related news on the situation around Seysulan village, the official representatives 
of Azeri Ministry of Defence are permanently issuing fake news on liberation of Seysulan, but in 
Armenian reality it still remained Armenian land, "as it used to be before". The ARMENPRESS 
has represented a statement of the Defense Army of the self-declared Nagorno-Karabakh 
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Republic, with peculiar footage that has allegedly shown the killed Azerbaijanis in red circles 
who have allegedly occupied Seysulan.190 Later the reporters of pro-Armenian France Presse 
agency who have visited a front zone have confirmed the fact of the liberation of Leletepe Hill 
but ill-treated it as Azeri occupation.  Nonetheless, there have been issued such contradicting 
news as the German Reuters agency reported the seizure of the village of Talish by the 
Azerbaijani armed forces, and subsequent retaliation by the soldiers of the self-declared Republic 
of Nagorno-Karabakh.191 
Generally speaking, the "April war" has played very crucial role as a projectile of the new 
hybrid warfare factors, because of upsurging strategical and tactical-operational levels of 
hybridity. As a result of the mixed co-existence of the new factors of hybrid warfare, the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict has roped with certain templates. Not productive activity of 
international mediators and diplomatic stagnation slowly, but it was expected, have flowed in the 
beginning of war. The present Azerbaijani government has been called upon to accept a new 
strategic step for discharge attention of its population from internal political-economic and social 
crisis which main cause was the lack of democracies, secured space for building of the new 
peaceful relations with Armenia that could be a quite innovative approach in solutions of an 
economic crisis of both countries and a failure of the international mediation which was fraught 
with a lack of international peace treaty. These negative components of April war became a face 
of constantly upgrading new factors of hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh. Also after the 
"April War", the level of participation and the number of conflicting parties were summed up. It 
was completely clarified that the war is between Armenia, not the Armenians of Nagorno-
Karabakh, and Azerbaijan. Since the agreements on armistice between Azerbaijan (represented 
by N. Sadikhov) and Armenia (represented by Y. Khachaturov) in Moscow April 5, 2016, have a 
very strong diplomatic background, because there was no third party represented by the 
representatives of the "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic". It is also worth emphasizing still the 
importance of the new hybrid tactics realized in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as it played a 
role of new factors of hybrid warfare in an operational phase of the conflict. The Azerbaijani 
army has been equipped much better than it was possible to imagine. It was also clear that 
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Azerbaijan actively purchases the latest military equipment. But the last operations during the 
“April war”, have proved that a lot of things have been hidden from the public. The anti-tank 
complexes “Spike” and the reconnaissance-percussion Israeli-made Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
(hereinafter UAV) “Harop” in an arsenal of the Azerbaijani army became a surprise for all.192 
According to the last report of an outstanding Russian news agency “RIA NOVOSTI”, 
during fights on the northern direction of the line of contact of forces of Azerbaijan and self-
declared NKR an unusual incident has occurred. The UAV of the Azerbaijani army has struck a 
blow to the bus in which the Armenian volunteers commuted. After this RIA Novosti have said 
that the head of the press service of the Ministry of Defence of Azerbaijan Vagif Dyargakhly, 
has expressed that the Azerbaijani side would not comment on the message of the Armenian 
media. "It is information of the Armenian media. It does not concern us. The armed forces of 
Azerbaijan monitor a situation along the line of contact in Karabakh. We control the territories 
freed the day before".193 According to this information, the possibility of tactical use of warring 
drones, for the first time in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is not disproved and became an 
obvious new factor of an operational phase of hybrid war in Nagorno-Karabakh. But it was not 
everything as the Armenian side has begun to counter-act by quite new tactical and operational 
methods for undermining psychological advantage of the opponent which were rather 
unsuccessful.  
Pursuant to the "Statement on the use of white phosphorus bomb by the armed forces of 
Armenia against civilians and civilian objects of Azerbaijan" issued by Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs of the Republic of Azerbaijan, Armenia has also wanted to show its ability to use 
irregular tactics filled with a high level of hybridity. In recent escalations and offensive actions 
starting from April 2, 2016, armed forces of Armenia among numerous instances of deliberate 
shelling on civilians and civilian objects of Azerbaijan with artillery and large-caliber weapons 
have also used shells containing chemicals such as white phosphorus. One of such projectiles 
was shelled on Askipara village of the Tartar region of Azerbaijan, coincidentally it missed its 
prime target and landed on the cultivated cotton field and was found as an unexploded ordinance 
by Azerbaijan National Agency for Mine Action (ANAMA) on May 10. If landed on the densely 
populated part of Askipara village, the projectile would have inflicted serious casualties and 
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injuries among the civilians.194 In response, Spokesman of the Defense Ministry of Armenia 
Artsrun Hovhannisyan said that the Azerbaijani allegations of white phosphorus usage by 
Armenian Forces are “ill-mannered delusions”. “A few words regarding the white phosphorus: 
Azerbaijan is in an ill-mannered delusion. But we understand this type of behavior. The saying is 
correct: “Fear has big eyes. They see even what is not present” (У страха глаза велики: чего 
нет, и то видят)”, Hovhannisyan wrote via Facebook.195 
To end up, we might argue that main reasons of burning new hybrid warfare factors 
within conflict could be shaky economic situations in, both, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and also 
the emergence of a possibility of Azerbaijan to deal with Russia in order to get green light to the 
commencement of full-scale war en route liberation of occupied territories. But, this kind of 
academic prognosis still needs to be reaffirmed by periodic repetition of aforementioned 
casualties which are not far away from conflict's contemporary battlespaces. 
 
2.3. Convoluted hybrid warfare factors within alternative conflict models for 
peaceful resolution 
 
In addition to the aforementioned principles of peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, the international community has put forward completely innovative methods 
for resolving intercommunal and ethnic strife based on a comparative analysis of appropriate 
regional conflicts. Some of them were put into the heart of very prolific, comparative research 
completed by Ali Abasov and Haroutiun Khachatrian on various variants of the settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Nevertheless, it has to be admitted that within this sort of 
comparative analysis there were detected a systematic merge amidst old and new factors of 
hybrid warfare in Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The main outcome was dealt with prolongated 
Armenian policy on de jure non-recognition of self-declared NKR. The main reason was tied 
with unremitting Armenian appetite to keep itself in a closest geopolitical position to this region 
and uprising fear to leave NKR alone within international mediation that would cut it from 
Armenia and to lose its reputation in the eyes of local Armenians who might be enticed by 
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growing economy of Azerbaijan, who are not living inside economic prosperity and have 
encountered with many social and financial aid problems from the government.196 Currently, this 
fear was ballooned by the decision of Trump's administration to cut financial aid to Armenia 
from the state budget. The US budget issued on May 2018 would show a decisive 70 percent cut 
in aid to Armenia over the fiscal year 2017 budget, which allocated $22.4 million in assistance to 
Armenia. Trump’s budget would be calling for a $6.8 million aid package to Armenia.197 
“We are troubled by President Trump’s ill-advised and misguided proposal to sharply cut 
aid to Armenia. His budget recommendation underscores the need to work with Congressional 
appropriators to reverse these reductions while redoubling our efforts to empower Armenia’s 
aid-to-trade transition,” said Aram Hamparian, Executive Director of the Armenian National 
Committee of America.198 
Despite these facts, the historical background of alternative peaceful resolutions arisen 
from comparative analysis of similar conflict models was serving as a main pillar of this sort of 
Armenian ambivalent foreign policy toward self-declared NKR. For the first blush, there could 
be mentioned the idea of the so-called Cyprus variant that was emerged in discussions even 
within the 1990s how to settle the Karabakh conflict and its future status. Point of "the Cyprus 
model" consisted that this formation (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus) is officially 
recognized by Turkey only and exists and functions de facto. The Cyprian model in relation to 
Nagorno-Karabakh meant: not to recognize it de jure, but to agree with its existence de facto. It 
was meant that Nagorno-Karabakh would not be an integral part of the Azerbaijan Republic or 
the Republic of Armenia, would not be officially recognized as an independent state, would not 
be a member of the international community, but would exist and function as an independent 
state formation. In the begining of negotiations based on this model, the opinion of the Armenian 
side, the Cyprus model was a compromise one. It could allow the sides to reconcile themselves 
to the existing state of affairs without the humiliation of the national dignity of all sides involved 
in the conflict. It would facilitate tension, would provide a respite and would promote the future 
broader approach to a solution. On the other hand, it would contribute to the normalization of the 
relations between neighbors - Azerbaijan and Armenia. In a quite opposite response expressed 
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by the Azerbaijani side, such model violated its territorial integrity and sovereign management 
over it and nearly ten years work but hasn't met expectations.199 
The secondly proposed model was the “Chechen Variant”. In one and a half years of 
bloodshed in 1996, the Russian Federation and Chechnya have come to the agreement on the war 
termination, peace-making and a delay of determination of the status of Chechnya within five 
years. Such is there was an essence of the Chechen option, some kind of "mechanism of the 
delayed determination of the political status". Beyond the Russian-Chechen agreement, various 
state advisers in the Russian Federation, Armenia and the administration of the self-declared 
NKR have started to speak about a probability of application of this model relating to the 
Karabakh problem. It was thought that if the question of status would be delayed, for instance for 
a five year period, within this timeframe a new generation of politicians could emerge, there 
would be more clarity in the geopolitical situation in the South Caucasus as well as in the 
economy. Perhaps, parties to the conflict would refuse too categorical accent in negotiations. 
Thus, there could be an opportunity to move a problem from the deadlock. At least, "the 
Chechen model" was based on three basic principles which have resulted from the Russian-
Chechen war: 
a) ensuring the maximum safety for Karabakh and inhabitants of adjacent territories of 
the Republic of Armenia and the Azerbaijan Republic; 
b) establishment of a transition period at least for five years during which the delay of 
determination of the political status of Nagorno-Karabakh would be postponed. Therefore, it 
would create a reprieve and more favorable political, geopolitical and economic conditions for 
the settlement of the Karabakh problem; 
c) during this period there would be a new generation of politicians, free from a burden of 
the previous period and mutual hostility, and this generation would act in the new atmosphere 
and in new conditions; 
In fact, one variation of the “Chechen variant” was the Dayton Peace Accord (1996) 
according to which the Serb population of Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted “a delayed 
right” of self-determination after nine years. The leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh (hereinafter 
NK) immediately gave a positive estimation to the possibilities of the “Chechen variant”. 
Aftermath, that-times president of unrecognized NKR, Robert Kocharian, stated on February 27, 
1997, in Stepanakert that the “variant of the resolution of the Karabakh problem in analogy with 
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the Chechen problem is quite acceptable for Karabakh”. He said that as far back as two years 
ago, the NK leadership suggested departing from the principles of territorial integrity and self-
determination, but that suggestion was rejected by the leadership of Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan, in 
turn, thought that the “Chechen variant” was incompatible with the situation in NK. There is no 
one for Chechnya to integrate with, while NK has already widely integrated with the Republic of 
Armenia and, in another five years, would simply complete this process. Meanwhile, the 
development of the political situation in Chechnya led to the oblivion of the Khasavyurt 
agreements, which, however, did not rule out the importance of studying the “Chechen variant” 
as it is.200 The de facto recognition of NKR by the state of Armenia was another hybrid strategy 
to maneuver amidst further de jure recognition and non-recognition, for paving the chiseled 
ground of image-making game within offered peaceful principles and alternative conflict 
resolutions. 
The third, probably the most idealistic model was called as the “Andorra variant” laid on 
the principle of a condominium. After the Key West meeting, Armenian and Azeri mass media 
wrote about an allegedly proposed variant of “Andorra status” (condominium) envisaging the 
participation of “plenipotentiary representatives” of Azerbaijan and Armenia in the government 
structures of NK and other “attributes” (including the establishment of some kind of international 
control over the “corridors”).201 The matter was likely to have concerned a mere touchstone to 
gauge the political opinions in Azerbaijan, NK, and Armenia. In reality, the OSCE MG co-
chairmen could hardly have intended to consider the plan themselves, let alone propose it to the 
conflicting sides. The thing was that any “Andorrised” variant of a settlement, logically, had to 
be based on the denial of the right of “new Andorrans” to maintain their own armed forces. As it 
became clear from the public statements of the OSCE Minsk Group co-chairmen in Khankendi 
(Stepanakert) and Yerevan, and especially by N. Gribkov and P. de Suremain, the international 
community was inclined to understand that NK long ago turned into a “big independent factor” 
of Transcaucasian politics. It was likely to mean that the OSCE MG Co-chairmen were inclined 
to distinguish the separate role of NK’s armed forces in this factor. And in the case of 
“Andorrisation” of NK or even one single similar attempt, the U.S., Russia, and France would 
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face the task beyond their strength of fully and unconditionally disarming the NK defense army 
and demilitarizing the territories of not only NK but also of the lands adjacent to it both in 
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Meanwhile, in Azerbaijan, the co-chairmen pronounced quite different 
statements, acknowledging that negotiations were conducted exclusively between the Azerbaijan 
Republic and the Republic of Armenia and that their framework could be broadened after first 
successes were achieved.202 
Despite already proposed, but ineffective comparative models of peaceful resolution of 
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, there were some not popularized, but quite interesting variants 
of settlement as the “Dayton schemes”  and "The Dartmouth initiative". The first one was purely 
based on the inability of Azerbaijan and Armenia to find an acceptable solution to the territorial 
dispute which created an urgent need to find an internationally accepted system of coercive 
measures that would be directed at the elimination of conflicts which threaten the existence of 
whole regions and were capable of causing full-scale international crises. The deep roots of a 
pending coercive international response were dealt with such an already revealed and newly-
popularized hybrid warfare's factor as image-making games playing in front of international 
community  and leading global powers. According to the basic principles of the "Dayton 
schemes", one possible way to settle the conflict could be achieved with the aid of external 
coercion by the world superpowers, which can be conventionally called the “Dayton 
Principle”.203 In comparison with previous ones, the Dartmouth initiative was moreorless far 
away from the threat arisen from those contagious factors of hybrid warfare and dated back to 
1960 as a place of a meeting of citizens of the USSR and the USA on the improvement of mutual 
understanding between the two countries. In 1982, this forum created a working group of the 
Dartmouth conference on regional conflicts. In October 2001, the working group of the 
Dartmouth conference on regional conflicts organized a dialogue on Nagorno Karabakh led by 
the co-chairmen of the Dartmouth conference - Harold Saunders (the USA, ex-Undersecretary of 
State) and Vitali Naumkin (Russia). On June 24-26, 2005, the eighth round of dialogue of 
representatives of the public of Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Nagorno Karabakh took place in 
Moscow within the framework of this dialogue. During this round, a draft framework agreement 
on the peace process in the region of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh, proposed by 
                                                          
202 The title of the book - "Karabakh Conflict, Variants of settlement: Concepts and reality" written by Ali Abbasov 
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the co-chairmen of the Dartmouth conference, as well as a joint press release, were discussed and 
coordinated.  The basic idea of “the Dartmouth variant” was the initiation of an all-around peace 
process, as a process of “continuous interaction at all public levels and in many spheres of social, 
political and economic life which would be accompanied by the general provisions of the draft 
framework agreement. Another important feature of the offered scheme was that it was proposed 
to negotiate in two stages:  
a) the first phase of negotiations should be concluded by intermediate steps which were 
confidence-building measures implying equivalent concessions of the parties in coordinated 
spheres;  
b) the second, these measures should demonstrate the achievement of progress on the 
way to peace and create prerequisites for the resolution of final questions. At this stage of 
intermediate steps, it would be necessary to exclude questions concerning the final agreement;204 
Today, there are too many variants of settlement emerged in the result of comparative 
analysis and researches by local think-tanks suiting to Armenian interests, and, probably, the 
most interesting one from all of them is "Land for peace" variant that sought to be compared 
with the Arab-Israeli conflict, introduced then harshly criticized by Lynette Hacopian, who is a 
Resident Fellow of prominent Armenian think-tank "Regional Studies Center" in the South 
Caucasus. In the seventh article of “RSC Guest Analysis” publication series, entitled “Land for 
Peace: A Comparative Analysis of the Cases of Israel and Nagorno-Karabakh,” she has offered 
an innovative comparative assessment of the concept of “land for peace” in the cases of Israel 
and Nagorno-Karabakh. Hacopian argued that “of the many aspects of the complex Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict, the core issues of self-determination and territorial integrity have presented a 
challenging clash or even contradiction of key principles of international law. Within the 
framework of diplomacy and mediation, there is also a related issue of the need for concession 
and compromise, largely defined by the surrender of Armenian-held, or ‘occupied,’ territories of 
Azerbaijan proper beyond the borders of Nagorno-Karabakh, in exchange for the self-
determination of Karabakh through a referendum on final status.” She further stated that “while 
this issue of ‘land for peace’ continues to be a highly charged and daunting aspect of the 
Karabakh peace process, there were interesting and pertinent lessons learned from other cases of 
the concept of land for peace, namely in the case of the Arab-Israeli conflict, or more precisely, 
regarding the issue of Palestinian statehood in exchange for peace with Israel. She sought to 
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present specific lessons learned from the Israeli case and to demonstrate the comparative 
relevance to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.” In this point, there has been detected another 
Armenian fear of losing occupied land for peace, its negative approach and collateral hybrid 
strategy on absolute and de jure independence of NKR, again has proven the ineludible co-
existence of hybridity. She concluded her analysis by contending that “due to Azerbaijan’s 
behavior and maximalist policy towards Armenia, a giveaway of the occupied territories, 
comprised of seven districts, to Azerbaijan would prove detrimental to the peace process and will 
put Armenia at a geographical disadvantage.”205 
In comparison with Armenian logic of settlement, Azeri one has mostly relied on the 
international assistance as it was demonstrated within aforementioned "Dayton Principle". But 
we do consider that there must be an alternative and comparative Azeri approach as well that 
would suit its very-well backed principles of territorial integrity and sovereign rule within 
internationally recognized borders, where it would have no right to be drabble with transmissible 
and contagious factors of hybrid warfare. Azeri analysts always seek this models far away from 
its borders, in the insights of different, geographically farthest local conflicts, but the nearest and 
the most suitable model was right nearby and might be fetched even with passed internal 
conflicts of Russia with Chechnya (but categorically not previous "Chechen Variant") and the 
Dagestani Republic. Post-Soviet Russian Federation like the post-Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan 
was a multinational state with internationally recognized borders. After the collapse of Soviet 
Union, Russia as Azerbaijan also had to face the territorial claims of such national minorities as 
Chechens, Dags and etc. Passing through different war-time periods, they were successful to be 
ensured with wide autonomy within the internationally recognized borders of the Russian 
Federation committing to such basic principles of international law as the inviolability of 
territorial integrity and the right of national minorities for self-determination. As the Russian 
Federation or other internationally recognized independent states, the Republic of Azerbaijan has 
got the same rights for keeping up of its territorial integrity by being ready to defer highest 
autonomies to national minorities residing within one's national borders. Unfortunately, modern 
rules of international shade bureaucracy and double-standards chiefly encompassed by the 
insights of ad hoc interpretations of local conflicts and was getting immediately time-worn. 
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Conclusion 
 
During whole analysis of the conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh region of the Republic of 
Azerbaijan, we have got several malfunctions, but nevertheless, we have achieved our major 
goal within the full implementation of given task. Though the concept of hybrid warfare was 
fresh, using quite pragmatical methods of the scientific analysis, we managed to reveal old and 
new factors of hybrid warfare in the current Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The historical 
component of the conflict has been subjected to periodic changes and the sharp academic 
criticism based on the comparative and systematic analysis of the facts. The concept of hybrid 
warfare has been interpreted in a special academic framework covering the nature and distinctive 
features of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Through primary academic analysis of factors of 
hybrid warfare which are the main stumbling block in a way of peaceful settlement of the 
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the relevance of our subject has been emphasized.  
The last and probably the most viable attention of an international community within the 
legal documentation of international responses and demands over conflicting sides of Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict was United Nations General Assembly Resolution № A/RES/62/243, adopted 
on 14 March 2008. This document has again reaffirmed continued respect and support for the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Azerbaijan within its internationally 
recognized borders. It has, again and again, demanded the immediate, complete and 
unconditional withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all the occupied territories of the Republic 
of Azerbaijan, reaffirmed the inalienable right of the population expelled from the occupied 
territories of the Republic of Azerbaijan to return to their homes, and stresses the necessity of 
creating appropriate conditions for this return, including the comprehensive rehabilitation of the 
conflict-affected territories, recognized the necessity of providing normal, secure and equal 
conditions of life for Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of 
the Republic of Azerbaijan, which would allow an effective democratic system of self-
governance to be built up in this region within the Republic of Azerbaijan, and reaffirmed that no 
State shall recognize as lawful the situation resulting from the occupation of the territories of the 
Republic of Azerbaijan, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining this situation. Within the 
necessary call for the implementation of aforementioned provisions, it has also expressed its 
support to the international mediation efforts, in particular, those of the Co-Chairmen of the 
Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, aimed at peaceful 
settlement of the conflict in accordance with the norms and principles of international law, and 
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recognizes the necessity of intensifying these efforts with a view to achieving a lasting and 
durable peace in compliance with the provisions stipulated above, called upon Member States 
and international and regional organizations and arrangements to effectively contribute, within 
their competence, to the process of settlement of the conflict, and requested the Secretary-
General to submit to the General Assembly at its sixty-third session a comprehensive report on 
the implementation of the present resolution. There has also been decided to include in the 
provisional agenda of its sixty-third session the item entitled “The situation in the occupied 
territories of Azerbaijan”.206  
The resolution has been adopted soon after the happened collisions near the occupied city 
of Agdere (Mardakert) in the Nagorno-Karabakh region which have turned into a hot skirmish 
on March 4, 2008, between armed forces of Azerbaijan and Armenia of the protecting NKR near 
the village of Levonarkh controlled by the army of the self-proclaimed NKR.207 These actions 
were considered as the largest collision since the ceasefire in 1994 too, but in the military and 
operational scale were small and more moderate in comparison with April four-day war of 2016. 
For adoption of the resolution have voted 39 countries, among which there were such, 
geographically and geopolitically close to Nagorno-Karabakh region, countries as Afghanistan, 
Georgia, Turkey, Moldova, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, etc. Armenia, of course, was against adoption 
of this resolution, but the United States, Russian Federation and France, the same co-chairmen of 
the Minsk Group of OSCE, and the three of the permanent states of the UN Security Council, in 
advance adopted, nearly dozen of the resolutions not different from basic requirements of the 
current resolution were the most shocking countries which have voted against. To the strange 
backgrounds in this situation, the reason expressed by the representative of the USA who has 
supported almost other two co-chairmen of the Minsk Group of OSCE as well, against adoption 
of this resolution which, according to him, had unilateral character. However, he has specified 
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https://www.un.org/press/en/2006/ga10487.doc.htm // The title of the primary source - "Resolution № 62/243: on 
the situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan ", adopted by the General Assembly on 14 March 2008 // 86th 
plenary meeting of UN General Assembly // URL: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/62/243 // It was also recalling Security Council 
resolutions 822 (1993) of 30 April 1993, 853 (1993) of 29 July 1993, 874 (1993) of 14 October 1993 and 884 (1993) 
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that despite the negative vote onto this document, the co-chairmen maintain territorial integrity 
of Azerbaijan and do not recognize the independence of self-declared NKR.208  
According to an interview with the British politician Lord Howell Gildford, his country 
have refrained from vote as in the resolution, according to him, "the Madrid principles and the 
process of the Minsk group of OSCE were not considered.209  
As we see, the image-making game of conflicting sides entailed with high degree of 
negligence of international mediation and the use of conflict for the next distraction from internal 
problems, being two of those hybrid warfare factors, have been turned into diplomatic collision 
and conceptual contradictions over the peaceful resolution of the conflict in the last Resolution 
№ 62/243 of UN General Assembly in 2008. We do agree that the acceleration process within 
the sporadic dissemination of hybrid warfare factors, has begun aftermath of these events. It led 
to another hugest casualty that was occurred within "Four-day war" from the April, 1 to the 
April, 5.  
All these events have afresh endorsed the role of those hybrid warfare factors as a basic 
hindrance en route achieving of the real peaceful resolution based on mutual trust and respect of 
nations. Through initial thematic analysis of relevant primary sources and systematic modeling 
of the conflict itself, we have observed and academically proven that hypotheses of our thesis 
interrogated by the research questions on the significance of this region and the existence of 
obstacles in the face of relieved hybrid warfare factors were successfully done and responded.  
In the end, it has to be accentuated that for the eschewing from the future speediest 
dissemination of different sorts of new hybrid warfare factors or possible rebirth of old ones, it is 
quite mandatory to maximally oblige the conflicting sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to 
sign an international peace treaty and even put economic sanctions on either side, for non-
implementation of already achieved basic principles of territorial integrity and the right for the 
highest self-governance within internationally recognized borders, relied on insuperable volition 
of leading international mediation, which even might be reconstructed for the sake of real peace 
and prosperity. Unfortunately, unless there is a mandatory internationally recognized peace 
treaty, the solution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict would be almost impossible.  
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